Opinion
No. 35860
Decided May 27, 1959.
Workmen's compensation — Claim death from pre-existing cause and accelerated by accidental injury — Acceleration by substantial period of time — Causal relation between injury and death.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County.
This is an action to recover death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Decedent was employed as a craneman in the plant of appellant, a self-insurer, at the time of his death.
For a period of approximately eight months before his death, decedent had been suffering from hypertension and coronary heart disease, the latter being evidenced, during the last three months, by pain in his left arm and scapula, shortness of breath and periodic "blacking out." On the morning of the day of his death, he complained of pain in his left arm but reported for work. While in the cab of the crane on that day and performing his duties as a craneman, while the crane was parked, he suffered pain in his left shoulder, blacked out and apparently, in doing so, bumped the controls with his head, causing the crane to proceed down the track until it hit the bumper or crane stop at the end of the shop. When fellow employees came to the cab they found decedent sitting on the stool therein. He had a slight abrasion on the bridge of his nose and left cheek. He was assisted to the ground and taken to the plant hospital where it was observed that his temperature was normal, pulse 80 and color good, and he stated that he felt pretty good. He was put to bed and medication was given as directed by his family physician. About one hour later he died of coronary thrombosis.
The claimant, widow of decedent, filed a claim for death benefits with the Industrial Commission. The claim was disallowed for the reason that proof of record does not establish that decedent's death was the result of an injury received in the course of and arising out of employment.
An appeal to the Court of Common Pleas resulted in a verdict for the claimant, on which judgment was rendered.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court.
The allowance of a motion to certify the record brings the cause to this court for review.
Messrs. Kalafut Tablack, for appellee.
Messrs. Manchester, Bennett, Powers Ullman and Mr. Paul J. Fleming, for appellant.
It is admitted that decedent died of coronary thrombosis, that the heart attack began while decedent was in the crane cab, and that such attack was not caused by anything arising out of his employment. Claimant's contention is that the jarring and shaking of decedent's body, caused by the crane's impact with the bumper or crane stop while decedent was "blacked out," was a sudden mishap or accidental occurrence, and that decedent's pre-existing heart condition was aggravated and death accelerated by such sudden mishap.
A physician called as an expert witness, in answer to a hypothetical question, stated that in his opinion decedent's heart attack began while he was in the crane cab and continued uninterrupted until his death an hour later, and that the jolting or shaking was enough to cause an acceleration of death. However, the physician did not state that the jolting or shaking was substantial or by what period of time death was accelerated. Two other expert witnesses testified that in their opinion there was no direct causal relationship between the injury decedent suffered in the cab and the death, and, in answer to a question whether, assuming decedent fell to the floor of the cab, "would that in your opinion be an accelerating factor in this case, would it aggravate the existing attack which began in the cab," one expert witness replied that, "if it did, the possibility is very slight," and that the trauma had no effect whatsoever on decedent's death.
In order to recover, claimant must establish that the death of her husband was accelerated by a substantial period of time as a direct and proximate result of the accidental injury. In support of her claim, claimant has not produced sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of the case to a jury.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and final judgment rendered for appellant on authority of McKee v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 168 Ohio St. 77, 151 N.E.2d 540, and Senvisky v. Truscon Steel Division of Republic Steel Corp., 168 Ohio St. 523, 156 N.E.2d 724.
Judgment reversed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., ZIMMERMAN, MATTHIAS and HERBERT, JJ., concur.
TAFT, BELL and PECK, JJ., dissent.