Opinion
5:23-CV-109-FL
05-08-2023
MELANIE B. MEEKS, Plaintiff, v. NC ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Robert B. Jones, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE-2], and for frivolity review of the complaint, [DE-1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id.; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
IL FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges as follows in her complaint. [DE-1], She states that she has suffered “discrimination of my color.” Id. at 2. She is an African-American of “fair complexion,” and the supervisor and regional supervisor are both “darker complexion African-Americans.” Id. A Korean-American co-worker was also treated poorly due to his color. Id. Plaintiff alleges that she asked for the same treatment as her white co-workers, but was denied such. Id. She states that “I went to my supervisor to resolve all matters I had complaints about and never got a resolution,” then “I went to the Regional Supervisor and nothing was resolved,” and, ultimately, “I went to the HR department and filed a formal complaint.” Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff participated in a mediation, and she was not given a resolution that dealt with “the bullying, retaliation, [and] alienation.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff later states in the “relief' section of her complaint that she was never given “family leave” or was denied leave, and further states that she was never given a reason why she was asked to resign or be fired. Id.
Plaintiff seeks $750,000, [DE-1-4] at 1, in relief “for pain and suffering, loss of income, state job salary compensation, and years lost for retirement with state job security and all health insurance benefits,” “including years of service compensation given yearly for 10 plus years.” [DE-1] at 3.
Plaintiff attached to her complaint a charge filed with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), [DE-1-1], as well as what appear to be two sets of notes regarding a mediation, [DE-1-2], and a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC issued on December 7, 2022, [DE-1-3], In the section of Plaintiffs charge where she is asked “why you think you were discriminated against,” Plaintiff indicated “retaliation” and “other” and wrote “son[']s medical condition.” [DE-1-1], Plaintiff did not indicate either race or color as a basis for discrimination in her charge. Id. Plaintiff described that she was denied “sick time” for a doctor's appointment on March 23, 2022, and she was asked to meet with a supervisor when she was sick and out from work on April 21, 2022. Id. She stated she filed a formal complaint with human resources on April 28, 2022, and participated in mediation on April 7, 2022. Id. She alleged that in the mediation her supervisor “lied on me [sic] about a contact for a family in that meeting it was not me but a volunteer that didn't make contact.” Id.
Plaintiff attached what appear to be two sets of almost identical notes regarding an April 7, 2022 mediation. [DE-1-2], Plaintiff stated that she was given directives from co-workers without follow-up from the DA, which made achieving tasks complicated because she was not sure if the directive was actually from the DA. Id. at 1. Plaintiff stated that a co-worker assigned Plaintiff cases and no one told Plaintiff that those cases were assigned to her until it was time for court. Id. Plaintiff also stated that her co-worker assigned her volunteers cases without consulting Plaintiff about her cases. Id.
Plaintiff further stated in her notes that she experienced discrimination, alienation, and bullying. Id. Regarding discrimination, Plaintiff stated that she was not notified that a training was running late. Id. She was told that it was her responsibility to ensure reports were completed even if volunteers did not turn in reports, and Plaintiff's fellow co-workers were not told this. Id. Plaintiff stated that she requested to work from home, but “it is frowned upon,” while a co-worker worked remotely for two weeks out of the state and often did so. Id.
Regarding bullying, Plaintiff stated that the DA yelled at her for not assigning cases to her volunteers, and Plaintiff requested a “staffing” to improve communication, but none occurred with the DA. Id. Plaintiff further stated that after having lunch with a fellow employee, she received an email stating that if she wanted to have lunch with a friend she should do so away from the building. Id. at 2. Plaintiff wrote that she had been told on several occasions by a co-worker that Plaintiff looked like she would punch them in the face, but Plaintiff stated she had never said anything harmful or negative to that person. Id. Plaintiff also wrote that she received a text message during a training that inferred Plaintiff was being rude to a volunteer, but the volunteer was having technical difficulties at the beginning of the training. Id. Plaintiff stated that she was denied sick leave, that the DA called to explain why her sick leave was denied, and that Plaintiff was asked to resend her sick leave request but it was never approved. Id. Plaintiff wrote that she called-in sick on a different day, but worked while she was sick because Plaintiff was asked “how will the reports get filed,” and Plaintiff was told not filing her reports was “insubordinate.” Id. Plaintiff also stated that she was accused of not showing up for a meeting at DSS and was yelled at for not being there, but she was in fact there and was waiting on a DSS employee to walk her through the building. Id. at 4.
Regarding alienation, Plaintiff stated that she was often not included in team events although she participated in office gift giving. Id. at 2. Plaintiff explained that she was not invited with everyone else to meet new staff at the Harnett County building, and she was informed she could not go. Id. Plaintiff stated she contributed $30 to the social worker appreciation gift, but was not invited to the gift giving event. Id. Plaintiff also wrote that she was not allowed to ask the intern for help. Id. at 4. Plaintiff finally stated she was not informed of changes around the office, and also that she asked for her case files that are locked in a file cabinet, but no one has the key, and those reports could not be completed on the “file day.” Id. at 2.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Title VII Race or Color Discrimination
Plaintiff states in her complaint that she experienced discrimination based on her “color.” [DE-1] at 2. Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharging] any individual, or otherwise . . . discimin[ating] against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(a). A plaintiff is required to exhaust her administrative remedies by bringing a charge with the EEOC before filing suit. See Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (f); 29 U.S.C. § 633a(d)). “The allegations contained in the administrative charge of discrimination generally operate to limit the scope of any subsequent judicial complaint.” Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing King v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976)). While the charge-filing requirement is not jurisdictional, i.e., it can be forfeited if not timely raised, the requirement is mandatory. See Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, __ U.S. __, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1849-51 (2019); Rios v. City of Raleigh, No. 5:19-CV-00532-M, 2020 WL 5603923, at *7 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 18, 2020). The court may consider affirmative defenses sua sponte when a litigant seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. See Eriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 953-54 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Here, Plaintiffs EEOC charge does not indicate she was discriminated against on the basis of either race or color. [DE-1-1], Only “retaliation” and “other” are indicated as why Plaintiff thought she was discriminated against, and Plaintiff indicated another basis of her “son[']s medical condition.” Id. Plaintiffs factual description on the charge mentions nothing regarding race or color. Id. As noted above, the charge description only states that Plaintiff was denied sick leave for a medical appointment, was asked to meet with a supervisor when out of work sick, and that Plaintiff filed a formal complaint and attended mediation, presumably regarding Plaintiffs sick leave. [DE-1-1].
Accordingly, any discrimination claim on the basis of race or color under Title VII should be dismissed for failure to exhaust. Gilliam v. Bertie Cnty. Bd. of Educ., No. 2:20-CV-00076-M, 2022 WL 11867136, at *2 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 20, 2022) (“A plaintiffs claims fails if her ‘administrative charges reference different time frames, actors, and discriminatory conduct than the central factual allegations in [her] formal suit.'”) (citing Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 506 (4th Cir. 2005)); see Hoffman v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 99 F.Supp.3d 631, 634 (W.D. N.C. 2015) (“Plaintiff did not check the boxes on the EEOC charge for discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, all of which are considered under a Title VII claim. Thus, Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies in regards to a Title VII claim for discrimination based on race, color, sex, religion, or national origin.”); Caldwell v. U.S. Foods, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-0234-RJC-DSC, 2016 WL 6803138, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 2, 2016) (recommending that claims for wrongful termination based upon race, sex and age in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 be dismissed because plaintiff did not check the boxes labeled “race,” “gender,” or “age” nor did he mention them in the “Particulars” section of the narrative), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 6780336 (W.D. N.C. Nov. 15,2016).
Alternatively, there are no allegations in the complaint that constitute direct evidence of race or color discrimination. “Absent direct evidence [of discrimination], the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII are: (1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” Coleman v. Md. Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 295 (4th Cir. 2004)), aff'd, 566 U.S. 30 (2012). “Although an employee need not prove a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, he must state a plausible right to relief.” Ofoche v. Apogee Med. Grp., Va., P.C., 815 Fed.Appx. 690, 692 (4th Cir. 2020) (citing Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 648 (4th Cir. 2017)). An adverse action is one that “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Hoyle v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 337 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). To state a plausible claim, the complaint must contain allegations from which the court could find that defendant took adverse employment action against plaintiff because of her race. See McCleary-Evans v. Maryland Dep 't of Transp., State Highway Admin., 780 F.3d 582, 585 (4th Cir. 2015). It is not enough to simply state that one was treated differently and is a member of a protected class. See Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 306 (4th Cir. 2022) (concluding the plaintiffs allegations-that but for her race defendant's wrongful conduct would not have occurred and plaintiff suffered harm due to defendant's racial discrimination-were insufficient to state a claim because there were no facts alleged to support a plausible inference that the defendant's actions were because of the plaintiffs race).
Here, Plaintiffs allegations, liberally construed, are insufficient state a claim for race or color discrimination under Title VII. First, Plaintiff has alleged she is a member of a protected class based on her race. [DE-1] at 2. Second, Plaintiff appears to generally allege she exhibited satisfactory job performance. [DE-1, -1-2]. Third, she mentions that she suffered adverse employment action, that she was asked to resign or be fired, though Plaintiff does not describe her termination in any detail. [DE-1 ] at 3. Fourth, Plaintiff generally states she was treated differently than white co-workers in her complaint. Id. at 2; [DE-1-2], However, Plaintiffs claim that she was discriminated on the basis of her race or color is speculative. Plaintiff does not plausibly connect her race or color to any of this treatment or her termination. Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts from which the court could find that defendant took adverse employment action against plaintiff because of her race, see McCleary-Evans, 780 F.3d at 585, and it is not enough to simply state that one was treated differently and is a member of a protected class, see Nadendla, 24 F.4th at 306. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for race discrimination under Title VII.
B. Title VII Retaliation
Within her EEOC charge, Plaintiff checks the box indicating “retaliation” as a basis for discrimination. [DE-1-1]. “A Title VII retaliation claim requires that a plaintiff allege that she ‘[1] engaged in protected activity, [2] that [her] employer took an adverse employment action against [her], and that [3] there was a causal link between those events.'” Neil v. Warren Cnty. Sch., No. 5:20-CV-595-FL, 2022 WL 4467671, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 26, 2022) (quoting Savage v. Maryland, 896 F.3d 260, 276 (4th Cir. 2018)). “Title VII protects not only complaints about ‘employment actions actually unlawful under Title VII but also employment actions [she] reasonably believes to be unlawful.'” Id. (quoting Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 282 (4th Cir. 2015)).
A plaintiffs filing of an EEOC charge can constitute a protected participation activity under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Gray v. Walmart Stores, Inc., No. 7:10-CV-171-BR, 2011 WL 1831780, at *7 (E.D. N.C. May 12, 2011) (citing Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 656 (4th Cir.1998)). An adverse action is one that “constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Hoyle, 650 F.3dat337.
First, Plaintiff indicates she engaged in one or more protected activities. She states that she filed a complaint with her employer, had a mediation, and filed the attached EEOC charge, in which she described her asking for time off for a doctor's appointment and her being asked to meet with a supervisor when on sick leave. See [DE-1] at 2-3; [DE-1-1]. Second, Plaintiff also indicates she experienced an adverse employment action, that she was asked to resign or be fired. [DE-1] at 3. Third, however, Plaintiff does not adequately connect these events. She does not appear to allege any causal link between her termination and her complaint or EEOC charge relating to sick leave. Plaintiffs formal complaint appears to allege “discrimination based on my color.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff states she was never informed why she was asked to resign or be fired, and Plaintiff does not appear to allege her termination occurred because o/her filing a complaint or EEOC charge. Id.', [DE-1-1]. She does not describe, for example, that she was threatened with termination for complaining about perceived unlawful employment practices, see Gates v. Waffle House Corp., No. 4:18-CV-00140-BO, 2019 WL 613555, at *6 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 9, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 615364 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 13, 2019), or that she complained about the employer's conduct and was terminated a short time later or contemporaneously, see Diede v. UNC Healthcare, No. 5:16-CV-00788-BR, 2017 WL 745731, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 20, 2017) (“Although not conclusive, temporal proximity between the protected activity and the adverse action often is sufficient for a ‘prima facie case of causality.'”) (citing Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 551 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Williams v. Cerberonics, Inc., 871 F.2d 452, 457 (4th Cir. 1989))), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 744559 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 24, 2017). Plaintiff does not describe the “how,” “when,” or “why” of her termination, and only appears to mention her termination on one occasion in the relief section of her complaint. [DE-1] at 3. Plaintiff only contends she complained and filed an EEOC charge, and at some unknown time was later terminated or asked to resign. Plaintiff specifies no other circumstances or details. Accordingly, any Title VII retaliation claim should be dismissed.
C. Family Medical Leave Act
Plaintiff indicates on her EEOC charge that she was discriminated against based on “other” and wrote her son's medical condition. As noted above, she also describes on the charge that she was denied sick leave for a doctor's appointment on March 23, 2022, and was asked to meet with a supervisor when Plaintiff was out of work sick on April 21,2022. [DE-1-1]. In the relief section of the formal complaint, Plaintiff also states that she was never given “family leave” or was denied such leave, but she provides no other supporting information. [DE-1] at 3. The court construes this as a possible claim under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).
The FMLA makes it “unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided under [the FMLA].” 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). To state a claim for interference with an FMLA benefit, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he is entitled to an FMLA benefit; (2) his employer interfered with the provision of that benefit; and (3) that interference caused harm.” Adams v. Anne Arundel Cnty. Pub. Sch., 789 F.3d 422, 427 (4th Cir. 2015). Benefits under the FMLA include “a total of 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . due to a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of [her] position,” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), and upon the employee's return from FMLA leave, “to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or to be restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and other terms and conditions of employment,” id. § 2614(a)(1). Benefits also include 12 workweeks of leave for health-related reasons, such as “birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or daughter” or “to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition.” Id. § 2612(a)(1).
The FMLA also “contains proscriptive provisions that protect employees from discrimination or retaliation for exercising their substantive rights under the FMLA.” Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 546 (citation omitted). “Known as ‘retaliation' or ‘discrimination' claims, causes of action alleging violations of these proscriptive rights arise under 29 U.S.C. A. § 2615(a)(2), which states that ‘ [i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.'” Id. “To succeed on a claim of retaliation, a plaintiff must show ‘that she engaged in protected activity, that the employer took adverse action against [her], and that the adverse action was causally connected to the plaintiffs protected activity.'” Wilson v. Nash Edgecombe Econ. Dev., Inc., No. 5:19-CV-322-FL, 2020 WL 5594538, at *17 (E.D. N.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (quoting Yashenko, 446 F.3d at 551).
Plaintiffs allegations regarding the FMLA do not meet the pleading standards. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relieff.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This is necessary “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,47 (1957)). At the pleading stage, “while a complaint. .. does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Id.
Plaintiff arguably alleges that she requested FMLA leave, according to her complaint, where she states later in the relief section, “[t]he last submission of Family Leave and [sic] never given the leave or even denied leave.” [DE-1] at 3. She then states, “I was never given a reason why I was asked to resign or be fired.” Id. Again, Plaintiffs EEOC charge only describes that she was discriminated against because of her son's medical condition, she was denied sick leave on March 23, 2022, and was asked to meet with a supervisor while she was out sick on April 21, 2022. [DE-1-1], Plaintiff provides no other supporting information regarding formally requesting FMLA leave for any of her or her son's medical issues or regarding her termination. Further, as discussed above regarding Title VII retaliation, Plaintiff likewise does not causally connect her termination with any requested FMLA leave. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state an FMLA claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiffs application to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED, and it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs claims against Defendant be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until Monday, May 22, 2023, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline may bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).