Opinion
NUMBER 13-14-00709-CR
02-04-2016
JUAN MEDINA, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 105th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Benavides
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
Following a bench trial, the trial court found appellant Juan Medina guilty of one count of aggravated assault on a public servant and two counts of assault on a public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.01, 22.02 (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). By two issues, which we address as one, Medina contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 13, 2013, Medina was arrested for assaulting two police officers, Edward Soliz and Gilbert Casas, after Medina physically resisted the officers' efforts to detain him. Thereafter, the State indicted Medina on one count of aggravated assault on a public servant, alleging that he caused serious bodily injury to Soliz by fighting with him, knowing that Soliz was a police officer, and that Soliz was lawfully discharging an official duty by detaining Medina (count 1). The State also indicted Medina on two counts of assault on a public servant, alleging that he caused bodily injury to Soliz by striking him with his elbow, and that he caused bodily injury to Casas by kicking him with his foot, knowing that both were police officers and that they were lawfully discharging an official duty by detaining Medina (counts 2 and 3).
The case was called for a bench trial. At trial, officer Soliz testified that he responded to a residential disturbance call and came upon an argument between Medina and his father, and that he attempted to come between the two to protect the father. When Soliz suggested that Medina go outside with him, Medina threatened that "if you touch me I'm going to kick your f—king ass." Soliz testified that he then grabbed Medina by the arm to escort him out of the house; however, Medina gripped onto the chair he was sitting in and threatened to bite Soliz. According to Soliz, Medina eventually freed his arm from the chair and a struggle ensued during which Medina hit Soliz several times in the abdomen with his elbow causing pain. Soliz further testified that during the struggle to subdue Medina, he heard a "pop" and then lost movement in his right arm. Officer Casas, who assisted Soliz during the melee, testified that Medina kicked him in the groin area with his foot and that it was painful. The evidence showed that the police officers eventually managed to subdue Medina until back-up officers arrived. After hearing all of the evidence, the trial court found Medina guilty on all three counts alleged in the State's indictment.
Casas testified that he attempted to tase Medina to end the struggle, but his taser gun did not work.
II. DISCUSSION
Medina contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove: (1) that Soliz and Casas suffered the requisite level of "injury" to support a finding of guilt as to counts 1, 2, and 3; and (2) that Soliz and Casas were lawfully discharging an official duty when they detained him.
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
We conduct our sufficiency review by applying the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 906 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Under this standard, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19. The trial court, as the fact finder in a bench trial, is the exclusive judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. See Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
A defendant is guilty of assault on a public servant if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to a person he knows to be a public servant who is lawfully discharging an official duty. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01 (b)(1). This assaultive offense becomes "aggravated" when the public servant suffers "serious bodily injury" as a result of the defendant's conduct. Id. at § 22.02(b)(2)(B).
B. Injury Element
a. Count 1: Aggravated Assault on a Public Servant
Concerning count 1, Medina argues that the State did not sufficiently prove that Soliz suffered "serious bodily injury" to his right arm to support his conviction for aggravated assault on a public servant. The penal code defines "serious bodily injury" in relevant part as bodily injury that causes "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." Id. at § 1.07(a)(46) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). To be considered "protracted," the loss or impairment need not be permanent, but it must be "continuing, dragged out, drawn out, elongated, extended, lengthened, lengthy, lingering, long, long-continued, long-drawn, never-ending, ongoing, prolix, prolonged, or unending." Moore v. State, 739 S.W.2d 347, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987). The relevant issue is the "impairing quality of the bodily injury as it was inflicted, not after the effects have been ameliorated or exacerbated by other actions such as medical treatment." Nash v. State, 123 S.W.3d 534, 539 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref'd) (quoting Brown v. State, 605 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980)).
Here, Officer Soliz testified that during the struggle to subdue Medina, he heard a "pop" and then lost movement in his right arm. Soliz further testified that he suffered "an ACL separation and some torn ligaments" and that he underwent surgery on his right shoulder to repair it, followed by fourteen weeks of physical therapy. Soliz also testified that at the time of trial, which took place almost a year after the injury occurred, he still had not completely regained strength and mobility in his shoulder and continued to suffer pain.
Soliz's physical therapist, Rea Strowbridge, testified on behalf of the State. She explained that she had been working with Soliz to get his range of motion and strength back, but that his strength was not coming back well. Strowbridge elaborated:
The strength is not going so well because he developed an impingement. That means that the shoulder hangs a little bit too far forward and it impinges the just-repaired tendon. And then often it results in a tendinitis.Strowbridge further testified that without surgery and physical therapy, Soliz would not be able to lift his shoulder to the side, and that he would still need another surgery in order to fully lift his shoulder up. Finally, Strowbridge characterized Soliz's injury as "serious bodily injury," based on her understanding of the legal definition and her opinion that it would be hard for Soliz to fully recover from the injury.
Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the State sufficiently proved the "serious bodily injury" element in count 1. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19. It showed that Soliz suffered a protracted loss or impairment of the function of his right arm as a result of Medina's conduct. See id.
Concerning count 1, Medina also asserts that Soliz's injury required "minor surgery, and it was more likely that [Soliz's] age and extended service as a policeman made an otherwise minor injury seem worse than it ever actually was." However, the penal code provides that a criminal defendant may not escape liability simply because a concurrent cause brought about the injury in question unless the concurrent cause was "clearly sufficient" to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly insufficient. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN § 6.04(a) (West, Westlaw 2015 through R.S.). Here, Soliz's age and service as a police officer were not alone clearly sufficient to produce his injury because the injury would not have occurred at all had Medina not physically resisted detention. --------
b. Counts 2 and 3: Assault on a Public Servant
Concerning counts 2 and 3, Medina contends that the State did not sufficiently prove that Soliz and Casas suffered "bodily injury" when he elbowed Soliz in the abdomen (count 2) and kicked Casas in the groin (count 3).
The penal code defines bodily injury as "physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(8). The court of criminal appeals has explained that "[t]his definition encompasses even relatively minor physical contact if it constitutes more than offensive touching [and that] [d]irect evidence that a victim suffered pain is sufficient to show bodily injury." Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (citing Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) and Lewis v. State, 530 S.W.2d 117, 118 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975)). "Any physical pain, however minor, will suffice to establish bodily injury." Garcia v. State, 367 S.W.3d 683, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
Here, Soliz and Casas both testified that they felt pain when Medina hit them with his elbow and foot, respectively. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 524. The trial judge, as the exclusive finder of fact and judge or witness credibility, was free to believe or not believe this testimony. See Jones, 944 S.W.2d at 647-48. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the State sufficiently proved the "bodily injury" element of assault on a public servant to support counts 2 and 3. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19.
C. Official Duty Element
Finally, Medina contends that the State did not sufficiently prove that Soliz and Casas "lawfully" discharged their duties as police officers because their conduct in detaining him was "excessive, heavy-handed[,] and without justification" and turned a "simple detention" into a "police brawl."
The court of criminal appeals has held that police officers lawfully discharge their official duties when they act within their capacity as peace officers. Mays v. State, 318 S.W.3d 368, 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). This determination depends upon the details of the officer-citizen encounter, such as whether the police officer was in uniform, on duty, and whether he was on regular patrol at the time of the assault. Hall v. State, 158 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Moreover, "a police officer is still acting within the lawful discharge of his official duties when he makes an unlawful arrest, so long as he is acting within his capacity as a peace officer. Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 388 (quoting Montoya v. State, 744 S.W.2d 15, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). "[T]he lawful discharge of official duties in this context means that the public servant is not criminally or tortiously abusing his office as a public servant by acts of, for example, official oppression or violations of the civil rights of a person in custody or the use of unlawful, unjustified force. Hall, 158 S.W.3d at 474-75 (internal quotations omitted).
Here, the evidence showed that Soliz and Casas were on duty and in police uniform when they responded to a domestic disturbance call concerning Medina and his father. In an effort to separate Medina and his father, Soliz initially asked Medina to follow him outside voluntarily, but Medina responded by stating, "if you touch me I'm going to kick your f—king ass." When Medina refused Soliz's verbal request to exit the house, Soliz grabbed Medina by the arm to escort him out. However, Medina refused to cooperate, which required Soliz and Casas to use additional force in order to subdue him. The evidence showed that the officers' use of force was not excessive, but instead appropriately commensurate with the amount of resistance put up by Medina who officers described as "very" and "extremely" strong. The evidence further showed that the officers' use of force involved only hand-to-hand contact with Medina in an effort to subdue him. Finally, even assuming without deciding that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to detain Medina, they were still acting within the lawful discharge of their official duties by responding to a reported domestic disturbance while on duty. See Mays, 318 S.W.3d at 388; Johnson v. State, 172 S.W.3d 6, 11 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, pet. ref'd) (holding that attempt by police officer responding to a domestic disturbance call to separate and restrain the parties to that disturbance amounted to a lawful exercise of a police duty).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the State sufficiently proved that Soliz and Casas acted in the lawful discharge of their official duties when they detained Medina. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 902 n.19. We therefore overrule Medina's first and second issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
/s/ Rogelio Valdez
ROGELIO VALDEZ
Chief Justice Do Not Publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b). Delivered and filed the 4th day of February, 2016.