Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-2539-CM
November 19, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter comes before the court on plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, Motion for Rule 52(b) Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Retrial on Denial of Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. 35). Also pending before the court are plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defense of Business Justification (Doc. 38) and plaintiff's Motion to Strike Defense of Statute of Frauds (Doc. 39). As set forth below, plaintiff's Motion for New Trial is denied. As a result, plaintiff's Motions to Strike are dismissed as moot.
I. Procedural Background
On November 12, 2002, plaintiff filed its amended complaint against defendants, alleging defendants violated the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Clayton Antitrust Act and the Hobbs Act. Plaintiff also alleged violations of the USA PATRIOT Act and made various state law claims. On March 27, 2003, defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiff's claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On June 16, 2003, this court entered an order granting defendants' motions to dismiss plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). On June 23, 2003, plaintiff filed its Motion for New Trial Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, Motion for Rule 52(b) Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Retrial on Denial of Preliminary Injunctive Relief
As an initial matter, the court notes that plaintiff's motion for a new trial under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 and for amendment of the judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(b) are inappropriate, because this matter did not come for hearing before a jury or before the court. However, because plaintiff filed its motion within 10 days after the entry of the court's June 16, 2003, Order dismissing plaintiff's claims, the court will treat plaintiff's motion as one for reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). See Hatfleld v. Bd. of County Comm'rs.for Converse County, 52 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 1995).
II. Standard for Motion to Reconsider
Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is committed to the court's discretion. Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996); Hancock v. City of Okla. City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1395 (10th Cir. 1988). In exercising that discretion, courts have recognized three major grounds justifying reconsideration: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. See Major v. Benton, 647 F.2d 110, 112 (10th Cir. 1981); Burnett v. W. Res., Inc., 929 F. Supp. 1349, 1360 (D. Kan. 1996); Marx v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 895, 897 (D. Kan. 1994). "Appropriate circumstances for a motion to reconsider are where the court has obviously misapprehended a party's position or the facts or the law, or the court has mistakenly decided issues outside of those the parties presented for determination. A party's failure to present its strongest case in the first instance does not entitle it to a second chance in the form of a motion to reconsider." Burnett, 929 F. Supp. at 1360 (citing Anderson v. United Auto Workers, 738 F. Supp. 441, 442 (D. Kan. 1990); Renfro v. City of Emporia, Kan., 732 F. Supp. 1116, 1117 (D. Kan. 1990)). Moreover, "[a] motion to reconsider is not a second chance for the losing party to make his strongest case or to dress up arguments that previously failed." Flake v. Hoskins, 55 F. Supp.2d 1196, 1203-04(0. Kan. 1999).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's Federal Claims
In its June 16, 2003, Order, this court dismissed plaintiff's federal claims pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Plaintiff has asked the court to reconsider that decision and alter or amend its order, but plaintiff has not satisfied any of the three grounds which might justify relief. In its June 16, 2003, Order, this court thoroughly analyzed each of plaintiff's claims, accepted as true all well-pleaded facts, and viewed all reasonable inferences from those facts in plaintiff's favor. See Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984) (explaining standard for dismissal of claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)). Even doing so, this court found plaintiff failed to state any claim for relief and properly dismissed plaintiff's claims brought under federal law.
In its motion for reconsideration, plaintiff first argues that there has been an intervening change in controlling law invalidating the court's cited authorities for antitrust pleading requirements. However, plaintiff cites no legal authority that was not already in existence at the time the court entered its June 16, 2003, Order dismissing plaintiff's claims, much less any authority that changes the court's analysis of its ruling. Plaintiff's argument is simply an attempt to revisit issues already addressed by the court. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on this ground fails.
Plaintiff next argues that the court erred in dismissing plaintiffs federal claims because the court made mistakes of both fact and law in analyzing plaintiff's claims, again claiming the court failed to recognize intervening change in authority. In support, plaintiff cites no new legal authority. Rather, plaintiff expresses its disagreement with the court's analysis of its claims and the applicable legal standards. Plaintiff also attaches exhibits to its motion for reconsideration that it calls "new evidence." Based on the dates of the documents attached to plaintiff's motion, they clearly were available to plaintiff at the time it responded to defendants' motions to dismiss and the court entered its June 16, 2003, Order. Plaintiff's failure to present its strongest case to the court in response to defendants' motions to dismiss does not justify reconsideration of the court's order. Moreover, plaintiff's blatant attempt to reassert arguments that previously failed does not justify reconsideration of the court's order. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on this ground also fails.
The court has analyzed the June 16, 2003, Order, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, and defendants' response to the motion for reconsideration. Upon its review, the court does not believe that its June 16, 2003, Order was the result of clear error or manifest injustice. Moreover, plaintiff has not identified, nor has the court discovered, any intervening change in controlling law or the availability of new evidence pertinent to that order. Therefore, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this court's dismissal of its federal claims is denied.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claims
Plaintiff has also requested that the court amend its ruling to retain jurisdiction over the parties and pendent state law claims under diversity jurisdiction. In its June 16, 2003, Order, this court properly declined to retain jurisdiction over the state law claims once it dismissed plaintiffs federal claims. Because the court has denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration on its federal claims, the court upholds its June 16, 2003, ruling, and denies plaintiff's request that it retain jurisdiction over the state law claims.
C. Plaintiff's Request for Preliminary Injunctive Relief
On November 22, 2002, plaintiff filed two motions seeking urgent preliminary injunctive relief from USA PATRIOT Act Reporting and trade secret misappropriation by defendants. On December 12, 2002, this court conducted a hearing on both of plaintiff's motions for injunctive relief and denied both of them. Plaintiff failed to request a rehearing of this court's denial within 10 days as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(b). Instead, plaintiff appealed the denial of those motions directly to the Tenth Circuit. Plaintiff also separately moved the Tenth Circuit for emergency injunctive relief. The Tenth Circuit denied plaintiff's appeal and request for emergency injunctive relief on January 9, 2003. As a result, plaintiff's request for a retrial or rehearing of this court's denial of its motions for preliminary injunctive relief is moot.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT plaintiff's Motion for New Trial Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59, Motion for Rule 52(b) Amendment of Judgment and Motion for Retrial on Denial of Preliminary Injunctive Relief (Doc. 35) is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT plaintiff's Motions to Strike (Docs. 38 and 39) are dismissed as moot.