Opinion
C.A. No. 03C-05-013 WCC.
Submitted: March 24, 2004.
Decided: July 30, 2004.
Upon Defendants', Wilmington Housing Authority and Fred Purnell's Motion to Dismiss. GRANTED.
Timothy J. Meades, Sr., 615 West 8th Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19801. Pro se.
William W. Bowser and Adria B. Martinelli, Young Conaway Stargatt Taylor, LLP, The Brandywine Building, 1000 West Street, 17th Floor, Wilmington, Delaware, 19801. Attorneys for Defendants, Wilmington Housing Authority and Fred Purnell.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Plaintiff's amended complaint. This lawsuit is one of a series of legal actions taken by the Plaintiff as a result of the termination of his employment by the Wilmington Housing Authority (the "Authority"). The initial complaint filed in this Court on May 2, 2003 requested that damages of 1.5 million dollars be assessed against the Defendants for "wrongful termination, loss of wages, loss of benefits, defamation of character, emotional duties and punitive damages." On November 24, 2003, the Court dismissed the complaint as the relief being requested, except for defamation, had been previously sought in a Chancery Court action and had been denied. However, in fairness to the Plaintiff, the Court dismissed the complaint without prejudice to allow him an opportunity to refile a complaint alleging with specific particularity the defamation action. An amended complaint was filed on December 23, 2003 and this is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss that complaint.
I. FACTS
The facts leading up to the Plaintiff's termination were set forth in the Chancery Opinion issued on March 6, 2003 and to a large degree will be repeated verbatim herein.
See Meades v. Wilmington Hous. Auth., 2003 WL 939863 (Del.Ch.).
The Plaintiff, Timothy Meades ("Meades"), was employed by the Authority as a District Superintendent. On May 3, 2001, the Authority fired Meades as a result of the incidents next described.
On April 26, 2001, John Triplett, a cleaning subcontractor who was doing work at an Authority site, approached Meades. Triplett asked if he could remove two doors and a vanity from one of the abandoned housing units located at the Eastlake Development in northeast Wilmington ("Hope VI"). Because Meades did not know Triplett, Meades asked his superior, David Rush, if Triplett could take the three fixtures. Rush replied that Triplett could do that. Later that day, Meades took Triplett and another person to the Hope VI site, but because dusk was approaching, they decided to return the next morning to remove the three fixtures.
The following morning at 8:30 a.m., Meades escorted Triplett and two of Triplett's friends to Hope VI. Meades opened the gate to the site, and allowed them inside. Shortly after they arrived, Meades departed the site, leaving the three men unattended. At the arbitration hearing, Meades claimed that he left because he was responding to a call about a maintenance emergency at another housing unit, and that emergency kept him busy from between 12:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. until about 4:15 p.m. The arbitrator found that Meades's testimony could not be reconciled with the other evidence, but even if Meades's testimony was accepted in its entirety, his conduct nonetheless merited his termination.
That same day (April 27, 2001), at about 12:30 p.m., Fred Purnell, the Authority's Executive Director, saw eight or nine men at Hope VI stripping aluminum and other materials from the housing units. Those men, who had already removed a large amount of material from 35 units, told Purnell that they worked for Triplett. Purnell was concerned that that unauthorized demolition work might cause lead contamination that could injure the young children who attended a nearby charter school and day care center. Purnell radioed Meades to ask if he was aware of the demolition work. Meades responded that Rush had authorized it. Rush later claimed (and Meades corroborated), however, that all that Rush had authorized was the removal of three fixtures. As a result, Rush and Karen Spellman, the Authority's Director of Housing Operations, recommended that Meades be fired.
The foregoing incident resulted in about $3,330 of out-of-pocket costs to the Authority. The aluminum that had been stripped from the site was worth approximately $2,000, and the lead hazard soil sampling cost $1,330 . Although the Authority did not prove that the incident caused any on-site lead contamination, the Authority took the threat seriously enough to have the lead hazard tests performed.
The Authority had implemented a remediation plan. Remediation is the process or act of reducing, preventing, or minimizing the release of hazardous substances into the environment so they do not endanger public health. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24) (West 2002).
Shortly after Meades was fired, his union, Local 562 of The American Federation of State, County And Municipal Employees (the "Union") filed a grievance under Article VI of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (the "CBA") against the Authority on Meades's behalf. Meades exhausted the grievance procedure without being rehired. Thereafter, the Union took Meades's case to arbitration under the CBA.
The Authority and the Union were the only parties to the CBA. Individual employees, including Meades, were not parties to that agreement.
CBA art. VI, §§ 6.5-6.7.
The arbitration hearing was conducted, between April 9, 2002 and May 13, 2002, under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Both parties were represented by counsel and presented evidence to the arbitrator. The arbitrator determined that the Authority had just and sufficient cause to terminate Meades, having found Meades's conduct to be "serious" and "irresponsible." That conduct, the arbitrator found, violated (I) Paragraph L of the Employee's Code of Conduct and Responsibility by reason of Meades neglecting his duties and acting in a grossly incompetent manner, and (ii) Work Rule #13, by reason of Meades's poor job performance and carelessness.
It is this factual context and the subsequent fallout from Meades' termination that forms the basis of this defamation action.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss under Delaware Civil Court Rule 12(b)(6) for failure of the Plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. If a plaintiff may recover under any reasonably conceivable set of circumstances, a Motion to Dismiss must be denied. "Only if a court can say that the plaintiff could prevail on no set of fact inferable from the pleadings may it dismiss the complaint . . . [for failure to state a claim]." In addition, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), all the allegations in the complaint must be accepted as true. A motion to dismiss must be decided solely upon the allegations set forth in the complaint. In addition, a party "is bound by the allegations in the complaint."
See Spence v. Funk, 396 A.2d 967 (Del. 1978).
Rammuno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998).
See Barni v. Kutner, 76 A.2d 801 (Del. 1950).
See Growbow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988).
Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 1993 WL 542399, at * 6 (Del.Super.).
III. DISCUSSION
While it is difficult to ascertain from the Plaintiff's amended complaint exactly the nature or circumstances of the alleged defamation conduct, it appears the allegations center around communications made to or by three groups of individuals. They are (1) WHA staff, union members, legal counsel and the arbitrator involved in the termination process; (2) the Wilmington Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and (3) general staff and residents of the Wilmington Housing Authority. The Court will review the claims as to each group separately.First, it is clear to the Court that there exists a conditional privilege to allow employers to discuss the circumstances of an employee's termination and/or job performance, particularly when the termination is being challenged by that employee. This is a rational and common sense privilege to allow an employer to set forth the facts it believes justifies the job action and to communicate that reasoning to those responsible for making such decision or those who may legitimately question that action. This privilege can only be forfeited by (1) excessive or improper publication (2) using the information for a false purpose or (3) making a statement known to be false. As to this grouping of individuals there has been no allegation that the communication went beyond those necessary to effectuate the Plaintiff's termination. As such, the information was made for a legitimate employment purpose, i.e. the termination of the Plaintiff who had allegedly violated company policy and the comments were supported by a factual context derived from those involved in the incident. While the Plaintiff may dispute the accuracy of these facts, it was the information provided to officials at the Wilmington Housing Authority which lead to his termination and which were eventually supported by the arbitration decision and affirmed by the Chancery Court. Regardless of the Plaintiff's perceived fairness of these proceedings, there was a factual basis to justify his termination, supported by the decision of an independent arbitration before which he was represented and supported by his union. In simple terms, communications made by Wilmington Housing Authority staff were made for a legitimate purpose and supported by facts, though adverse to the Plaintiff. In this area, the complaint is simply a tool being utilized by the Plaintiff to address his unhappiness with that decision. It is not a proper ground for a defamation suit. The Court finds that the conditional privilege has not been waived or forfeited by the employer and the cause of action as to this group will be dismissed.
See Schuster v. DeRocili, 2000 WL 1211504 (Del.Super.).
See Battista v. Chrysler Corp., 454 A.2d 286, 291 (Del.Super.Ct. 1982).
The next group relates to communications made to law enforcement personnel, allegedly by the Defendants. While it is unclear as to whether the Defendants ever made such communications, it simply does not matter. The Restatement (second) of Torts § 598 provides that there is a conditional privilege to rely upon information when the information affects a sufficient important public interest and the public interest requires communication of a defamatory matter to a public officer who is authorized to take action if the defamatory matter is true. Obviously, conduct that allegedly asserts a misappropriation of Authority property is of significant public interest. The funds of this agency are primarily public in nature and when taken, even if simply old brass and aluminum intended to be demolished, has ramifications to that agency far beyond its monetary value. The Plaintiff has not asserted that any communication beyond that which formed the basis of his termination were communicated to law enforcement and this clearly would be an appropriate referral for investigation. The mere fact that no charges were brought, while beneficial to the Plaintiff, does not provide a basis to now claim defamation. As such, this privilege clearly applies and the defamation as to this group will also be dismissed.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 598 (1977).
The final group relates to the general staff and residents of the Authority as well as the Plaintiff's family. At best, the complaint here states in generalities that the Plaintiff was questioned by staff and residents why he had been terminated and their speculation as to the improper conduct that lead to his firing. This type of generalized pleading simply is not sufficient to allow a defamation claim to remain. There is no reference to time, place or even the individual who allegedly made such comments or to whom they were made. This is nothing more than a reflection of the normal inquisitory nature of people to an individual who has been fired and provides no basis for a defamation claim. At best, the assertions are speculative, not specific and fail to reflect any malice directed toward the Plaintiff by those who allegedly made the comments.
The Court can appreciate the Plaintiff's frustration with being fired for some scrap metal that was probably going to be thrown out when the building was demolished. However, it is not this Court's role to determine the fairness of such action nor would it be proper for the Court to allow this law suit to continue to simply provide a mechanism to right a perhaps unnecessary firing. The facts here clearly support the Plaintiff's termination as evidenced by the arbitration ruling and the Court of Chancery opinion. Whether one characterizes the Plaintiff's actions as misappropriation, negligence, carelessness or even a theft is pure semantics, not defamation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the above, the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.