Summary
In Maryland Employment Security Board v. Poorbaugh, 195 Md. 197, 200, 72 A.2d 753, 754 (1950), we held that not reporting for work for 4 months because of poor weather was voluntarily quitting without good cause.
Summary of this case from Total Audio-Visual Systems, Inc. v. Department of LaborOpinion
[Nos. 148-150, October Term, 1949.]
Decided April 14, 1950.
Unemployment Compensation — Findings of Employment Security Board Supported By Evidence and No Suggestion of Fraud — Administrative Decisions — Legislative Prerogative to Give Finality to, Long Recognized, Provided Exercise of Power Not Arbitrary.
The legislative prerogative to give finality to administrative decisions, provided the exercise of the power is not arbitrary, has long been recognized. p. 199
In these three cases appellees appealed to the circuit court from decisions of the Maryland Employment Security Board denying their claims for unemployment benefits. In the first case appellee had received a maternity leave and was fully occupied in caring for her child at the time she registered with the Employment Service. There was no evidence that she had made any effort to procure work, other than "to watch the ads," and the Board found that she was unavailable for work and had not actively sought work as required by Code (1947 Supp.), Art. 95A, sec. 4. In the second case appellee admitted that he "laid off" because of the cold weather, and his employer contended that he had voluntarily quit his job. His employer notified him to report for work the next day, if he wished to keep his job, but he failed to report until four months later, a month after he filed his claim. The Board found that he left work voluntarily and without good cause as required by sec. 5. In the third case appellee, a messenger, resigned her job to get married, and under a company rule married women were not employed as messengers. She applied for a transfer to another department, but there was no vacancy, and since her marriage she had not applied for work elsewhere. The Board found that she had not complied with the requirements of sec. 4. In each case the lower court reversed the decision of the Board denying benefits. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the orders of the lower court, held that there was evidence to support the Board's findings and no suggestion of fraud. pp. 198-200
J.E.B.
Decided April 14, 1950.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Allegany County (BRUCE, JR., J.).
Proceedings by Grace K. Poorbaugh, Jacob R. Feaster and Joan H. Merbaugh before the Maryland Employment Security Board for unemployment compensation. From orders reversing decisions of the Board, which denied benefits in each case, the Board and William P. Roeder, employer of Jacob R. Feaster, appeal.
Orders reversed.
Before MARBURY, C.J., COLLINS, GRASON, HENDERSON and MARKELL, JJ.
Submitted on brief by Hall Hammond, Attorney General, Aaron A. Baer, Special Assistant Attorney General, and James N. Phillips for the Maryland Employment Security Board.
No brief and no appearance for the appellees.
These three appeals are from orders of the Circuit Court for Allegany County reversing decisions of the Maryland Employment Security Board. In the first case the claimant was denied benefits on the strength of a finding that she was unavailable for work and had not actively sought work, as required by Section 4, Article 95A of the Code (1947 Supplement). In the second case the claimant was denied benefits because it was found that he left work voluntarily and without good cause, as required by Section 5. In the third case, the claimant was denied benefits because the claimant was unavailable for work and had not actively sought work, as required by Section 4. In each case the Court reviewed the evidence and made findings of fact different from those of the Board. We think the Court's orders were based on a misconception of the function of the court in these appeals.
Section 6(h) "Judicial Review", provides "* * * In any judicial proceeding under this Section, the findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be conclusive, and the jurisdiction of said court shall be confined to questions of law." We have had occasion to construe and give effect to that provision in Tucker v. American Smelting Co., 189 Md. 250, 55 A.2d 692, 693 and Brown v. Maryland Unemployment Comp. Board, 189 Md. 233, 55 A.2d 696, 699. See also Johnson v. Pratt, 200 S.C. 315, 20 S.E.2d 865, construing the similar provision of the South Carolina Statute. We have long recognized, in other fields, the legislative prerogative to give finality to administrative decisions, provided the exercise of the power is not arbitrary. Bethlehem-Sparrows Point Shipyard v. Bishop, 189 Md. 147, 55 A.2d 507, 511, (Workmen's Compensation); Lewis v. Mayor and City Council of Cumberland, 189 Md. 58, 54 A.2d 319, 324 (rate-making); Wasena Housing Corp. v. Levay, 188 Md. 383, 393, 52 A.2d 903 (tax assessment); Mahoney v. Byers, 187 Md. 81, 85, 48 A.2d 600 (racing regulation); Heaps v. Cobb, 185 Md. 372, 374, 45 A.2d 73 (pension system).
A review of the testimony in the instant cases shows clearly that there was evidence to support the Board's findings. Mrs. Poorbaugh received a maternity leave, and at the time she registered with the Employment Service was fully occupied in taking care of her child. There was no evidence that she had made any effort to procure work, other than to "watch the ads." Mr. Feaster, whose employer contended that he had voluntarily quit his job, admitted that he laid off because of the cold weather. The employer sent him word that if he didn't report "for work tomorrow he wasn't going to have any more work", but he did not report until about four months later, a month after he filed his claim. Mrs. Merbaugh was employed as a messenger. She resigned her job to get married. Under a rule of the Company married women were not employed as messengers. She applied for a transfer to another department, but there was no vacancy. She admitted that since her marriage she had not applied for work elsewhere.
Since there was evidence to support the Board's findings and no suggestion of fraud, the court erred in attempting to substitute its judgment for that of the Board.
Orders reversed, with costs.