Opinion
Civil Action No. 02-8941.
June 9, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case involves a dispute between Rochelle McQueen, Plaintiff, and the Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) over Plaintiff's temporary displacement from public housing and the resulting damages. Plaintiff claims that the PHA, through its agents Carl Greene, Carolyn Carter, and Tania Stephens, violated her constitutional due process rights, the U.S. Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437 et seq., the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4601 et seq., and the regulations promulgated pursuant to those statutes, depriving Plaintiff of rights enforceable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. The court granted summary judgment in favor of the PHA, all individual defendants in their official capacities, Defendant Greene in his individual capacity, and Defendants Carter and Stephens with regard to the § 1983 claims based on 42 U.S.C.A. § 4601 et seq. and 24 C.F.R. § 968.108. Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to prove that any individual defendant violated a specific federal statute or regulation that creates a federal right enforceable under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Defendants further contend that even if Plaintiff can prove her rights were violated, she has failed to establish a legal basis for the award of monetary damages.
After a bench trial on the issues remaining against individual Defendants Carter and Stephens, and upon consideration of the parties' pretrial submissions, this court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.
I. FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Plaintiff and her two daughters lived in the "Tasker Homes" public housing development at 2910 "C" Pierce Drive, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for a number of years.
2. The Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) decided to undergo an extensive modernization of Tasker Homes over a period of several years.
3. PHA informed all Tasker Homes residents that they would be required to move elsewhere for the duration of the modernization process. See Pl. Br., Exh. #1 (PHA's Relocation Notice).
4. On May 22, 2002, Plaintiff was notified that she would be required to move from Tasker Homes in order for the modernization process to commence. See Pl. Br., Exh. #3 (Plaintiff's Affidavit).
5. During the summer of 2002, PHA representatives attempted to temporarily relocate Plaintiff to another PHA-owned facility, but were unsuccessful.
6. On August 21, 2002, Plaintiff met with a PHA representative to discuss relocation to a privately owned apartment through PHA's Section 8 program. Id.
7. PHA processed Plaintiff's application for Section 8 housing, and on August 28, 2002, Plaintiff was issued a voucher entitling her to move into a Section 8 apartment of her choice. See Pl. Br., Exh. #4 (Copy of plaintiff's Section 8 Voucher).
8. PHA mailed Plaintiff a "Notice of Necessary Transfer" form on November 20, 2002.
9. In mid-to-late November 2002, Plaintiff located a desirable apartment at 1080 Alcott Street in Philadelphia, and met with the landlord to do a walk-through.
10. On November 22, 2002, Brian Slaughter, a PHA Relocation Representative, informed Plaintiff that she would be required to move to 1080 Alcott Street on November 29, 2002. See Pl. Br., Exh. #6 (PHA's Client Assessment Form).
11. On November 25, 2002, Plaintiff signed the lease for 1080 Alcott Street, and certified that she selected the apartment of her own free choice after being given the opportunity to explore the private real estate market. See Pl. Br., Exh. #4 (Copy of plaintiff's Section 8 Voucher).
12. On November 25, 2002, a PHA Relocation Aid submitted paperwork to have Plaintiff's belongings moved to 1080 Alcott Street on November 29, 2002.
13. On November 25, 2002, the PHA Relocation Aid learned that the apartment was in the Section 8 program and had to pass inspection prior to occupancy, and subsequently telephoned Plaintiff to inform her of the necessary inspection.
14. On November 27, 2002, 1080 Alcott Street failed inspection, as it was in need of some minor repairs. See Pl. Br., Exh. #5 (Request for Admissions).
15. PHA contracted with Father Sons Moving Storage Company to move Plaintiff's belongings, and on November 29, 2002, the Company moved most of Plaintiff's belongings to 1080 Alcott Street. See Pl. Br. Exh. #3 (Plaintiff's Affidavit).
16. Plaintiff arrived at 1080 Alcott Street shortly after the moving truck. She found the door to the apartment open, but no one was present to provide her with a key. Id.
17. Plaintiff waited for a key inside the apartment for several hours. When no one appeared, Plaintiff left the apartment, locking the door behind her. Id.
18. While Plaintiff was waiting inside the apartment, she discovered it was in need of several repairs. Id.
19. Plaintiff never received any keys to 1080 Alcott Street.
20. On the night of November 29, 2002, Plaintiff returned to her old unit at Tasker Homes. She left early the next morning.
21. Plaintiff and her two daughters temporarily moved in with Plaintiff's sister.
22. Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff spoke with Section 8 Representative Sharon Robinson about the situation at 1080 Alcott Street. Id.
23. During Plaintiff's conversation with Ms. Robinson, she was informed that 1080 Alcott Street had not passed the PHA inspection. Id.
24. Ms. Robinson informed Plaintiff that a second inspection was scheduled to be conducted on December 2, 2002. Id.
25. PHA attempted to inspect 1080 Alcott Street on December 2, 2002, but could not gain access to the property, as the door was locked and no one appeared to let the inspector inside. See Pl. Br., Exh. #10 (December 2, 2002 Inspection Report).
26. On December 11, 2002, a second inspection of 1080 Alcott Street was conducted, and the property passed inspection. See Pl. Br., Exh. #5 (Request for Admission).
27. Plaintiff did not move into the property or remove her belongings at this time.
28. On December 17, 2002, PHA obtained Paul Wilhite's signature on an Assisted Lease Agreement Voucher, thereby allowing plaintiff to move into the residence. Id.
29. However, Plaintiff was unable to gain access to 1080 Alcott Street until she was issued a second Section 8 voucher by PHA on March 18, 2003. See Pl. Br., Exh. #3 (Plaintiff's Affidavit).
30. Plaintiff has since located and been rehoused in another Section 8 property.
The lease was dated December 12, 2002.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Section 8 rental assistance program enables low-income families to rent decent, safe, and sanitary housing with the assistance of subsidies from local housing authorities. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(f) and C.F.R. Part 982.
2. Funding for the rental subsidies and the operation of the program is paid by the U.S. Department of Housing Urban Development (HUD) to local participating housing authorities. 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.101 and 982.102.
3. HUD enters into an Annual Contributions Contract (ACC) with the participating housing authority. 24 C.F.R. § 982.151.
4. The ACC, inter alia, mandates that the participating housing authority follow the federal guidelines in operating the program.
5. Eligible families are issued a voucher, along with a family packet that contains information about the program and paperwork that must be completed by the tenant and the prospective landlord before being returned to Section 8. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.301.
6. Once a tenant locates an appropriate rental unit and submits the necessary paperwork, the housing authority must inspect the rental unit to insure that it meets the federal housing quality standards. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.153(b)(11) and 982.401.
7. Section 8 is required to inspect the unit leased to a family prior to the initial term of the lease. 24 C.F.R. § 982.405(a).
8. Where the requirements of the program are met, the housing authority must approve the lease agreement and enter into a Housing Assistance Payment contract (HAP contract) with the owner. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.305 and 982.451.
9. Pursuant to the HAP contract, the housing authority makes assistance payments to the landlord on behalf of the Section 8 tenant. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.451.
10. The tenant's share of the shelter costs is set at 30% of the tenant family income. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1437(a).
11. Pursuant to the ACC, Section 8 must make monthly assistance payments to landlords. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.153(b)(14) and (16).
12. A participating tenant family may receive a new certificate and family packet in order to move to another rental unit with continued Section 8 rental assistance where, inter alia, Section 8 has terminated the HAP contract due to the landlord's failure to make repairs. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.314(b)(1) and 982.453.
13. When relocating a resident because of PHA's actions, PHA must insure that it has taken all reasonable steps to minimize the displacement of families during the period of any modernization project. 24 C.F.R. § 968.108(a).
14. Residents who are required to transfer to another unit during a modernization project are entitled to reimbursement for all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred in connection with the relocation. 24 C.F.R. § 968.108(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 4622(a).
15. For those residents who are being moved temporarily, PHA is required to give the resident reasonable advance written notice of: (a) the date and approximate duration of the temporary relocation; (b) the location of the suitable, decent, safe and sanitary housing to be made available for the temporary period; and (c) all reasonable out-of-pocket expenses incurred. 24 C.F.R. § 968.108(b)(2).
16. Pursuant to its requirements regarding displacement of families, PHA must comply with the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, (URA), 42 U.S.C.A. § 4601 et al., and the conforming federal regulations. 24 C.F.R § 968.108(f).
III. OPINION
On September 26, 2003, the Honorable William H. Yohn, Jr. granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, dismissing all of Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 Monell claims against the PHA, all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities, all claims against individual Defendant Carl Greene, and Plaintiff's claim for violations of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act under § 1983 and its supporting regulation, 24 C.F.R. § 968.108, against the individual Defendants Carolyn Carter and Tania Stephens.
Monell refers to Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
At the time of trial, the following three § 1983 claims remained against Defendants Carolyn Carter and Tania Stephens in their individual capacities:
1. Defendants violated Plaintiff's due process rights by failing to provide Plaintiff with advanced notice of relocation, terminating Plaintiff's public housing rights through self-help eviction, and failing to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to be heard before terminating her public housing benefits pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.555;
2. Defendants violated Plaintiff's due process rights by displacing Plaintiff and her children without first providing them the opportunity to move into alternate subsidized housing pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(e)(8) (i) (ii); and
3. Defendants failed to meet their obligation to ensure that a Section 8 unit passes inspection before moving Plaintiff into the property pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 982.405(a).
Defendants argued that it was questionable as to whether any of the statutory violations Plaintiff was claiming created an actionable right under § 1983, and if so, whether the regulation(s) could serve as the basis for monetary relief. Additionally, Defendants claimed that even if Plaintiff could overcome these initial hurdles, she would still have to prove that either Carolyn Carter or Tania Stephens was personally involved in violations of the regulations in order to be awarded relief.
This court will address Plaintiff's claims in the order in which they are listed above. In her first claim, Plaintiff argues that she was denied her right to due process in that she was not provided advanced notice of relocation, her public housing rights were terminated through self-help eviction, and she was denied a hearing under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555. Before reaching the merits of Plaintiff's first claim, this court must first determine whether it is actionable under § 1983. The test for that determination was laid out by the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41, 117 S. Ct. 1353, 1359-60 (1997), and is as follows:
1. Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff;
2. The plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so `vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence; and
3. The statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the states. In other words, the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.
With respect to Plaintiff's first claim, 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 discusses when the PHA must provide a participant family an informal hearing to determine whether decisions made by the PHA are in accordance with the law, HUD regulations, and PHA policies. As such, it is clear that Congress intended for this provision to benefit the Plaintiff. The right protected by the statute — entitlement to a hearing in certain specific cases — is clearly defined, and thus its enforcement would not strain judicial competence. Lastly, the right is couched in mandatory terms — it requires a hearing in cases in which the enumerated circumstances arise. Thus, Plaintiff's first claim is actionable under § 1983.
However, with regard to the merits of this claim, Plaintiff has a significant problem. 24 C.F.R. § 982.555 enumerates six instances in which participants are entitled to a hearing, and none of those instances apply in this case. Where the PHA is accused of failing to provide advanced notice of relocation, or effectively terminating public housing rights through self-help eviction, the complainant is not entitled to a hearing under 24 C.F.R. § 982.555. As a result, Plaintiff cannot prevail on her first claim for relief.
In her second claim, Plaintiff argues that her due process rights were violated in that she and her children were displaced without first being provided the opportunity to move into alternate subsidized housing pursuant to 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(e)(8)(i) (ii). Again, we must first determine whether this claim is actionable under § 1983.
The relevant section of the statute discusses PHA's obligations to its participants through its leases. As such, it is clear that Congress intended for this provision to benefit the Plaintiff. The statute states that the PHA must notify the tenant of the specific grounds for any proposed adverse action by the PHA. It then goes on to define "adverse action", and states when the PHA is required to provide the participant with a grievance hearing. The rights protected under the statute are clear, and thus their enforcement would not strain judicial competence. Lastly, the rights protected by the statute — the standard lease terms for which the PHA must be held responsible — are couched in mandatory terms. Therefore, Plaintiff's second claim is actionable under § 1983.
However, with regard to the merits of her claim, Plaintiff has significant difficulties. 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 deals only with lease requirements. It does not pertain to the remedies available if and when the PHA fails to meet its obligations under a given lease. Thus, even if the PHA did violate the provisions of Plaintiff's lease, she cannot collect compensatory damages under 24 C.F.R. § 966.4. As such, Plaintiff cannot prevail on her second claim for relief.
In her third claim, Plaintiff argues that Defendants failed to meet their obligation under 24 C.F.R. § 982.405(a), in that they failed to ensure that her Section 8 unit had passed inspection before moving her belongings into the property. Again, we must first determine whether this claim is actionable under § 1983.
The relevant portion of the statute is as follows:
(a) The PHA must inspect the unit leased to a family prior to the initial term of the lease, at least annually during assisted occupancy, and at other times as needed, to determine if the unit meets the HQS.
This portion of the statute discusses when units leased by the PHA must be inspected by the PHA. As it pertains to concerns of safety and habitability, it is clear that Congress intended the statute to benefit the Plaintiff. The right assertedly protected is evident on the face of the statute, and thus, enforcing such right would not strain judicial competence. Lastly, as the statute clearly defines the PHA's responsibilities in terms of inspections, it couches the asserted right in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms. Thus, Plaintiff's third claim is actionable under § 1983.
According to the facts of the case laid out at trial, the PHA, through some unclear internal glitch, did not discover that an inspection was required on the Section 8 property in question until November 25, 2002. That same day, the PHA made arrangements for Plaintiff's belongings to be moved from her Tasker Homes unit to her new Section 8 unit on November 29, 2002. Also that same day, Plaintiff signed a new lease for the Section 8 unit. On November 27, 2002, the PHA conducted the inspection and found that some minor repairs were needed before the property would be considered habitable. It is unclear whether or not Plaintiff was made aware that her move was to be delayed as a result of the failed inspection. That is of no matter however, as the PHA sent Father Sons Moving and Storage Company to Plaintiff's residence to move her belongings to the Section 8 property as originally scheduled on November 29, 2002.
As was previously mentioned, the lease was dated December 12, 2002.
The PHA, by and through its agents, failed to conduct its inspection prior to November 25, 2002, when Plaintiff was provided with, and signed, the lease agreement for the Section 8 property. In addition, the PHA erroneously moved Plaintiff's belongings to the property prior to it passing inspection. As a result of the PHA's actions, Plaintiff was effectively locked out of the Section 8 property, and some of her belongings were subsequently stolen from within. In addition, Plaintiff's access to her old property at Tasker Homes was limited both in terms of the time it would remain habitable prior to the scheduled renovations, and in terms of the time it would remain habitable as a result of the heat having been shut off.
However, the PHA is no longer a defendant in this case. See Memorandum and Order, Yohn, J. 9/26/03. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory damages unless she can show that Defendants Carolyn Carter and/or Tania Stephens were responsible in their individual capacities for the violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.405(a).
In order to be liable for a § 1983 violation, an individual defendant must have been personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1294 (3d Cir. 1997); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). A supervisor's personal involvement may be shown by establishing that the supervisor had actual knowledge of, and acquiesced in, the deprivation. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1294. It is not sufficient, however, for a plaintiff to allege that an individual had constructive knowledge of his or her subordinates' unconstitutional conduct simply by virtue of his or her supervisory position. Regan v. Township of Lower Merion, 1999 WL 999381 at *5 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 28, 1999) ("[C]onstructive knowledge by virtue of being the supervisor of subordinates who may have actual knowledge is not sufficient to support liability under § 1983."); DeBellis v. Kulp, 166 F.Supp.2d 255, 277 (E.D.Pa. 2001) ("The fact that [defendants] are in supervisory positions does not, standing alone, establish their liability."); see e.g. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1208 (holding that grievances actually filed with the Governor's office were "insufficient to show that [he] had actual knowledge of [the plaintiff's] alleged harassment" and noting that "a contrary holding would subject the Governor to potential liability in any case in which an aggrieved employee merely transmitted a complaint to the Governor's [O]ffice of [A]dministration . . ."); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1479 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that supervisory liability applied where "it would be incomprehensible" for the supervisor not to have noticed the misconduct and "impossible for [him] to contend that he overlooked" such misconduct). Indeed, to hold otherwise would arguably vitiate the distinction between liability based on a theory of personal involvement and that based on a theory of respondeat superior, thereby undermining the holding of Monell, 436 U.S. 658, namely, that one "cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory."Id. at 691.
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has failed to show that either Defendant Carolyn Carter or Defendant Tania Stephens had personal knowledge of the alleged violations of her federal constitutional and statutory rights.
Defendant Carolyn Carter was regarded as the "head honcho" at the PHA. She never had any specific contact with Plaintiff regarding the move from Tasker Homes to Section 8 housing, and it is unclear whether she knew or should have known of Plaintiff's situation. Thus, liability would only apply under a theory of respondeat superior, which, as noted above, is inapplicable in a § 1983 case. Therefore, Defendant Carolyn Carter cannot be held individually responsible for the violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.405(a).
Defendant Tania Stephens was a PHA official who had a number of subordinates. Both she and several unnamed people underneath her were personally involved with Plaintiff and the problems which arose with Plaintiff's attempted move to 1080 Alcott Street. Defendant Stephens and Plaintiff interacted a number of times, and their relationship unfortunately turned hostile. They last spoke at some point before prior to Plaintiff's scheduled moving date. Though Defendant Stephens was personally involved in the decisions being made with regard to Plaintiff's move, Plaintiff has failed to prove that Defendant Stephens was individually responsible for the series of errors which resulted in a late failed inspection, a move in spite of the fact, and Plaintiff's being locked out of her new home. Several unnamed persons were working on Plaintiff's case for Defendant Stephens, and thus it is unclear on whom the fault lies. Thus, liability would only apply under a theory of respondeat superior, which, as noted above, is inapplicable in a § 1983 case. Therefore, Defendant Tania Stephens cannot be held individually responsible for the violation of 24 C.F.R. § 982.405(a). As a result, Plaintiff is not entitled to compensatory monetary damages. An appropriate order follows.