Opinion
2:20-cv-00432-JPH-MJD
03-14-2022
GROVER C. MCPHAUL, Plaintiff, v. MADISON COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, et al., Defendants.
Attorney for Appellant: Paul J. Podlejski, Anderson, Indiana Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
James Patrick Hanlon, United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana.
Grover McPhaul is an inmate at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. He brings this action alleging constitutional violations stemming from an incident that occurred at the Madison County Community Justice Center. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint on the basis that Mr. McPhaul's claims were already presented to, and rejected by, another court. As explained in greater detail below, the action is barred by res judicata so the motion to dismiss is granted.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The Court summarizes the facts as alleged by Mr. McPhaul in his amended complaint.
On August 20, 2018, while in the dorm area of the Madison County Center, Mr. McPhaul tossed a meal tray that hit a control booth window. Control booth officer Nick Henderson called other officers to help remove Mr. McPhaul from the dorm area, and Officers Austin Bentley and Nick Robinson responded. The three officers then beat Mr. McPhaul and used a pressure point neck restraint to restrain him.
As a result of this incident, Mr. McPhaul was convicted of two counts of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official and one count of criminal mischief. See McPhaul v. State, 132 N.E. 3d 939, 2019 WL 4125324 at *1 (Ind.Ct.App. Aug. 30, 2019). 1
In August 2020, Mr. McPhaul filed this lawsuit. His complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, and he was allowed to amend his complaint. The Court screened his amended complaint, permitting excessive force claims to proceed against the individual officers involved in the incident and Monell claims to proceed against Sheriff Mellinger and the Madison County Board of Commissioners on the basis that they had an unconstitutional policy or practice of failing to train correctional officers on the proper use of force. Dkt. 23 at 5.
On October 12, 2020, Mr. McPhaul filed a complaint in the Madison County Circuit Court naming the Madison County Sheriff's Department, the Madison County Board of Commissioners, the Madison County Community Justice Center, and Madison County Commissioners John Richwine, Kelly Gaskill, and Mike Phipps as defendants. Dkt. 30-3. The Madison County complaint alleged false arrest and imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, negligence, due process violations, emotional pain and distress, cruel and unusual punishment, and abuse of process. Id. at 1. Those claims arose from the same August 20, 2018, events that Mr. McPhaul alleges in this case.
The defendants in the Madison County case filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Indiana Trial Rule 12(C), arguing that the allegations presented in the complaint were barred by the statute of limitations, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, and Heck v. Humphrey." Ex. A at 1. The Madison Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss as to all defendants, but the order did not identify the specific basis on which the complaint was dismissed. See dkt. 30-4 (stating, "Defendants, by counsel, having filed their Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Ind. Trial Rule 12(C), and the Court being duly advised in the premises, now ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES 2 that this cause should be, and the same is hereby DISMISSED, as it pertains to all Defendants. Costs paid.").
The defendants do not include a copy of the motion as an exhibit. The Court takes judicial notice of this public record and attaches it to this Order as Exhibit A.
In Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme Court held that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilty or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
The defendants filed the motion to dismiss in this case on the basis that the allegations presented were already adjudicated in the Madison County case.
Mr. McPhaul filed a motion to correct error in the Madison County case, alleging that his response to the defendants' motion to dismiss was not filed. Dkt. 40-1. The Court denied that motion, finding that even if his response had been filed it would not have affected the outcome of the case. Id. Mr. McPhaul then moved the Madison County Court for an extension of time to appeal, but the Court denied it finding he failed to show "any excusable reason for not meeting his appellate deadlines." Dkt. 40-2.
II. Discussion
A. Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must accept all well-pled facts as true and draw all permissible inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Tucker v. City of Chi., 907 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2018).
B. Res Judicata
"A fundamental precept of common-law adjudication, embodied in the related doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata, is that a right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction . . . cannot be disputed in a subsequent 3 suit between the same parties or their privies[.]" Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979).
Here, the Court looks to Indiana law to determine whether the doctrine of res judicata bars this case. Daza v. State, 2 F.4th 681, 683 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985)). In Indiana,
[t]he principle of res judicata is divided into two branches: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion applies where a final judgment on the merits has been rendered which acts as a complete bar to a subsequent action on the same issue or claim between those parties and their privies. Issue preclusion, also referred to as collateral estoppel, bars the subsequent relitigation of the same fact or issue where the fact or issue was necessarily adjudicated in a former suit and the same fact or issue is presented in a subsequent action.First American Title Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 65 N.E.3d 1045, 1050 (Ind. Ct. 2016) (cleaned up). In this case, the defendants' res judicata defense is based on claim preclusion. Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action when:
(1) The former judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) The former judgment was rendered on the merits;
(3) The matter now in issue was or might have been determined in the former suit; and
(4) The controversy adjudicated in the former suit was between the parties to the present action or their privies.Matter of Eq. W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1209 (Ind. 2019).
That Mr. McPhaul filed this action before filing the Madison County action does not preclude dismissal based on res judicata. The Madison County action was decided first, so it is the relevant "former suit." Platt v. CitiMortgage, 632 Fed.Appx. 294, 295 (7th Cir. 2016) ("When two parallel cases are pending at the same time, the first final judgment will raise the issue of preclusion in the other case.") (citing Jones v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 489 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind.Ct.App. 1986) 4 ("[I]t is elementary that the sequence of judgments, not the sequence of filings, determines which of two cases will act as res judicata for the other.")).
Here, the first element is easily met as there is no dispute that the Madison County Circuit Court had jurisdiction over Mr. McPhaul's state complaint.
The second element is also met because the Madison County court did not state the basis for its dismissal-whether it was based on the statute of limitations, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Heck v. Humphrey, or all three. For purposes of this element, "the basis of the earlier decision is unimportant so long as the claim was decided on the merits. Thus, a dismissal of a suit may have preclusive effect even if it did not resolve the central controversy." United States ex rel. Conner v. Mahajan, 877 F.3d 264, 271 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasis in original). An Indiana Trial Rule 12(C) motion "is typically directed toward a determination of the substantive merits of the controversy" and is properly "granted only where it is clear from the face of the complaint that under no circumstances could relief be granted." Mourning v. Allison Transmission, Inc., 72 N.E.3d 482, 486 (Ind.Ct.App. 2017) (cleaned up). Further, an order that dismisses all claims against all the defendants renders it a final judgment to which res judicata can be applied. Ball v. Jones, 52 N.E.3d 813, 819 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (citing Ind.App. Rule 2(H)(1)). In other words, the fact that the judge in the Madison County case did not specifically address the underlying allegations in Mr. McPhaul's complaint does not mean that the order dismissing the case does not count as a decision on the merits. See also Hutchinson v. City of Madison, 987 N.E.2d 539, 543 (Ind.Ct.App. 2013) ("observing that an adjudication based on the running of a statute of limitation is a judgment on the merits") (citing Creech v. Town of Walkerton, 472 N.E.2d 226, 229 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984)); see also Beyer v. Cormier, 70 Fed.Appx. 903, 905 (7th Cir. 2003) ("[F]or res judicata 5 purposes, a decision based on the statute of limitations is a final judgment on the merits of a claim.").
For the third element, "[t]he test generally used for determining whether or not the issue could have been decided previously is the identical evidence test: whether identical evidence will support the issues involved in both actions." Hilliard v. Jacobs, 957 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (Ind.Ct.App. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It does not matter if individual pieces of evidence differ from the two actions. Id. at 1047. Rather, the court looks to whether "the same general evidence" would be used to support both actions, whether all the evidence was available from the beginning of litigation, and whether it was a conscious decision to exclude relevant evidence and legal theories from the prior action. Id. That element is satisfied here. In both cases, Mr. McPhaul alleges that the correctional officers used excessive force against him during the August 20, 2018, incident due to improper training on the use of force. Compare dkt. 21 with dkt. 30-3.
Finally, the fourth element is met. The question is whether the Madison County action involves the same defendants or parties that constitute their privies. There is overlap of defendants in the two actions. The Madison County Board of Commissioners are defendants in both. Sheriff Mellinger is sued in his official capacity in this action, and the Madison County Sheriff's Department was a defendant in the Madison County action. Any policy-or-practice claim against Sheriff Mellinger is equivalent to a claim against his department. See Cano v. Vasquez, No. 2:16-cv-401, 2016 WL 7475658, *2 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 29, 2016) ("A suit against a public employee in his official capacity is equivalent to a suit against the government entity.") (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985)). 6
Officers Robinson, Bentley, and Garrett, however, appear in this case but not in the Madison County case. In Becker v. State, 992 N.E.2d 697, 701 (Ind. 2015), the Indiana Supreme Court explained, "A privy is one who after rendition of a judgment has acquired an interest in the subject matter affected by the judgment or whose interests are represented by a party to the action." (cleaned up). Privity exists when there is a "commonality of the parties' substantial interests[, ]" and "for res judicata purposes, the court looks beyond the nominal parties and treats those whose interests are involved as the real parties." Id. (cleaned up). Mr. McPhaul alleged in his Madison County complaint that he was the victim of "assault and battery . . . and cruel and unusual punishment" due to the officers' use of force during the August 20 incident. Dkt. 30-3 at 2. In both suits, he attributed the alleged excessive force to inadequate training by the Sheriff's Office. Dkt. 21 at 2 and dkt. 30-3 at 2-3, 4-5. Because the officers' interests were affected by the outcome of the Madison County action, they were in privity with the defendants in that case. See Benton v. Clark Co. Jail, 586 Fed.Appx. 231, 234 (7th Cir. Dec. 1, 2014) (finding that the Commissioner's Office, who was not named as a defendant in the plaintiff's prior state action, was "in privity with the jail because [plaintiff's] allegations against the office stem from his treatment at the jail." (citing Becker, 992 N.E.2d at 700-01). See also Licari v. City of Chi., 298 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting that government and its officers are generally in privity for res judicata).
The Court finds that res judicata applies. The defendants' motion to dismiss, dkt. 30, is granted and the Court does not address the other grounds raised by defendants in support of dismissal.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion to dismiss, dkt. [30], is granted. The action is dismissed with prejudice. Judgment consistent with this Order shall now issue. 7
SO ORDERED. 8
Exhibit A
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Come now Defendants, Madison County Sheriffs Department, Madison County Board of Commissioners and Madison County Community Justice Center, by counsel, pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(C), respectfully move the Court to Dismiss the Plaintiffs Complaint.
I. INTRODUCTION
This case is alleged to have arisen during Plaintiffs incarceration in Madison County in August 2018. Plaintiff was booked into the Madison Co. Jail on July 22, 2018 for burglary, residential entry and battery and placed into the Madison County Correctional Complex. Plaintiff proceeded to file his pro se Complaint against the Defendants for multiple allegations that arise out of the events that occurred on August 20, 2018. Plaintiffs Claims should be dismissed because Plaintiffs alleged claims are barred by the Statute of Limitations, the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel, and Heck v. Humphrey. 1
II. MATERIAL FACTS
On October 12, 2020, Plaintiff filed his handwritten complaint Plaintiff claiming violations of Indiana Constitution Article 1§11, 1§12, and 1§ 16. (Plaintiffs Complaint attached as Exhibit A). Plaintiffs Complaint claims false arrest imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, negligence, violations of due process, emotional pain and distress, and cruel and unusual punishment and abuse of process. All of Plaintiffs claims arise out of events on August 20, 2018. (See Plaintiffs Complaint).
Plaintiff alleges in his Complaint that on August 20, 2018 that he was incarcerated in the Madison County Community Justice Center. (Plaintiffs Complaint). On this date (August 20, 2018) Plaintiff alleges that law enforcement officers claimed that Plaintiff threw a metal meal tray at a Control Booth Window. (Plaintiffs Complaint). Per Plaintiff, an altercation ensured with officers after the window event and Plaintiff claimed self-defense in his actions involving the officers. (Plaintiffs Complaint). Plaintiff was charged with 2 counts of Felony Battery on a Public Safety Officer and 1 count of Criminal Mischief for the events of August 20, 2018. (Plaintiffs Complaint). Plaintiff was found guilty of the charges against him on November 12, 2018. (Plaintiffs Complaint). Plaintiff received a 6-year sentence to be executed at the Indiana Department of Correction. (Plaintiffs Complaint).
Following the jury trial for the events of August 20, 2018, Plaintiff appealed the convictions alleging errors committed by the trial court. Grover McPhaul v. State of Indiana, 132 N.E.3d 939 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). A copy of Grover McPhaul v. State of Indiana, 132 N.E.3d 939 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) is attached as Exhibit B to the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Court of Appeals found no errors by the trial 2 court and thus upholding the convictions (two (2) counts of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, both level 5 felonies, and one (1) count of criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor). Id. at 1.
The facts as preserved in the Court of Appeals record confirm that on August 20, 2018 that Plaintiff was an inmate house at the Madison County Correctional Complex (MCCC). Id. at 1. At around 4:58 p.m., a correctional officer who was inside a control room heard a thud against the window. Id. To determine the noise the officer rewound the security footage which showed Plaintiff throw his dinner tray against the window of the control room in violation of MCCC rules. Id. After viewing the footage, the officer in the control room requested that officers remove Plaintiff from the Dorm so that he could be questioned on the violations observed on the video. Id. Officer Nick Robinson and Officer Austin Bently responded. Officer Robinson requested that Plaintiff cuff up which Plaintiff "just blew it off and walked past" him. Id. at 1. Plaintiff then ignored commands and resisted offices' attempts to place him into mechanical restraints. Id. at 1. A struggle ensued, Plaintiff kicked forcibly, attempted to punch officers, forcibly took Officer Bentley glasses from his face and then began going for the officer's eye. Id. at 2. Plaintiff continued to resist until the arrival of a third officer which allowed the officers to get mechanical restraints on the Plaintiff. Id. at 2.
The Court of Appeals recognized the facts in the record that Plaintiff repeatedly ignored commands and forcibly resisted while three officers attempted to restrain him. Id. at 5. The Court of Appeals stated, "There is no doubt that the correctional officers were engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, as instructed, and the record reveals no evidence of self-defense." Id. at 5. The Court of 3 Appeals upheld the conviction of two (2) counts of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, both level 5 felonies, and one (1) count of criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor. Id. at 1.
III. Legal Standard
Indiana Rule of Civil Procedure 12(C) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." The pleadings include the complaint, the answer, and any written instrument attached as exhibits. Ind. Trial Rule 12(C); Northern Indiana Gun and Outdoor Shows, Inc., v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, courts employ the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Ind.R.Civ.P. 12(b). National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Everton By Everton, 655 N.E.2d 360 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995). Indiana Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) authorizes the dismissal of claims for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." When a complaint shows on its face that it has been filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate under Indiana Trial Rule 12(C). Richards-Wilcox, Inc. v. Cummings, et. at, 700 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998); citing Monsanto Co. v. Miller N.E.2d 392 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983).
IV. Plaintiffs Claims are barred by the statute of limitations
Pursuant to IC 34-11-2-4 the time frame for bringing the actions claimed in Plaintiffs complaint were required to be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrued. When a complaint shows on its face that it has been filed after the running of the applicable statute of limitations, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate under Indiana Trial Rule 12(C). Richards-Wilcox, Inc. v. Cummings, et. al, 4 700 N.E.2d 496, 498 (Ind.Ct.App. 1998); citing Monsanto Co. v. Miller N.E.2d 392 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983).
The events giving rise to the alleged claims occurred on and arose out of the August 20, 2018 date when Plaintiff was an inmate house at the Madison County Correctional Complex (MCCC) and assaulted correctional officers after he threw the food tray at the control booth window.
Accordingly, Plaintiff had to, and including, August 20, 2020 to file his Complaint in accordance with the statute of limitations. However, Plaintiffs Complaint was not filed until October 12, 2020. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitation and must be dismissed.
V. Plaintiffs Claims are Barred by the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of collateral estoppel is a bar to subsequent litigation of a fact or issue which was adjudicated in previous litigation. Nolan v. City of Indianapolis, 933 N.E.2d 894 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010); Pritchett v. Heil, 756 N.E.2d 561 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). The former adjudication will be conclusive in the subsequent action even if the two actions are on different claims. Id.
In Nolan v. City of Indianapolis, the Indiana Court of Appeals held that criminal prosecution, wherein the trial court found that the defendant's arrest was lawful, precluded the defendant under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, from subsequently relitigating the lawfulness of his arrest in his civil claims for false arrest and false imprisonment. Nolan v. City of Indianapolis, 933 N.E.2d 894 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010). A two-part analysis determines whether collateral estoppel should be employed in a particular case: (1) whether the party against whom the former adjudication is 5 asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue and (2) whether it would be otherwise unfair under the circumstances to permit the use of collateral estoppel in the current action. Id.
Plaintiffs Complaint clearly states the facts that he was found guilty and convicted of two (2) counts of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, both level 5 felonies, and one (1) count of criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor. (Plaintiffs Complaint). As is laid out in the facts all of the events germane to this case arose out of the events of August 20, 2018. Plaintiffs Complaint is an attempt to completely relitigate his criminal case which he was found guilty and the Court of Appeals subsequently upheld. See Grover McPhaul v. State of Indiana, 132 N.E.3d 939 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) and Plaintiffs Complaint. In his criminal case Plaintiff claimed self-defense in his altercation with the Madison County Correctional Officers, denied that he broke any rules, and raised issues relating to preservation of video evidence in the underlying criminal case. Plaintiff now makes the same allegation in his Complaint in this civil action. See Plaintiffs Complaint and McPhaul v. State of Indiana, 132 N.E.3d 939 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019). Clearly Plaintiff is attempting to re-litigation the criminal case now in a civil lawsuit which the law does not allow.
Based upon the evidence and facts of this case the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes the Plaintiff for relitigating the lawfulness of the actions of the Madison County Sheriffs Department on August 20, 2018. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to have the Plaintiffs Complaint dismissed under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 6
VI. Plaintiffs Claims Are Barred by Heck v. Humphries
In his Complaint, Plaintiff admits that he was found guilty and convicted of two (2) counts of Felony Battery on a Public Safety Officer and (1) count of Criminal Mischief. He had a jury trial which he was found guilty and the Indiana Court of Appeals has upheld the trial court's actions. See Grover McPhaul v. State of Indiana, 132 N.E.3d 939 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019).
In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994).
The Supreme Court subsequently extended the holding of Heck to a challenge to the disciplinary hearing process afforded an inmate where a judgment in favor of the inmate would imply the invalidity of the punishment imposed, namely the revocation of good time credit. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646, 648 (1997).Heck has also been extended to pertain to probation revocation.
In Baskett v. Papini, 245 Fed.Appx. 677, 678 (9th Cir. 2007), the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff section 1983 action as Heck-barred because his allegations necessarily call into question the validity of the 7 probation revocation, see also Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 challenge to the denial of parole is barred by Heck ); and Vickers v. Donahue, 137 Fed.Appx. 285 (11th Cir. 2005), 1983 false arrest claim against probation officers, arising out of arrest for violation of probation conditions, was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, requiring a plaintiff seeking damages for alleged unlawful actions that would render a conviction invalid to prove the conviction was reversed, where arrestee's probation was revoked because of the violation of probation conditions, and prevailing in false arrest claim would inevitably undermine the revocation order.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges claims false arrest imprisonment, assault and battery, malicious prosecution, negligence, violations of due process, emotional pain and distress, and cruel and unusual punishment and abuse of process all of which arise out of the events of August 20, 2018. Plaintiffs convictions and sentence has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, or declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination. Plaintiff is still incarcerated with the Indiana Department of Correction for the convictions of the crimes that he committed on August 20, 2018. Plaintiff claims/allegation should all be precluded and barred by Heck v. Humphries.
WHEREFORE, the Defendants, Madison County Sheriffs Department, Madison County Board of Commissioners and Madison County Community Justice Center, would pray for judgment in their favor, that the Plaintiffs Complaint be Dismissed, that the Plaintiff takes nothing by way of his Complaint, for costs of this action, and for all other just and proper relief in the premises. 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned certifies that on the 13th day of January 2021, a copy of this document was filed electronically via the Court's system.
I further certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been duly served upon all persons listed below, by United States mail, first-class postage prepaid, on the 13th day of January, 2021: 9
Exhibit Omitted
(This disposition by unpublished memorandum decision is referenced in the North Eastern Reporter.)
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals of Indiana.
Grover MCPHAUL, Appellant-Defendant, v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CR-34
FILED August 30, 2019
Appeal from the Madison Circuit Court, The Honorable Angela Warner Sims, Judge, Trial Court Cause No. 48C01-1809-F5-2461.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Attorney for Appellant: Paul J. Podlejski, Anderson, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Curtis T. Hill, Jr., Attorney General of Indiana, Caroline G. Templeton, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Robb, Judge.
Case Summary and Issues
Following a jury trial, Grover McPhaul was convicted of two counts of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, both Level 5 felonies, and one count of criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced McPhaul to an aggregate term of six years, with three years executed in the Indiana Department of 10 Correction (“DOC”) and three years suspended. McPhaul appeals and raises two issues which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to the State's alleged failure to preserve certain evidence; and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give the jury an instruction on self-defense. Concluding the trial court did not err in either respect, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The Madison County Correctional Complex (“MCCC”) is a jail overflow facility in Anderson, Indiana, and contains three dormitories where inmates are housed. Each dormitory is comprised of thirty to fifty-one bunks, several long tables with benches, sinks, and a bathroom with an open doorway and walkway. The inmates' meals are served on reusable “big hard plastic” trays, which are placed on a cart and then wheeled into the dormitory area where the inmates line up to receive their meal. Transcript of Evidence, Volume II at 44. Inmates are permitted to eat anywhere in the dormitory. However, once finished, the inmates are required to stack the trays in a specific location. In dormitory two, inmates stack their trays next to the door, which is right next to the dorm's control room. The control room has a one-way mirror window, control panel, and five monitors displaying live footage of the dorm from several different angles, excluding the interior of the bathroom.
On August 20, 2018, McPhaul was an inmate housed in dormitory two at MCCC. Around 4:58 p.m., Correctional Officer Jared Henderson was inside the dorm's control room when he heard a “thud against the window.” Id. at 27. To determine the cause of the noise, Officer Henderson rewound the security footage a “short time” and observed McPhaul throw his dinner tray against the window of the control room, behavior that violates MCCC rules. Id. at 28. The footage showed McPhaul walked to a sink, proceeded to his bunk, grabbed a roll of toilet paper, and went into the bathroom. After viewing the footage, Officer Henderson requested via radio that McPhaul be removed from the floor. Correctional Officers Nick Robinson and Austin Bentley indicated they would respond.
Upon entering the dorm, the officers were unaware of McPhaul's location. Officer Bentley proceeded toward the bunks while Officer Robinson went straight into the bathroom area. When Officer Robinson entered, he observed “McPhaul getting ready to use the bathroom, ” so he walked up to McPhaul and asked “if he could cuff up[.]” Id. at 47. McPhaul “just blew it off and walked past” Officer Robinson and proceeded to exit the bathroom. Id. at 48. To prevent McPhaul from leaving, Officer Robinson grabbed McPhaul's right arm “to secure him in handcuffs[, ]” but McPhaul physically pulled away. Id. at 49. Officer Robinson attempted to pull McPhaul back toward him. Officer Bentley, who had been unable to locate McPhaul in the bunk area, went to the bathroom area 11 where he initially observed McPhaul walk ahead of Officer Robinson out of the bathroom and pull away as Officer Robinson tried to get him in handcuffs.
Therefore, Officer Bentley immediately assisted by making contact with McPhaul, and all three fell to the ground in the walkway of the bathroom. A physical struggle to restrain McPhaul ensued. Officer Bentley secured McPhaul's upper body and Officer Robinson attempted to secure his legs; however, McPhaul was "kicking frantic [ally]" and, at some point, drew his arm back as if he intended to punch Officer Bentley. Id. at 50. Officer Robinson grabbed McPhaul's arm before McPhaul was able to take a swing. McPhaul took Officer Bentley's glasses from his face and bent them. At some point, McPhaul "started going for [Officer Bentley's] right eye[.]" Id. at 78. Officer Bentley testified that he "could feel [McPhaul's] finger ... applying pressure to ... [his] right eye." Id.
The officers repeatedly ordered McPhaul to roll over on his stomach and place his hands on his back, but McPhaul did not comply and continued to forcibly resist their attempts to restrain him. Officer Garret arrived and delivered a defensive tactic to McPhaul enabling the officers to move McPhaul onto his stomach. Eventually, through the joint effort of the officers, McPhaul was restrained and escorted to an isolation cell. As a result of the altercation, Officer Robinson sustained an abrasion to his face and suffered from a headache, and Officer Bentley had some redness to his right eye.
MCCC Supervisor Mason Brizendine, who had finished his shift at 4:00 p.m. that day, received a phone call notifying him of the incident with McPhaul. The following morning, Brizendine reviewed the incident reports from the officers involved in the altercation, as well as the video footage involving McPhaul. Brizendine recorded the footage of the incident, downloaded the footage from 4:57 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. to a disc, and provided it to the Madison County Sheriffs Office. McPhaul filed a grievance alleging that, at 4:15 p.m. on August 20, 2018, he had informed an officer that he wished to speak to a supervisor to which the officer responded, "get away from my window before [I] throw you in isolation and my name is irrelevant[.]" Exhibits at 11. McPhaul also alleged that he was assaulted during the charged incident and suffered injuries. On September 12, 2018, McPhaul submitted a request to Brizendine for "all documents[, ] recordings related to the incident - assault that occurred on 8-20-18[.]" Id. at 13.
The State subsequently charged McPhaul with two counts of battery resulting in bodily injury to a public safety official, Level 5 felonies, and criminal mischief, a Class B misdemeanor. Notably, before trial, McPhaul filed a Notice of Meritorious Self Defense, a Motion for Specific Discovery requesting the full video footage from the date of the incident, and a Motion to Preserve Video Evidence. The day before trial, the trial court held a status hearing during which defense counsel alleged that the MCCC failed to preserve full video evidence from August 20. Following voir dire, the trial court held a hearing to address McPhaul's pending issues during which Brizendine testified that he 12 preserved video evidence from 4:57 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on August 20, which was consistent with the incident reports he had received from the officers involved in the altercation. However, footage automatically deletes after roughly twenty-nine to thirty-two days unless otherwise downloaded or preserved. Thus, any other video footage from August 20, including the interaction that McPhaul alleged had occurred forty-five minutes prior to the charged incident did not exist. McPhaul verbally moved to dismiss and for a mistrial due to Brady violations, namely failure to preserve all video evidence from that day. The trial court took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied McPhaul's Motion to Dismiss and/or for Mistrial, reasoning:
The Court again continues to see this as an issue that is - could be attack of the investigation, what was done, what wasn't done, which certainly can go to the strength and credibility of the State's case.... [A] lot of the arguments that [defense counsel] make[s] ... are appropriate in the sense in how you wish to cross examine this case and how you intend on behalf of your client to possibly question the cred[ibility] of this case. The Court sees these being pertinent to those issues rather than this being viewed through a Brady examination.Tr., Vol. I at 240. The matter proceeded to jury trial and at the conclusion thereof McPhaul tendered an instruction on self-defense, which the trial court refused to give. McPhaul was found guilty as charged and sentenced to an aggregate sentence of six years, with three years executed in the DOC and three years suspended. McPhaul now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
I. Motion to Dismiss
McPhaul argues that the “trial court abused its discretion in denying [his] motion to dismiss and motion for mistrial.” Appellant's Brief at 8 (emphasis added). The State, on the other hand, argues that the trial court ruled on a motion for mistrial, not a motion to dismiss, because, when asked by the trial court, defense counsel clarified that it was a motion for a mistrial. We disagree with the State and conclude that McPhaul moved to dismiss his case.
After voir dire and outside the presence of the jury, the trial court held a hearing to address McPhaul's pending issues before beginning the presentation of evidence. When asked whether McPhaul filed a formal motion to dismiss, defense counsel clarified, “No, 13 actually Judge [it is] a Motion for Mistrial caused by Brady Issues." Tr., Vol. I at ¶ 56.[1] However, throughout the remainder of the hearing, McPhaul essentially argued for dismissal of his case due to the alleged failure to preserve evidence, evidence that no longer exists and that he claims would have demonstrated that he acted in self-defense. Ultimately, the trial court denied what it characterized as McPhaul's "Motion to Dismiss and/or for a Mistrial." Id. at 231. Although the trial court characterized it as such, a motion to dismiss for failure to preserve evidence and a motion for a mistrial are analyzed differently. On appeal, McPhaul argues the State's "failure to preserve the requested [video] evidence which was potentially useful to [him] was in bad faith and a clear violation of his due process rights that warranted a dismissal of this cause." Appellant's Br. at 11. Ultimately, the substance of McPhaul's argument and the authority he cites leads this court to believe the relief McPhaul sought was available only through a motion to dismiss. As such, we now evaluate whether the trial court erred in denying his motion.
We review a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. Ceaser v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 918 find. Ct. App. 2012), trans, denied. We therefore reverse only where the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effects of the facts and circumstances before it. Id.
Again, the crux of McPhaul's argument is that he was denied due process requiring dismissal of the case because MCCC acted in bad faith by failing to preserve all requested video evidence from August 20, including video of an alleged encounter forty-five minutes prior to the charged incident. In Arizona v. Youngblood, the United States Supreme Court held that "unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law." 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988). "Evidence is merely potentially useful if 'no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.'" State v. Durrett, 923 N.E.2d 449, 453 (Ind.Ct.App. 2010) (quoting Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57).
McPhaul claims the prior encounter "ultimately led to him being assaulted by corrections officers" in the charged incident and this evidence would have been potentially useful to him at trial. Appellant's Br. at 10. However, we fail to see how evidence of an alleged encounter that occurred forty-five minutes prior to the charged incident provides any evidence that McPhaul was innocent or supports his theory that he acted in self-defense in the later altercation that was instigated when he repeatedly failed to comply with commands and physically resisted, causing injury to the officers. See Durrett, 923 N.E.2d at 453. Nonetheless, McPhaul attempts to demonstrate the State's bad faith by characterizing the timing of the charges as suspicious because they were filed thirty-five days after the incident and just a few days after video evidence not saved to a disc would be automatically deleted. Additionally, McPhaul asserts that 14 Brizendine decided to preserve only the three-minute portion of the footage he determined to be relevant and for the sole purpose of prosecuting McPhaul.
McPhaul argued to the trial court that the evidence was manipulated by a state actor, namely Brizendine, because he is paid by the State of Indiana. See Tr., Vol. I at 184, 201.
Based on our review of the record, we are unpersuaded that MCCC or the State acted in bad faith with respect to the video evidence. At the hearing, Brizendine testified that he determined what portions of the footage to record and save. He explained, in doing so, "My responsibility and what my priority was to clip the footage consistent with the incident that occurred. What caused the Officers to enter the dormitory and what ensued there after [sic]." Tr., Vol. I at 172. Brizendine chose to record and save the footage from 4:57 to 5:00 p.m. because it was "consistent with the reports" he had received from the officers involved in the altercation. Id. at 182. He also explained that unless recorded, all footage captured on MCCC's surveillance is automatically deleted by the system after twenty-nine to thirty-two days, depending on the camera. Brizendine provided the incident reports and downloaded footage to the sheriff, who testified that he prepared a probable cause affidavit requesting criminal charges based on the information Brizendine provided. With respect to the timing, the sheriff testified at trial that because McPhaul was already detained, "there was nothing ... so pressing that [the affidavit] needed to be completed right away" and he decided "to prepare the paperwork on a later date[.]" Tr., Vol. II at 193. Moreover, the sheriff was unaware that video footage automatically deletes until these proceedings began and had no reason to ask Brizendine to preserve additional evidence. With the evidence he had already received, "there was nothing else that [he] would be looking for." Id. at 197. The sheriff provided the affidavit and evidence to the prosecutor's office on September 7, 2018.
We acknowledge that McPhaul referenced the 4:15 p.m. incident in his grievance filed on August 22 and subsequently filed several requests for footage to be preserved before the twenty-nine to thirty-two days had passed. However, McPhaul's requests specifically referenced "the incident - assault that occurred on 8-20-18 by your hired help[.]" Exhibits at 12, 13. Therefore, MCCC staff had no reason to believe they needed to preserve any footage before that incident that occurred. McPhaul has failed to establish any bad faith by MCCC or the State.
We also note that McPhaul filed these requests on September 7 and 12, weeks after the incident occurred and after Brizendine already submitted the relevant information to the sheriff.
As previously indicated, defense counsel argued his position to the trial court. However, following evidence and argument at the hearing on the motion, the trial court ultimately denied McPhaul's motion, explaining it disagreed that the alleged evidentiary issues require a Brady analysis. Instead, the trial court stated that it viewed the argument as an attack of the investigation, namely "what was done, what wasn't done, which certainly can go to the strength and credibility of the State's case." Tr., Vol. I at 240. This is a reasonable interpretation of McPhaul's motion and the applicable law. Therefore, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in denying McPhaul's motion to dismiss. 15
II. Jury Instruction
Next, McPhaul contends that the trial court erred when it refused to provide the jury with an instruction on self-defense. Specifically, McPhaul argues his proposed jury instruction was a correct statement of the law and the evidence presented at trial "clearly established that an instruction on self-defense was warranted." Appellant's Br. at 15. We disagree.
The giving of jury instructions is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we review the trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction for an abuse of that discretion. Howard v. State, 755 N.E.2d 242, 247 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). An abuse of discretion occurs if the instructions, considered as a whole and in reference to each other, mislead the jury as to the applicable law. Smith v. State, 777 N.E.2d 32, 34 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002), trans, denied.
Generally, we will reverse a trial court for failure to give a tendered instruction if: (1) the instruction is a correct statement of the law; (2) it is supported by the evidence; (3) it does not repeat material adequately covered by other instructions; and (4) the substantial rights of the tendering party would be prejudiced by failure to give it.Howard, 755 N.E.2d at 247.
"A person is justified in using reasonable force against any other person to protect the person or a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force." Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(c) (2013) (emphasis added). A person is also justified in using reasonable force against a public servant in some circumstances outlined by statute. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(i) (2013). A correctional police officer is considered a public servant. Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(b) (2013); Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-185(a)(1). However, a person is not justified in using force against a public servant if the person reasonably believes the public servant is acting lawfully or engaged in the lawful execution of the public servant's official duties. Ind. Code 8 35-41-3-2(i)(4) (2013).
MCCC correctional officers "provide safety and security for all three ... dorms[, and m]ake sure that everybody is safe[.]" Tr., Vol. II at 41. The State maintains that even if McPhaul provided a correct instruction, there was still "no evidence to support a conclusion that the correctional officers were not engaged in the lawful execution of their duties." Brief of Appellee at 21. The evidence demonstrates that McPhaul's behavior in throwing his tray against the control room window violated MCCC rules and officers were instructed to remove McPhaul from the dormitory floor. When Officer 16 Robinson asked McPhaul to "cuff up," he ignored the instruction, walked past Officer Robinson, repeatedly ignored commands, and forcibly resisted while three officers attempted to restrain him. Tr., Vol. II at 47. There is no doubt that the correctional officers were engaged in the lawful execution of their duties, as instructed, and the record reveals no evidence of self-defense. As such, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to give the jury an instruction on self-defense.
Because this issue is dispositive, we need not address whether the instruction McPhaul tendered was a correct statement of law.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying McPhaul's motion to dismiss or in refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Pvle, J., concur. 17