Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1673-11T4
03-11-2013
DONOVAN MCKNIGHT, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ELAINE BAUGH MCKNIGHT, Defendant-Appellant.
Elaine Baugh McKnight, appellant pro se. Donovan McKnight, respondent pro se.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Simonelli and Koblitz.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Somerset County, Docket No. FM-18-453-09.
Elaine Baugh McKnight, appellant pro se.
Donovan McKnight, respondent pro se. PER CURIAM
Defendant Elaine Baugh McKnight appeals from the division of marital debt in her September 23, 2011 dual final judgment of divorce (JOD). The judgment was entered after a limited trial, the parties having agreed to most issues in an April 11, 2011 property settlement agreement (PSA) when they were both represented by counsel. Defendant was not represented by counsel at trial, although she was represented before and after trial. Plaintiff Donovan McKnight was represented by counsel at trial. Defendant argues on appeal that the court improperly ignored the credit card debt incurred in her name during the marriage. We affirm.
Her notice of appeal also references plaintiff's non-payment of childcare expenses ordered in the JOD. Enforcement of the JOD must be sought initially in the trial court. See R. 1:10-3; R. 2:8-1. She also complains in her lengthy statement submitted with the form notice of appeal that she did not receive the JOD timely and that her signature on the JOD was not authentic. Defendant does not indicate what harm flows to her from these alleged improprieties and we therefore deem them without sufficient merit to necessitate further discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Defendant indicated at the start of trial that she could not "afford to have her [attorney] any longer."
The parties were married in 2004, although the parties' relationship started in Jamaica many years before the marriage. Three children were born to the parties. In 2010, plaintiff earned approximately $45,000 annually and defendant earned approximately $25,000 annually.
We focus only on the facts necessary to resolve the dispute concerning the marital debt. Both parties testified at trial. Plaintiff testified first and presented documentary proof of the credit card debt incurred in his name during the marriage. The parties agreed that this debt was marital debt. Both parties testified that defendant also used these credit cards. Defendant testified that when plaintiff stopped providing her with money to support the home and children, she used the credit cards. She indicated that the parties transferred the balances on the cards to different credit cards several times to reduce interest rates on the debt. She also testified that she took care of plaintiff's ailing mother for six years and that $10,000 of the debt incurred was charged for her mother-in-law's funeral expenses. After testifying as to her credit card use the judge asked, "Is there anything else you want me to consider, Ms. McKnight?" Defendant then began to discuss issues involving attorney's fees.
Defendant was permitted wide latitude in her testimony and discussed at length her financial difficulties during the marriage. She submitted documentary evidence. She did not, however, delineate in her testimony any debt incurred in her name. On cross-examination the following exchange occurred:
[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL:] Do you agree that those debts were - - are you aware of those debts that were incurred during the marriage?After the judge began to deliver his opinion, defendant interrupted to state,
[DEFENDANT:] Yes. I'm aware of them.
[PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL:] And you agree that they were marital debts?
[DEFENDANT:] Yes, including the ones that I have.
[JUDGE:] In regard to the parties' contribution to the joint debt and what is considered joint debt, the testimony is that the parties have - -
[DEFENDANT:] I didn't give you mine yet.
[JUDGE:] - - 22,700 - - I'm sorry. Yes.
[DEFENDANT:] Your Honor, you didn't get my side of it yet.
[JUDGE:] Well, ma'am, it's a little late for that now. I've got enough to make this decision, and I'm moving forward.
The parties have total debt of $31,753.03. The defendant has testified that approximately $10,000 of that debt was incurred to pay for burial and other death expenses of the plaintiff's mother. That testimony is uncontroverted. Leaving joint debt, this Court finds, of $21,753.03.
Apportioning that debt in accordance with the parties['] respective income and considering this Court's equitable powers to accomplish substantial justice, of that $21,753.03, the defendant shall be responsible for $7,000 of that debt; the [plaintiff] being responsible for the balance, or $14,173 - - I'm sorry. $14,753.03.
[DEFENDANT:] Could you repeat that, your Honor?
[JUDGE:] You are responsible for $7,000 of the joint debt.
[DEFENDANT:] Okay.
Defendant argues that the judge should have considered the marital debt she incurred on credit cards during the marriage. On appeal, she provides a copy of a cover letter from her lawyer to her adversary dated over two months prior to trial. Her lawyer wrote in pertinent part:
Defendant did not seek the required permission to expand the trial record. R. 2:5-5. However, we have considered her documents in the interest of fairness.
I have enclosed copies of credit card statements incurred by the parties while they were living together . . . . Ms. McKnight will rely on these statements in support of the balances that were supplied to you at the time of our last Court appearance when the parties testify [sic] before [the prior judge] as to this issue on May 16, 2011.It appears that the handwritten message on the bottom of the page is written by defendant's lawyer to defendant. It states in part, "I have included copies of all statements for your review." No such statements were supplied to the trial judge or to us. Defendant did supply us with a typed list of five debts. The list purports to be "[a]ll balances as of 2008 when accounts went into collection due to lack of payment[.]" The list does not contain any credit card numbers. The total is $29,746.04. Even if defendant had thought to present this evidence to the trial judge, it does not demonstrate that she had incurred this debt in her name during the marriage.
Although the lawyer states that the date of the prior testimony was May 16, 2011, the letter is dated May 5, 2011.
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Defendant also provided us with another letter from her attorney, who had not attended the trial. In that letter her lawyer objects to the proposed JOD supplied by her adversary in part because it
[R]eferences only those credit cards which are in your client's name and does not reference the credit cards which are in Ms. McKnight's name. She told me that she had the balance information for the cards in her name at the time of the hearing, but that they were, apparently, not referenced by you. This needs to be corrected or she will take the issue back to Court.
It was not the obligation of plaintiff's counsel to present defendant's case. Pro se litigants must follow the same court rules as attorneys. Venner v. Allstate, 306 N.J. Super. 106, 110 (App. Div. 1997). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to allow defendant to reopen her case when he was rendering his decision, especially in light of the weakness of the proofs defendant was prepared to submit. Malik v. Ruttenberg, 398 N.J. Super. 489, 498 (App. Div. 2008) (finding that "the trial judge possesses wide discretion to control the trial" (citations omitted)).
"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's fact-finding function is limited. The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Moreover, "[b]ecause of the family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 413. "Deference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" Id. at 412 (quoting In re Return of Weapons to J.W.D., 149 N.J. 108, 117 (1997)). The question is not whether this court would come to a different conclusion were it the trial tribunal. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). We intervene only when convinced that the trial judge's factual findings and legal conclusions "'are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc., supra, 65 N.J. at 484).
Plaintiff filed his divorce complaint in October 2008. The parties were finally divorced in September 2011. They attempted to place a full settlement on the record after signing their April 11, 2011 PSA, but became bogged down in unresolved issues. Months later they tried those issues and the trial judge ruled on those issues based on the evidence presented at the trial. Finality is particularly important where the financial stability of parents and children is impaired by uncertainty.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION