Summary
denying writ of prohibition to halt initiative election on zoning ordinance
Summary of this case from Gumprecht v. City of Coeur D'AleneOpinion
No. 79SA435
Decided September 8, 1980.
Action commenced by qualified electors in their individual capacity and as representatives of all qualified electors of the City of Louisville against members of the city council, the mayor and the city alleging that the electors' constitutional rights to referendum and initiative were abridged by the failure of the named city officials to refer an annexation ordinance to the voters of the City, and by their failure to submit to the vote of the electorate an initiated measure repealing the said ordinance. From an adverse judgment, the electors appealed.
Reversed
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — Political Power — Vested in People. All political power is vested in and derived from the people and all government originates from the people.
2. Right to Legislate — Reserved to People. By the express provisions of the Colorado Constitution the people have reserved for themselves the right to legislate; this right is of the first order; it is not a grant to the people but a reservation by them for themselves.
3. INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, RECALL — Right — Any Measure — Municipalities — Legislation of Every Character. The right of initiative pertains to any measure, whether constitutional or legislative, and, in the case of municipalities, it encompasses legislation of every character.
4. Fundamental Right. Like the right to vote, the power of initiative is a fundamental right at the very core of our republican form of government.
5. Right — Liberally Construed — Curtailment — Viewed With Scrutiny. The right of initiative has always been liberally construed, and the supreme court has viewed with the closest scrutiny any governmental action that has the effect of curtailing its free exercise.
6. Unavailable — Exemption — Emergency Clause — Judicial Protection — Power of Electorate. Where the power of referendum is ostensibly unavailable to the people through the constitutional exemption of an emergency clause, nothing short of jealous judicial protection of the one remaining power of the electorate is in order.
7. Governmental Officials — Lack of Power — Prohibit the Exercise — Prematurely — Constitutionality or Validity of Measure — When Determined. Governmental officials have no power to prohibit the exercise of the initiative by prematurely passing upon the substantive merits of the initiated measure; nor may the courts interfere with the exercise of this right by declaring unconstitutional or invalid a proposed measure before the process has run its course and the measure is actually adopted; then and only then, when actual litigants whose rights are affected are before it, may the court determine the validity of the legislation.
8. Presumption of Validity — Measure — Proposed by Electors. An initiative measure proposed by electors is clothed in the first instance with a presumption of validity, and its actual validity may be considered by the court only if and when it is adopted into the law by the electorate.
9. Process of Amendment — Interruption by Courts — Restrain Popular Vote — Lack of Power. The courts have no power to interrupt the process of amendment before it is complete, to restrain a popular vote upon a constitutional proposal, even though they may be clearly of the opinion that the popular vote will be ineffective because of defects already apparent in the method of proposal.
10. Fundamental Right of Electorate — Initiated Repeal of Annexation Ordinance — Competing Interests of Property Owners. Interests of intervening property owners — which might be legally implicated and adversely affected by the initiated repeal of annexation ordinance — do not override the legitimate and fundamental right of the electorate to seek the only available redress for municipal legislation which to them may seem unreasonable, burdensome or outrightly offensive.
11. Initiated Repeal of Annexation Ordinance — Interests of Intervening Property Owners — Due Process. Prior to an actual election on an initiated measure, neither due process of law nor any other constitutional principle serves to elevate the claimed interests of intervening property owners to a constitutional absolute; at this stage of the proceedings those interests are entitled to no more process than that which an initiative election affords them, and the qualified electors of the city are entitled to no less under the Colorado Constitution.
12. Repeal of Annexation Ordinance — Matter of Local Concern. The initiated measure in instant case — for repeal of annexation ordinance — relates exclusively to a matter of local interest and concern, namely, the 1407 acres of property annexed to the city of Louisville; thus, the uniquely local subject matter of the initiated measure, its clearly legislative character, and the timely filing of the initiative petitions prior to the effective date of the annexation ordinance, place the electors' claim to an initiative election within the broad powers reserved to the people by Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution.
13. Annexation Ordinance — Emergency or Safety Clause — Referendum Petitions — Initiative Petitions — Submission to Electorate. Where qualified voters of a municipality file protest referendum petitions before and immediately after the adoption of an annexation ordinance by a municipality, and the electors are effectively precluded from a referendum election because of the incorporation of an emergency or safety clause in the ordinance, and immediately after the adoption of the ordinance and before it becomes effective under the municipal code, the qualified voters file initiative petitions for the repeal of the annexation ordinance, such qualified voters have a constitutional right to have that initiated measure submitted to the electorate in accordance with Colo. Const., Art. V, Sec. 1, and section 1-40-116, C.R.S. 1973, and municipal officials in such case must take all necessary and proper measures to implement the submission of that measure to the electorate.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of Boulder, Honorable William D. Neighbors, Judge.
Caplan and Earnest, Gerald A. Caplan, Richard E. Bump, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Rautenstraus Joss, Curt D. Rautenstraus, W. Bruce Joss; Musick, Williamson, Schwartz, Leavenworth Cope, P.C., Stephen T. Williamson, for defendants-appellees and special counsel to the City of Louisville.
French Stone, Joseph C. French, Robert W. Stone for intervenor-appellee, Hanover Development Company.
This appeal questions the extent to which the legislative body of a municipality, by adopting an annexation ordinance as an emergency measure, can thereby curtail the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people by Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution.
The plaintiffs-appellants, Don McKee and four other qualified electors (electors), commenced this action individually and as representatives of all qualified electors of the City of Louisville against the members of the city council, the Louisville mayor, and the City of Louisville. The complaint alleged that the electors' constitutional rights to referendum and initiative were abridged by the failure of the named Louisville city officials to refer an annexation ordinance, ordinance 637, to the voters of Louisville, and by their failure to submit to the vote of the electorate an initiated measure repealing ordinance 637. After a trial on the merits, the district court ruled that the electors had no right to either a referendum or initiative election and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. We reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the cause with directions.
I.
On December 13, 1978, Hanover Development company, Zenith Builders, Inc., WJS Corporation and William and Associates (property owners) filed a petition with the City of Louisville for annexation of certain land they had assembled. The land consisted of 1,407 acres which they intended to develop as both residential property and a regional commercial center known as Centennial Valley Mall. A public hearing on the proposed annexation was held on February 13, 1979. One week later, on February 20, 1979, the Louisville City Council introduced and unanimously approved on first reading ordinance 637, which purported to annex the property in question. The ordinance contained an emergency or safety clause rendering it effective upon its adoption as necessary for the public health, safety and welfare. No mention of the emergency clause was made at the February 20 meeting and the ordinance was read by title only. At this meeting the electors orally requested the city council to refer the ordinance to a vote of the qualified electors of the city. This request was summarily denied and a public hearing on the ordinance was scheduled for 30 days later, March 20, 1979. The electors then filed duly signed petitions for a referendum with the city clerk. The city council refused to refer the ordinance to a vote of the electorate.
At the public hearing on March 20, 1979, the electors asked the city council what they were required to do in order to place the ordinance before the electorate. The received no response. At the March 20 meeting the city council unanimously adopted ordinance 637.
The city council on March 20, 1979, also adopted ordinance 638, which zoned by section the property annexed by ordinance 637 for residential, commercial and agricultural uses.
Upon adoption of the ordinance the electors immediately refiled the referendum petition with the city clerk. On the following day, March 21, 1979, the electors at 8:15 a.m. also filed with the city clerk initiative petitions duly executed by a sufficient number of qualified electors. The initiative petitions proposed a measure to repeal ordinance 637. The city officials of Louisville refused to submit the initiated measure to the electorate.
The electors, on March 21, 1979, filed an action in the district court requesting the court to suspend the effect of ordinance 637 and to order a referendum election, or alternatively, to order the Louisville city officials to publish the initiated measure and to submit it to a popular election. On motion of the property owners, the district court permitted them to intervene because of their interest in the matter. After a trial on the merits the court held that the electors had no right to a referendum on the annexation ordinance because the inclusion of the emergency clause exempted it from the referendum provision of the Colorado Constitution. Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1. The court also held that the electors had no constitutional right to an election on the initiated measure because, under the Municipal Annexation Act of 1965 (Municipal Annexation Act), sections 31-12-101 et seq., 31-12-501, 31-12-601, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12), neither the city council nor the electorate have the power to disconnect annexed land without the consent of the property owners.
The electors on this appeal have challenged the order of the district court permitting the property owners to intervene under C.R.C.P. 24. In view of our disposition of the case we find it unnecessary to address this issue.
On this appeal the electors claim that Article V, Section 1 of the Colorado Constitution entitles them to a referendum election on ordinance 637 despite the inclusion of an emergency clause in the ordinance, or at least to an initiative election on the proposed repeal measure. We find it unnecessary to address the electors' claim regarding a referendum election, as the electors were clearly deprived of their constitutional right to initiative.
Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1, excepts from the referendum provisions laws necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety.
II.
[1-4] "All political power is vested in and derived from the people," and all government originates from the people. Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 1; Colorado Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, 178 Colo. 1, 495 P.2d 220 (1972); Hudson v. Annear, 101 Colo. 551, 75 P.2d 587 (1938). By the express provisions of the Colorado Constitution the people have reserved for themselves the right to legislate. Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1. This right is of the first order; it is not a grant to the people but a reservation by them for themselves. E.g., In re Legislative Reapportionment, 150 Colo. 380, 374 P.2d 66 (1962). The right of initiative pertains to any measure, whether constitutional or legislative, and, in the case of municipalities, it encompasses legislation of every character:
"The initiative . . . powers reserved to the people by this section are hereby further reserved to the legal voters of every city, town and municipality as to all local, special municipal legislation of every character in or for their respective municipalities." Colo. Const. Art. V, Sec. 1.
Section 1-40-116, C.R.S. 1973, provides for the submission by qualified voters to the legislative body of a municipality any proposed ordinance, charter, or charter amendment, and also contains procedures for an election on the proposed measure. Louisville Municipal Code, § 1.16.020, states that any proposed ordinance may be submitted to the city council upon petition of qualified electors in the manner provided by the state law.
Like the right to vote, the power of initiative is a fundamental right at the very core of our republican form of government. E. g., Bernzen v. City of Boulder, 186 Colo. 81, 525 P.2d 416 (1974); Brownlow v. Wunsch, 103 Colo. 120, 83 P.2d 775 (1938).
[5,6] This court has always liberally construed this fundamental right, and, concomitantly, we have viewed with the closest scrutiny and governmental action that has the effect of curtailing its free exercise. E.g. Billings v. Buchanan, 192 Colo. 32, 555 P.2d 176 (1976). Colorado Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, supra; Burks v. City of Lafayette, 142 Colo. 61, 349 P.2d 692 (1960); Yenter v. Baker, 126 Colo. 232, 248 P.2d 311 (1952); Baker v. Bosworth, 122 Colo. 356, 222 P.2d 416 (1950). Especially in cases where, as here, the power of referendum is ostensibly unavailable to the people through the constitutional exemption of an emergency clause, nothing short of jealous judicial protection of the one remaining power of the electorate is in order. We expressly recognized this responsibility in Van Kleeck v. Ramer, 62 Colo. 4, 156 P. 1108 (1916):
"Under the reserved power of the initiative and referendum, after the declaration by the General Assembly that a law is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, when not referred to the people for their judgment, it still remains with them if they are dissatisfied with it, to cause a measure to be submitted at the next general election for its repeal." 62 Colo. at 13, 156 P. at 1111.
[7] Governmental officials have no power to prohibit the exercise of the initiative by prematurely passing upon the substantive merits of the initiated measure. City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, 133 Colo. 262, 293 P.2d 974 (1956). Nor may the courts interfere with the exercise of this right by declaring unconstitutional or invalid a proposed measure before the process has run its course and the measure is actually adopted. City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra; Speer v. People, 52 Colo. 325, 122 P. 768 (1912). Then and only then, when actual litigants whose rights are affected are before it, may the court determine the validity of the legislation. City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra; Speer v. People, supra.
The trial court's dismissal of the electors' complaint in this case is flawed in two respects. First, the court determined that the interest of the intervening property owners in the annexed property permitted it to rule upon the validity of the initiated measure before its adoption. And second, the court based its dismissal upon a premature judicial determination that the initiated measure, if approved, would be invalid as beyond the legislative power of the city council and, accordingly, beyond the initiative power of the electorate.
III.
In rejecting the electors' claim for a judicially ordered initiative election, the trial court ruled that the interests of the intervening property owners would be adversely affected by the initiated measure and, therefore, the court could properly determine the validity of that measure in advance of its adoption. In so ruling the court rendered an advisory opinion on a measure not yet affecting the intervenors' property interests and pre-empted the initiative process itself.
[8,9] The initiated measure proposed by the electors is clothed in the first instance with a presumption of validity, and its actual validity may be considered by the court only if and when it is adopted into law by the electorate. Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra. In Speer v. People, supra, at 342-45, 122 P. at 773-774, which dealt with an initiative election on an amendment to the Denver City Charter, this court clearly articulated the operative principles in these matters:
"'The courts have no power to interrupt the process of amendment before it is complete, to restrain a popular vote upon a constitutional proposal, even though they may be clearly of the opinion that the popular vote will be ineffective because of defects already apparent in the method of proposal. They must wait until the amending process is fully completed, and then pass upon the validity of the amendment if this question is properly presented in litigation before them. In accordance with this view it would seem that the courts should compel by mandamus administrative acts incident to the amending process . . . .'"
. . .
"Future possibilities, that a measure may be invalid . . ., count for nothing in the presence of the overwhelming necessity of obeying the plain mandates of the constitution, and of keeping inviolate the distribution of powers as made until the people themselves, in their sovereign power, see fit to make a change . . . . Not until the measure is adopted and made a part of the charter have the courts any power to determine its validity and then only when actual litigants, whose rights are affected, are before them."
[10] The interests claimed by the intervening property owners in this case consist of the receipt of various municipal services, such as water services and police and fire protection, and other benefits incidental to the zoning of the annexed property. Assuming that such interests might be legally implicated and adversely affected by the initiated repeal of the annexation ordinance — and we intimate nothing in regard to the validity of that claim or the propriety of relief in that instance — those interests do not override the legitimate and fundamental right of the electorate to seek the only available redress for municipal legislation which to them may seem unreasonable, burdensome or outrightly offensive.
If the repealing measure is not adopted at the initiative election, the claimed interests of the property owners will not have been affected in any manner, and the electors will have received their constitutional entitlement under the initiative clause. If, on the other hand, the repealing measure receives a majority of the votes cast at the election, section 1-40-113, C.R.S. 1973, the fundamental right of the electors will have been preserved and the property owners may then, if they so desire, resort to the judicial process on their claimed abridgement of interest.
Section 31-12-117, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12), provides that after the effective date of an annexation ordinance, all acts taken in conformity with the charter and ordinances of the annexing municipality remain effective, including subdivision platting and construction and occupancy of improvements. See City Council v. Board of Directors of South Suburban Metropolitan Recreation and Park District, 181 Colo. 334, 509 P.2d 317 (1973); City and County of Denver v. Board of Directors of Bancroft Fire Protection District, 38 Colo. App. 53, 554 P.2d 714 (1976). The intervening property owners acknowledged during the trial that any steps taken by them in connection with the development of the land in question would be at their peril, pending final resolution of this matter. The issue of whether, under the circumstances of this case, the property owners might acquire any vested rights pursuant to section 31-12-117 is precisely the type of question which should await the outcome of the election on the initiated measure, when litigants, whose rights are actually affected, are before the court.
[11] Prior to an actual election on the initiated measure, neither due process of law nor any other constitutional principle serves to elevate the claimed interest of the intervening property owners to a constitutional absolute. At this stage of the proceedings those interests are entitled to no more process than that which an initiative election affords them, and the qualified electors of Louisville are entitled to no less under the Colorado Constitution. See Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 426 U.S. 668, 96 S.Ct. 2358, 49 L.Ed.2d 132 (1976).
IV.
In dismissing the electors' complaint with prejudice the trial court determined that "the Louisville City Council has no authority to pass an ordinance disconnecting annexed property from the City without the property owner's consent," and "[s]ince the Louisville City Council cannot disconnect the intervenors' property from the City without their consent, neither can the voters achieve that by initiative." By so ruling, the trial court assumed that when the electors filed the initiative petitions with the city clerk at 8:15 a.m. on March 21, 1979, the property had already been annexed to the City of Louisville. The trial court's ruling was predicated on a questionable assumption.
The initiative petitions were filed with the city clerk on March 21, 1979, before ordinance 637 had yet become effective. The Louisville Municipal Code, § 1.16.050, expressly provides that emergency measures take effect in five days. In fact, when the complaint was filed in this case, ordinance 637 had not yet been published as required by the Louisville Municipal Code. Although we need not and do not decide the issue at this time, it is strongly arguable that the initiative petitions were more in the nature of a repeal of a not-yet-effective ordinance than a disconnection of already annexed property, and thus within the legislative powers of the city council. See Board of County Commissioners. v. City and County of Denver, 190 Colo. 300, 546 P.2d 497 (1976); Board of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, 40 Colo. App. 281, 573 P.2d 568 (1978). The Municipal Annexation Act, section 31-12-101 et seq., C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12), is silent on the power of a municipality to repeal an annexation ordinance. See Board of County Commissioners v. City and County of Denver, supra.
Louisville Municipal Code, § 1.16.050, provides in pertinent part: "All ordinances of a general or permanent nature . . . shall be published in some newspaper published within the city limits. Such ordinances shall not take effect and be in force until the expiration of thirty days after they have been so published, except for ordinances . . . necessary to the immediate preservation of the public health or safety and containing the reasons making the same necessary in a separate section. The excepted ordinances shall take effect in five days, provided they have been passed by an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the members of the council." Ordinance 637 was published in the Louisville Times under a publication date of March 22, 1979.
[12] In terms of subject matter, the initiated measure in this case relates exclusively to a matter of local interest and concern — the 1,407 acres of property annexed to the city of Louisville. There is no statewide interest in this particular land. Admittedly, the state does have a general interest in matters of annexation and disconnection. That interest, however, centers essentially on procedural uniformity as it relates to the orderly growth of urban communities. Section 31-12-102, C.R.S. 1973 (1977 Repl. Vol. 12). The initiated measure here does not facially contravene or usurp any interest of the state. The uniquely local subject matter of the initiated measure, its clearly legislative character, e.g., City of Louisville v. District Court, 190 Colo. 33, 543 P.2d 67 (1975), and the timely filing of the initiative petitions prior to the effective date of annexation ordinance 637, place the electors' claim to an initiative election within the broad powers reserved to the people by Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution. See, e.g., Billings v. Buchanan, supra; Colorado Project-Common Cause v. Anderson, supra; Burks v. City of Lafayette, supra; City of Rocky Ford v. Brown, supra; Yenter v. Baker, supra; Baker v. Bosworth, supra; Van Kleeck v. Ramer, supra; Speer v. People, supra; see also Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 473, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976). The validity of the initiated measure, if approved by the electorate, can await determination at another time when actual litigants, whose rights are affected, are before the court. Van Kleeck v. Ramer, supra; Speer v. People, supra.
V.
[13] Our holding in this case is a narrow one. Where, as here, qualified voters of a municipality file protest referendum petitions before and immediately after the adoption of an annexation ordinance by a municipality, and municipal officials reject the referendum petitions on the basis of an emergency or safety clause incorporated in the ordinance, and immediately after the adoption of the ordinance and before it becomes effective under the municipal code, the qualified voters file initiative petitions for the repeal of the annexation ordinance, those qualified voters have a constitutional right to have that initiated measure submitted to the electorate in accordance with Article V, Section 1, of the Colorado Constitution, and section 1-40-116, C.R.S. 1973, and municipal officials in such a case must take all necessary and proper measures to implement the submission of that measure to the electorate.
The judgment is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded to the district court with directions to order an election on the initiated measure.
JUSTICE LEE and JUSTICE LOHR dissent.
JUSTICE DUBOFSKY does not participate.