OPINION

DORAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding in mandamus wherein the court below granted a peremptory writ to compel the appellants, as members of the Board of Pension Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, to pay to petitioner a pension pursuant to certain of the terms and provisions of article XVII of the Los Angeles city charter. There is no dispute as to the facts, which are that petitioner is the widow of Charles E. McKeag, who for many years acted as secretary of the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, having been appointed to that position in 1906. From 1925 to 1932, he acted as secretary of the Board of Fire Commissioners exclusively. He was retired on February 16, 1932, and was paid a pension from the police and fire pension system of said city until the time of his death on August 23, 1939. Thereafter his widow, petitioner herein, pursuant to the provisions of section 183 of the city charter, made application for a widow’s pension. There is no dispute as to petitioner’s claim that for more than one year prior to her husband’s death she was his wife; but on September 26, 1939, appellant commissioners denied her a widow’s pension on the ground that during his lifetime her husband was not legally entitled to receive the pension paid him, by reason of which fact petitioner herein was foreclosed from participating in the pension system benefits.

The question here involved is the same as that in Haas v. City of Los Angeles, Cal.App., 124 P.2d 100, this day decided, and for the reasons given in the opinion in the Haas case the judgment herein is reversed.

YORK, P. J., concurred.

WHITE, Justice (dissenting).

I dissent. Section 183 of the city charter, so far as here pertinent, provides in part as follows: "Whenever any member of the fire or police department shall die * * * after retirement, or while eligible to retirement from such department on account of years of service, then an annual pension shall be paid in equal monthly installments to his widow. * * *"

It is first contended by respondent that under the aforesaid charter provision the Board of Pension Commissioners had no alternative than to grant her a widow’s pension, for the reason that in 1932 her husband was duly retired on a pension which was regularly paid him for some seven years up to the time of his demise. Respondent argues that in 1939 the pension board was without authority to review its determination made in 1932 that her husband was a member of the fire department and of the class thereof entitled to share in the benefits of the pension fund. I am not in accord with respondent’s claim in this regard. The law seems well settled that where, as here, there is no provision in the charter giving to the Board of Pension Commissioners acting in any judicial capacity, the power to determine a question of fact in connection with the granting or withholding of a pension, the board is in the same position "with relation to such a matter as is any officer required by law to do a prescribed act in a certain contingency, where no special method is provided by law for the ascertainment of the facts. Under such circumstances it may often be true that there is uncertainty or dispute as to the facts, but in such a case the only resort of the officer is such investigation as he may be able to himself make for the purpose of determining his own course of action. His determination as to the facts, however, is not effectual for any other purpose. If not satisfied as to the evidence of the essential facts, he may refuse to act until required to do so by the judgment of some tribunal invested with the power to finally determine such controversy, but before such tribunal any conclusion to which he may have come on the facts has no legal force whatever. The sole question there is whether the facts are in realty such as to require the performance of the act, and this altogether regardless of the officer’s conclusion as to the facts. The party having a vested right in the performance of the act, if the facts are as claimed by him, has also the right to have his claim as to the facts judicially determined. The functions of the board in such a matter as this are really ministerial only, and come under the same principle as would apply in the case of a county or city auditor, in so far as any finality to its conclusions are concerned. * * * As we read the charter, it gives no judicial function whatever to the board in such a matter as this, confers upon it no authority to hear and determine a controversy in a judicial sense." French v. Cook, 173 Cal. 126, 160 P. 411, 413; Sheehan v. Board of Police Commissioners, 197 Cal. 70, 239 P. 844.

The determination of the Board of Pension Commissioners in 1932, when it voted respondent’s husband a pension pursuant to section 185 of the charter, not being judicial in character, possesses no legal force whatever as such and amounts to nothing more than an indication of the board’s course of action in the premises at the time such action was taken. From what has just been said, it follows that when called upon to determine the validity of respondent’s application for a widow’s pension in 1939, the board was not bound by its determination in 1932 to the effect that her husband was a member of the fire department entitled to a retirement pension. In its determination of respondent’s application, the board was empowered to make an investigation thereof for the purpose of deciding its course of action thereon, and if such investigation satisfied the board that at the time of the death of respondent’s husband he was not and durnig his period of retirement on pension never had been a member of the fire department as contemplated by section 185 of the charter, then the board was not bound by the course of action determined upon by it or its predecessor board in 1932. The right of the board in this regard does not of course foreclose respondent from having her claim as to the facts of the case in connection with the status of her husband in the fire department and its pension system judicially determined.

We come now to a consideration of appellant’s claim that respondent, as the widow of Mr. McKeag, was not entitled to a pension because the latter was never employed in the fire department within the class of such departmental employees that are entitled to participate in the fire and police pension fund system. The question of the eligibility of respondent’s husband to retire upon a pension is dependent upon a construction of the provisions of section 185 of the Los Angeles city charter as applied to the duties performed by him in his position as secretary to the Board of Fire Commissioners. The cited section, so far as here material reads: "For the purpose of the provisions contained herein, the Fire Department shall consist of all persons duly and regularly appointed in the Fire Department under civil service rules and regulations whose duty it is to prevent or extinguish fires in the City of Los Angeles, under whatever designation they may be described in any salary or departmental ordinance providing compensation for said fire department."

A further chronological review of the factual background surrounding the status of Secretary McKeag reveals the following: At all times, beginning with his appointment in 1906 and continuing until his retirement in 1932, he was paid by the fire department and carried on the payroll of such department. This was true during the period he also acted as secretary to the Board of Police Commissioners, for which service he received no compensation from or through the police department. Throughout the years here involved, the fire department was under the control and direction of the Board of Fire Commissioners, who so far as Secretary McKeag was concerned were empowered to require of him in addition to his secretarial activities the performance of "such other duties as the board may prescribe." It seems to me that any question as to whether respondent’s husband was a member of the fire department is settled by the provision of section 80 of the present city charter which reads: "Subject to the provisions of this charter * * * said general manager (chief engineer) shall have the power and duty * * * (2) to appoint, discharge, suspend or transfer the employees of the department, other than the secretary and the chief accounting employees; * * *."

The just-quoted section would appear to amount to a recognition of Mr. McKeag in his capacity as secretary to the Fire Commission as one of the employees of the fire department, but an employee whose appointment, discharge, suspension or transfer was not within the power of the chief of the fire department. The word "employee" used in the foregoing charter section is synonymous with "member," used in section 185 of the charter. Hurley v. Sykes, 69 Cal.App. 310, 231 P. 748. In connection with Secretary McKeag’s status with the fire department, it is noteworthy that upon his retirement a promotional civil service examination was held in the fire department to fill his position as secretary to the Board of Fire Commissioners. This promotional examination was limited to certain members of the fire department, viz., firemen, auto firemen, captains, etc. In other words, only members of the fire department could participate in the civil service examination for secretary to the Board of Fire Commissioners. In 1932 the council of the city of Los Angeles by ordinance determined who were and were not members of the fire department and segregated members of such department into two groups, (1) pension, and (2) nonpension employees. At this time the position of secretary held by Mr. McKeag was included in the pensioned group. This action certainly amounted to a legislative determination of the fact that the secretary to the Board of Fire Commissioners was a position created for the purpose of preventing or extinguishing fires in the city of Los Angeles, and as cogently stated by the city attorney of Los Angeles in an opinion furnished appellant Board of Fire Commissioners, "may generally be accepted by your honorable body for the purpose of determining the question of membership in the fire and police pension system."

As far back as 1930 appellant Board of Pension Commissioners, pursuant to ordinance No. 67778 of the city of Los Angeles, duly certified that Charles E. McKeag was "a member of the fire department, has served in such department the aggregate number of years, to-wit, 24, entitling such member to retirement as provided in section 181 of the Charter of the City of Los Angeles."

The record shows that the Board of Fire Commissioners found as a fact that Secretary McKeag was a member of the fire department "whose duty it is to prevent or extinguish fires in the City of Los Angeles"; and it also appears that in addition to his routine duties as secretary, Mr. McKeag was ordered by appellant Board of Fire Commissioners to "respond to such alarms of fire as the Board of Fire Commissioners may direct, and perform such other duties as may be required by the Board of Fire Commissioners or the chief engineer for the purpose of prevention and extinguishment of fires in the City of Los Angeles." It remains uncontradicted in the record that pursuant to directions of the fire commissioners, Secretary McKeag responded to fire alarms and performed actual work at the scene of fires in connection with the extinguishment thereof. In addition to the foregoing, he made records of conditions prevailing at these fires for the purpose of studying such conditions at a later date; he prepared legislation, resolutions and orders tending to decrease fire hazards and to make for more efficient operation of the fire department; he personally took steps to remedy hazardous situations. From the foregoing recital it appears plainly to me that in the course of his duties as secretary to the Board of Fire Commissioners Mr. McKeag was actually engaged in the prevention and extinguishment of fires in the city of Los Angeles, and therefore, under the provisions of section 185 of the city charter, was entitled to participate in the benefits of the pension fund.

Appellant commission, however, takes the position that it is not the duties performed by a member of the fire department, but the status of such person in the classified civil service that establishes his right to participate in the pension benefits. In other words, the Board of Pension Commissioners now asserts that in order to obtain the benefits of the pension system, a member of the fire department must hold a civil service classification or position which requires the performance of duties tending to prevent or extinguish fires in the city, and this assertion is now indulged in by appellant commission notwithstanding the fact that over a long period of years it recognized Secretary McKeag as a member of the fire department who was entitled to receive a pension and actually paid him such pension until the time of his death. I am not impressed with the argument of appellant board in the light of the plain and unequivocal language used in section 185 of the charter. I feel that the following quotation from my dissenting opinion in the case of Knoll v. City of Los Angeles, Cal.App., 124 P.2d 113, this day filed, effectively answers the last-mentioned contention of appellants herein: "* * * respondent argues that if a regularly classified civil service fireman were assigned appellant’s duties or were assigned to the salvage bureau or fire prevention bureau, such employee would nevertheless be entitled to participate in the pension system, not because of the duties he was performing, but because of the duties imposed by law upon one holding the civil service classification of a fireman. I do not concede the soundness of this argument, in view of the plain and understandable language of the charter, section 185 of which provides that ‘for the purpose of the provisions contained herein the fire department shall consist of all persons duly and regularly appointed in the fire department under civil service rules and regulations whose duty it is to prevent or extinguish fires in the City of Los Angeles, under whatever designation they may be described in any salary or departmental ordinance providing compensation for said department.’

"It is noteworthy that the section does not restrict the operation of the fire department pension fund to those members of the department of any particular designation described in any salary or departmental ordinance, but on the contrary, provides that notwithstanding any descriptive designation in the rules or ordinances, any employee whose duties involve the prevention or extinguishment of fires shall be regarded as a member of the fire department entitled to participate in the pension benefits of the fire department pension system. If the framers of the charter or the people in adopting the same had intended to limit the benefits of the system to those classified as firemen, it would have been very simple to so state. That they did not intend such a limitation is evident from the use of the language providing that any member of the fire department whose duty it is to prevent or extinguish fires in the City of Los Angeles shall be eligible to share in the pension funds regardless of the designation given him in any salary or departmental ordinance. * * *"

There is another phase of this case which adds strength to the conclusion that Secretary McKeag was a member of the fire department within the purview of section 185 of the charter, and that is the fact that appellant Board of Pension Commissioners, charged with the duty of interpreting the provisions of the charter in relation to applicants for pension rights, continued over a period of some ten years to determine and recognize that Secretary McKeag was entitled to pension rights. The record further shows that such a course of action on the part of the commission was in accordance with the advice and counsel of the city attorney of Los Angeles. This established course of conduct on the part of the commission, followed uninterruptedly for some ten years, constituted a contemporaneous practical construction of the applicable pension provisions of the charter by those charged with the duty of administering it. While such contemporaneous and practical construction is not controlling, it is nevertheless entitled to considerable respect and recognition. In United States v. Philbrick, 120 U.S. 52, 59, 7 S.Ct. 413, 417, 30 L.Ed. 559, it was said: "A contemporaneous construction by the officers upon whom was imposed the duty of executing those statutes is entitled to great weight; and, since it is not clear that that construction was erroneous, it ought not now to be overturned."

Construing the Los Angeles city charter provisions governing fire department pensions in a light which will render them reasonable, fair and harmonious with the manifest and apparent purpose, and which will conform to the spirit and intent of the charter, I am impressed that the trial court was correct in determining that Secretary McKeag was a member of the fire department and belonged to the class of members therein that entitled him to retire as he did on a pension; that accordingly, upon his death his wife, respondent herein, was entitled under the provisions of section 183 of the charter to receive and have paid to her the pension allowance therein provided for.

For the foregoing reasons, as well as for the reasons advanced in the dissenting opinions this day filed by me in the cases of Knoll v. City of Los Angeles and Haas v. City of Los Angeles, I feel that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.