Opinion
No. 13-03-430-CR.
Opinion delivered and filed April 29, 2004.
On appeal from the 24th District Court of De Witt County, Texas.
Before Chief Justice VALDEZ and Justices RODRIGUEZ and GARZA.
OPINION
By two issues, Dominic McKaine challenges his conviction and sentence for burglary of a habitation and committing aggravated assault therein. We reverse and remand for a new trial on punishment.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 30.02(a), (d) (Vernon 2003).
1. Background
The conviction from which McKaine appeals stems from the following events. On November 12, 2002, McKaine and three other people used force to unlawfully enter the residence of Charles and Amy in Cuero, Texas. McKaine entered the home carrying a twenty-gauge shotgun. His cohorts were armed with handguns. With their weapons drawn, the group forced Charles down onto the kitchen floor, threatening to kill him if he resisted. McKaine then pointed his shotgun at Charles's wife, Amy, and told her to take off her shirt. With her husband and three small children watching, Amy removed her shirt for McKaine, exposing her breasts. McKaine's companions then took Charles into the couple's bedroom, and McKaine took Amy and two of her children into a second bedroom. Once inside, he began to touch Amy, fondling her breasts and repeatedly telling her that he wanted to have sex and that he was going to have sex with her on her child's bed in front of her children. He threatened to kill her, her husband, and her children if she told anyone. McKaine then took Amy into the living room and in front of all three of her children, ordered her to pull down her pants. She refused. McKaine repeated his demand, and again, she refused, saying that she was "on her period." McKaine put his shotgun against the head of Amy's three year old son and said, "Pull down your pants and spread your legs, or I'm going to kill your son." She complied, but McKaine did not have sex with her. He and his companions left, taking a knife, cigarettes, and money belonging to the family. Before leaving, McKaine repeated his threat that he would kill all of them if they told anyone what happened.
We have withheld the couple's last name because of the nature of the crimes committed against them.
At the time of the incident, McKaine was sixteen years old. He was originally charged as a juvenile, but the State petitioned the juvenile court to transfer the case to district court so that he could be prosecuted as an adult. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified McKaine as an adult and transferred the case. Before the district court, McKaine pled guilty to burglary of a habitation and committing aggravated assault therein, a first-degree felony. He requested that a jury determine his punishment. The jury sentenced him to seventy-five years imprisonment.
See id.
2. Analysis
McKaine raises two issues on appeal. First, he challenges the juvenile court's decision to transfer his case to district court for trial as an adult. Second, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion during the punishment phase of the trial by not allowing his attorney to question Amy and Charles regarding their involvement in drug activities. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
A. Transfer to District Court
In his first issue, McKaine claims that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to district court. He complains that the court erred by considering a psychological report because it amounted to hearsay. McKaine also contends that the author of the report should have been present at the transfer hearing to explain her evaluation and the basis for her findings. Finally, he maintains that the juvenile court had insufficient evidence to transfer his case to district court for trial as an adult.
Under Article 44.47 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, an appeal from a juvenile court's decision to certify a defendant as an adult and to transfer the case under section 54.02 of the family code is a criminal matter. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.47(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2004). A challenge to the certification and transfer order can be made only in conjunction with the appeal of a conviction of or an order of deferred adjudication for the offense for which the defendant was transferred to criminal court. Id. art. 44.47(b).
The juvenile court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over children seventeen years of age and younger. Ex parte Waggoner, 61 S.W.3d 429, 431 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 51.04(a), 51.02(2) (Vernon 2002) (discussing the jurisdiction of juvenile courts and defining "child"). Texas Family Code Section 54.02(a) provides that the juvenile court may waive its exclusive, original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court for criminal proceedings if the child is alleged to have committed a first-degree felony and was aged fourteen or older at the time of the alleged offense. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a) (Vernon 2002). A juvenile court's discretionary power to transfer a juvenile can be exercised only after the State files a petition or motion requesting waiver and transfer. Hidalgo v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 749 n. 3 (Tex.Crim. App. 1999); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.04, 54.02(b) (Vernon 2002). When the State requests a transfer, the juvenile court is required to conduct a hearing without a jury to consider transfer of the child for criminal proceedings. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(c). Before the transfer hearing, the court must order and obtain a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense. Id. § 54.02(d); In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, writ dism'd by agr.). Based on this information, the court must determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the offense alleged and whether the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a); In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d at 326. The juvenile court's decision to transfer a case to district court is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Faisst v. State, 105 S.W.3d 8, 12 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2003, no pet.); see In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d at 326.
We first consider McKaine's argument that the trial court erred by considering a psychological report because it was inadmissible hearsay. Strict rules of evidence are not applied in transfer proceedings. In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d at 330; see also In re J.P.O., 904 S.W.2d 695, 699 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1995, writ denied). Section 54.02(e) authorizes the juvenile court to "consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, or professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(e). In at least one case involving the use of a pyschiatric evaluation in a transfer hearing, this Court overruled an alleged hearsay error, noting that juvenile courts are authorized to consider such evidence. See In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d at 330 (holding that there was "no error in . . . the use of records even though [they] . . . may not be admissible as evidence at an adjudication hearing"). We reach the same conclusion in this case. The juvenile court did not err in admitting the psychological report into evidence.
Other courts of appeal have also reached this conclusion. See In re J.A.W., 976 S.W.2d 260, 264 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) ("Section 54.02(e) of the Family Code, which allows the court to consider written reports from probation officers, professional court employees, and professional consultants, provides an explicit exception to the hearsay rule in a transfer to criminal court proceeding."); In re S.J.M., 922 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ) ("Because a juvenile transfer hearing is dispositional, rather than adjudicational in nature, a juvenile court may consider hearsay reports without violating the juvenile's right of confrontation."); In re G.B.B., 638 S.W.2d 162,164 (Tex. Civ. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no writ) ("a juvenile court may consider hearsay reports"); In re Q.D., 600 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1980, no writ) ("Section 54.02 of the Family Code is a statutory exception to the hearsay rule and authorizes the introduction of specified reports that would otherwise be objectionable."); In re R.G.S., 575 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex.Civ.App. — Eastland 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ("A juvenile court may consider certain hearsay reports at a transfer . . . hearing that would not be admissible at an adjudication hearing.").
McKaine also argues that Dr. Karan Redus, who conducted his psychological evaluation and authored the report, should have testified at the transfer hearing. He contends that the juvenile court's duty to conduct a "full investigation and hearing" is not complete without live testimony from the author of any reports relied upon under section 54.02(e). TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(c), (e). The State has not responded to this argument. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion. The family code does not specifically require that the juvenile court hear live testimony from a professional consultant whose written report is considered under section 54.02(e). Id. § 54.02(e). It allows the court to consider "written reports from . . . professional consultants in addition to the testimony of witnesses." Id. (emphasis added). Although McKaine makes compelling arguments regarding the court's duty to be fully informed of the juvenile's circumstances, he has cited no cases holding that the court must receive live testimony in addition to the written reports. Our research has unearthed no such authority. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. In so holding, we note that although McKaine's trial counsel complained of Dr. Redus's absence at the hearing, the record does not show that he ever attempted to subpoena her or otherwise solicit her testimony. The record shows that McKaine's trial counsel received proper notice of Dr. Redus's report under section 54.02(e). Id.
Finally, McKaine argues that the juvenile court erred in transferring his case to district court because the evidence was insufficient to support a transfer. McKaine has not specified whether his challenge is to the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence or to both. See In re J.P.O., 904 S.W.2d at 699-700 ("The juvenile court's findings of fact are reviewed by the same standards that are applied in reviewing the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury's answers to a charge."). He has not cited authorities for his contention that the evidence is insufficient. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h) ("The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record."). McKaine argues that the evidence adduced at the transfer hearing was insufficient to support a transfer because it showed that: (1) he had never been adjudicated of a felony as a juvenile; (2) he suffered from drug addiction and had not received treatment; and (3) the Texas Youth Commission offered services that could assist in rehabilitating him. The State has not responded to McKaine's sufficiency arguments. Assuming without deciding that McKaine has properly presented this issue for review, we hold that it does not warrant reversal because his arguments do not address all of the grounds for the juvenile court's decision. Specifically, McKaine has not addressed the court's finding that the seriousness of the offense necessitated criminal proceedings to protect the welfare of the community.
As noted above, the juvenile court has discretion to waive its jurisdiction and transfer a case to criminal court if it finds that there is probable cause to believe that the child committed the offense alleged and that the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(a); In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d at 326. In making this determination, the court is required to consider: (1) whether the alleged offense was against a person or property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the person; (2) the sophistication and maturity of the child; (3) the record and previous history of the child; and (4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures, services, and facilities available to the juvenile court. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.02(f). While the juvenile court must consider all of these factors before transferring the case to district court, it is not required to find that each factor is established by the evidence. In re D.D., 938 S.W.2d 172, 176 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, no writ); In re J.S.C., 875 S.W.2d at 329; In re M.D.B., 757 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ). The court is also not required to give each factor equal weight as long as each is considered. In re J.J., 916 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, no writ); In re C.C.G., 805 S.W.2d 10, 15 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1991, writ denied).
In its order, the juvenile court discussed each of the foregoing factors and how they influenced its decision. The court also noted that "[a]fter conducting . . . [a] full investigation, including evidence and argument of counsel, the Court finds that the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings, because of the seriousness of the offenses and the background of the child and . . . [because] there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offenses. . . ." On appeal, McKaine argues that his background did not require criminal proceedings for the protection of the community's welfare, but he does not challenge the court's finding that the seriousness of the offense warranted criminal proceedings. A court does not abuse its discretion by finding the community's welfare requires transfer due to the seriousness of the crime alone, despite the child's background. See In re D.D., 938 S.W.2d at 177; In re C.C.G., 805 S.W.2d at 15. Thus, even if we were to sustain McKaine's challenge regarding his background, his failure to challenge the court's finding regarding the seriousness of the offense would preclude relief on his sufficiency arguments. Appellant's first issue is overruled.
B. Admissibility of Evidence at Punishment Phase
In his second issue, McKaine claims that the trial court erred by not allowing his trial counsel to question Amy and Charles on their involvement in drug-related activities prior to the burglary. McKaine's attorney sought to ask Amy and Charles whether they were drug dealers and whether McKaine and his three companions had stolen cocaine and marihuana from them along with the knife, cigarettes, and money. Before trial, however, the State filed a motion in limine, requesting that the court "order counsel for the defendant not to inquire of any witnesses, mention or allude to . . . any alleged criminal record, activity, or involvement on the part of the . . . victims." The court granted the motion, and at trial, the testimony was ultimately excluded as irrelevant. See TEX. R. EVID. 401.
A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Green v. State, 934 S.W.2d 92, 101-02 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Ford v. State, 26 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.). Under Section 3(a)(1) of Article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State and defendant may offer evidence during the punishment phase of a trial as to: any matter the court deems relevant to sentencing, including but not limited to the prior criminal record of the defendant, his general reputation, his character, an opinion regarding his character, the circumstances of the offense for which he is being tried, and . . . any other evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004) (emphasis added); Mendiola v. State, 21 S.W.3d 282, 284 (Tex.Crim. App. 2000). In Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex.Crim. App. 1999), the court of criminal appeals explained that rule 401 was "helpful" in determining what evidence is "relevant" under article 37.07 section 3(a)(1) but noted that rule 401's definition of "relevant" was not a "perfect fit" in the sentencing context. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1); TEX. R. EVID. 401. As the court explained in Miller-El v. State, 782 S.W.2d 892, 895-96 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990):
admissibility of evidence at the punishment phase of a non-capital felony offense is a function of policy rather than relevancy. This is so because by and large there are no discreet factual issues at the punishment stage. There are simply no distinct "facts . . . of consequence" that proffered evidence can be said to make more or less likely to exist. Rather," deciding what punishment to assess is a normative process, not intrinsically factbound."
(footnotes and citations omitted). Based on this reasoning, the Rogers court concluded, "[W]hat is relevant . . . [is] a question of what is helpful to the jury in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a particular case." Rogers, 991 S.W.2d at 265.
McKaine argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Amy and Charles to be questioned about their involvement in drug-related activities because such testimony would have developed the circumstances of the offense. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1). According to McKaine, the jury may have been less severe with him if it knew the full details of his relationship with the couple. In response, the State argues that the evidence was irrelevant under rule 401 and that, in any event, it was inadmissible under rule 404(a)(2) because it constituted impermissible evidence of the victims' characters. TEX. R. EVID. 401, 404(a)(2).
We disagree that the excluded evidence was offered as character evidence. The record indicates that McKaine's trial counsel sought to question Amy and Charles, not to establish their bad characters, but to show that McKaine and his companions did not choose their house at random. The questioning was intended to develop the backdrop against which the offense was committed. According to McKaine's trial counsel, Amy and Charles were drug dealers and had been supplying drugs to McKaine prior to the offense. The defense's theory was that McKaine burglarized their home in an attempt to get more drugs.
The court allowed Amy and Charles to be questioned outside the jury's presence. For her part, Amy denied having any relationship with McKaine. When asked whether illegal drugs were stolen during the burglary, she said she was not aware that any drugs were in her home. Amy also stated that she had never sold marihuana to McKaine. When questioned further, she asserted her Fifth Amendment rights. Similarly, when Charles was questioned outside the jury's presence, he testified that there were no drugs in his home on the night of the burglary. He also testified that he had no explanation for why his home was singled out by McKaine. When asked if he understood that he could be charged with perjury for lying under oath, Charles asserted his Fifth Amendment rights.
Although the testimony was of only slight probative value, we conclude that it was relevant for purposes of sentencing because it pertained to the circumstances of the offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. ANN. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1). The trial court erred by excluding it. Having concluded the trial court abused its discretion, we must conduct a harm analysis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. The error in excluding evidence in this case is a non-constitutional error under rule 44.2(b). TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Accordingly, we must disregard the error and affirm the judgment if the error did not affect McKaine's substantial rights. Id.; see King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex.Crim. App. 1997). A substantial right is affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. King, 953 S.W.2d at 271. A criminal judgment should not be overturned for non-constitutional error if the appellate court, after examining the record as a whole, has fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or had but a slight effect. Johnson v. State, 967 S.W.2d 410, 417 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998).
Our review of the record gives us no fair assurance that the error did not influence the jury or that it had "but a slight effect." See id. The jury could have sentenced McKaine to as little as five years or as much as ninety-nine years imprisonment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.32(a) (Vernon 2003). It gave him seventy-five years. The record shows that McKaine had no prior felony adjudications. There was also evidence that McKaine might have suffered from drug addiction. Although both Amy and Charles denied any involvement in drug-related activities, the jury should have been allowed to assess their credibility and demeanor. We cannot tell whether the jury would have considered these circumstances in assessing McKaine's sentence or whether the testimony would have resulted in a less severe sentence. The error was therefore harmful. See Siverand v. State, 89 S.W.3d 216, 221 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) ("[I]f the reviewing court is unsure whether the error affected the outcome, the court should treat the error as harmful. . . ."). Appellant's second issue is sustained.
3. Conclusion
We reverse the portion of the judgment imposing punishment and remand to the trial court for another punishment hearing. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004).