Opinion
Civil Action No. SA-03-CA-0927-XR.
April 14, 2005
ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 14). Plaintiff has filed a claim for a violation of Title VII, alleging unlawful racial discrimination on the part of Defendant. Defendant has moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiff cannot meet the prima facie standard to show racial discrimination, and that there was a valid justification for Plaintiff's termination. The Court GRANTS Defendant's motion.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff is a Black male with a degree in Civil Engineering. Plaintiff had worked for Defendant during school breaks since his high school graduation and began a three-year term as an Engineering Assistant after his college graduation in 1999. Plaintiff was hired as an "Engineering Assistant II" in the construction office in May 1999. Plaintiff received positive evaluations and was promoted to Engineering Assistant III in January 2001. Plaintiff was transferred to the design section of the San Antonio Regional office in January 2001. In this office, Plaintiff was supervised by Rick Butler and Kathryn Pearson. Plaintiff was assigned two projects while employed in the design section. Butler and Pearson indicated to Plaintiff that his performance on these projects was poor. Specifically, both Butler and Pearson noted that Plaintiff could not perform calculations common to engineering graduates, took an excessively long time in working on the projects, eventually having to be pulled off of one project and placed on another, was not familiar with engineering computer programs, failed to make corrections to his work, and generally failed to improve. Plaintiff was counseled a number of times by both Butler and Pearson and was instructed on how to correctly perform his tasks. Pearson held individual sessions on performing certain calculations inherent to Plaintiff's job but, according to Pearson, to no avail. On April 5, 2002, Plaintiff was given a "Below Standards" review, demoted to Engineering Assistant II, and placed on six month probation. Following a 90 day evaluation, Plaintiff's employment was terminated on July 15, 2002.
Plaintiff's filings often refer to his position as "Engineer-in-Training" or "EIT." Defendant's filings consistently refer to Plaintiff's position as "Engineering Assistant." The summary judgment record indicates that an Engineering Assistant is an engineering graduate that has not passed the Engineer-in-Training exam. There is no indication that Plaintiff passed the Engineer-in-Training exam and all his employment paperwork indicate his title as Engineering Assistant.
Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Texas Commission on Human Rights on January 6, 2003. Plaintiff complained that he had been subjected to unfavorable terms and conditions in his employment based on his race. Plaintiff was issued a right to sue letter on June 23, 2003 (which he received on or about June 26) and filed his federal Complaint on the ninetieth day after the date of notice, September 24, 2003. Defendant has now moved for summary judgment.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991). All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this determination, the court will review the evidence in the record and disregard the evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). In order for a court to conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could have found for the nonmovant, or, in other words, that the evidence favoring the nonmovant is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmovant. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 4 (1986). If the record, viewed in this light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is proper.
III. Analysis
A. Title VII Claim
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discharge . . . or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race . . . [or] national origin. . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In order to establish a valid claim for discrimination, a plaintiff must meet a tripartite analysis. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If this is established, the burden shifts to Defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. If Defendant satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts again to Plaintiff to prove that the reasons offered were not true, but were a pretext to discrimination. Id. Plaintiff can establish pretext either directly, by showing a discriminatory reason motivated management, or indirectly, by showing that the reasons given are simply not believable. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is not overly difficult. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. To establish the prima facie case of disparate treatment discrimination, a plaintiff must show (1) he was a member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for his position; (3) an adverse employment action was suffered; and (4) other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. Bryan v. McKinsey Co., 375 F.3d 358 (5th Cir. 2004). There is little debate that the first three requirements are met. Plaintiff is a member of a protected class, was qualified for his position, and suffered an adverse employment action in being demoted and later terminated. Plaintiff has not, however, put forward any evidence of disparate treatment. There is no evidence that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than Plaintiff. In fact, Plaintiff has not pointed to any other similarly situated employees in his disparate treatment analysis.
Defendant's filings confuse the analysis under the adverse employment action and disparate treatment analyses. Much of Plaintiff's disparate treatment (and pretext) argument Defendant mischaracterizes as argument under adverse employment action. Defendant's analysis is sufficient, however, to apply to the disparate treatment and pretext analyses.
Plaintiff argues that he was treated differently than other Engineering Assistants and Engineers-in-Training because he was not allowed assistance and was not given the same training. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that other members of the design section were told not to assist Plaintiff in working on his projects, that the other members of the section often worked collectively, giving each other assistance, and that he did not receive training on a computer system that would have made his job easier, even though he had repeatedly asked for such training. Providing unequal access to job training and assistance is a violation of Title VII where there is proof of a discriminatory motive. See Wright v. Nat'l Archives Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 715 (4th Cir. 1979) ; Int'l Bhd. Of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 13 (1977). There is no evidence, however, that Plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated employees with regard to training. Plaintiff asserts that an engineering technician with only three months of experience was given "GeoPak" design program training for a period of three hours, while he was given only one hour of assistance with the GeoPak program, even though he had one and one-half years of experience. Plaintiff asserts that GeoPak training would have helped him complete his assignments at a higher quality. Defendant counters that Plaintiff had not demonstrated a level of performance to warrant that level of training, and that he had been given numerous other opportunities for training. The summary judgment evidence establishes that Plaintiff had been permitted to attend a number of training programs. There is no evidence that a specific training opportunity was denied to him. See Read v. BT Alex Brown Inc., 72 Fed. Appx. 112, 117, 2003 WL 21754966, *4 (5th Cir. July 30, 2003); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 161 (2nd Cir. 1992); Wright, 609 F.2d at 715.
Defendant objects to and moves to strike certain affidavits and declarations attached to Plaintiff's Response as not meeting the requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Defendant generally objects to the declaration of Plaintiff as containing hearsay and irrelevant material. The Court has disregarded all information that is inadmissible under the Rules in the consideration of this motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff's argument that he was denied assistance is equally unavailing. Defendant's summary judgment evidence establishes that he was given tasks that should have been completed by someone with his qualifications. Other members of the design section worked on entirely different projects. Plaintiff points to certain employees who were involved in "scandals" and disciplinary actions, but whose employment was not affected. Plaintiff fails to point to any employees whose work was rated as poorly as Plaintiff's but who kept their jobs. There is no evidence of similarly situated employees being treated differently because of their race. See Wyvill v. United Cos. Life Ins. Co., 212 F.3d 296, 304 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding a plaintiff must show that other employees were treated differently under "nearly identical" circumstances). In sum, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment.
Plaintiff also fails to rebut the anti-animus that applies when the decisions to hire and fire an employee are made by the same person. "From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, it hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job." Brown v. CSC Logic, Inc., 82 F.3d 651, 658 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). Dale Stein, the Area Engineer, made the initial decision to hire Plaintiff. Stein also made the ultimate decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment.
Even assuming Plaintiff's evidence of disparate treatment could establish a prima facie case, Plaintiff has not presented any evidence of pretext to rebut Defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for firing him, poor performance. Defendant's summary judgment evidence establishes Plaintiff's poor job performance. Plaintiff asserts that he was not given the proper assistance to perform his job, in contrast to the non-Black employees in the design section. Plaintiff points only to the arguments that he was denied the assistance of others in the office and was denied proper training. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was denied assistance, in contrast to other employees. The summary judgment evidence establishes that Plaintiff was offered assistance by his supervisors, that Pearson went through Plaintiff's calculations and attempted to show him what he was doing wrong, but that Plaintiff's performance did not improve, and that the projects to which Plaintiff was assigned should have been simple such that they could be completed by one engineer. Nor is there evidence that Plaintiff was denied training opportunities on the basis of race. The summary judgment evidence establishes that Plaintiff received job training, was given assistance on the GeoPak system, and was thought not to be qualified for higher level training. The evidence establishes that Plaintiff was demoted, and then fired, solely for poor performance. Plaintiff has not presented evidence to rebut this legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination. Where the plaintiff fails to produce substantial evidence of pretext, or produces evidence that permits only an indisputably tenuous inference of pretext, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate. West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379, 385 (5th Cir. 2003).
B. Defendant's Attorney's Fees Request
In its motion for summary judgment, Defendant asks for an award of costs and attorney's fees. "[A] district court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith." Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 418-19 (1978); Walker v. City of Bogalusa, 168 F.3d 237, 240 (5th Cir. 1999). In making the determination as to the awarding of attorney's fees, "courts should not hesitate to take the relative wealth of the parties into account." Faraci v. Hickey-Freeman Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 1025, 1028 (2nd Cir. 1979). While Plaintiff's Complaint is meritless, it does not rise to the level of frivolousness. Though Plaintiff and his attorney had been warned by no less than the EEOC investigator that he likely had no claim, had Plaintiff been able to come up with evidence of discriminatory motive, given the fact that he was the only Black employee in the design section, he may well have been victorious in his claim. That he could not does not make Plaintiff's claim frivolous. All attorney's fees and costs are to be paid by the party incurring the same.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff has filed suit under Title VII claiming discrimination in the denial of assistance and training opportunities, and in the termination of his employment as an Engineering Assistant. Defendant argues that Plaintiff was not denied assistance or training opportunities, and that Plaintiff was first demoted and then terminated based solely on his job performance. Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment. There is no evidence that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably than he was. In addition, even if Plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment, he has not presented any evidence that Defendant's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his termination, poor job performance, was a pretext for racial discrimination. The evidence establishes that Plaintiff's poor job performance was the sole reason for the adverse employment actions against him.
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED (docket no. 14). Defendant's motion to strike (docket no. 19) is DENIED. Defendant's request for attorney's fees is DENIED. All other pending motions (to include docket nos. 22 27) are DENIED as moot.