Opinion
Civ. No. B003191.
January 25, 1985
Joel Martin Levy, Jana Zimmer, Stephen P. Wiman and Marsha Jones Moutrie for Defendant and Appellant.
Christopher M. Harding, Mark Garrett and Rhodes, Maloney, Hart, Mullen, Jakle & Harding for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Real Parties in Interest.
No appearance for Interveners and Respondents.
JOHNSON, J.
The Santa Monica Rent Control Board appeals from a judgment which declares unconstitutional the only administrative remedy for tenants whose landlords have charged higher rent than permitted by the Santa Monica rent control law. We reverse the judgment.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1. The Parties
Plaintiff McHugh is a Santa Monica landlord found to have charged rents in excess of the maximum permitted under the city's rent control ordinance. Plaintiffs in intervention are other Santa Monica landlords who join McHugh in challenging the constitutionality of the enforcement procedures of the ordinance. Together these plaintiffs will be referred to as the landlords.
Defendant, Santa Monica Rent Control Board (board), is the agency charged under the ordinance with the duty to enforce the provisions of the rent control ordinance.
The real parties in interest, Smith and Plevka, are tenants whom the board determined, after a hearing, were overcharged in their rent by McHugh.
2. The Ordinance
In April 1979, the voters of the city of Santa Monica adopted a rent control charter amendment by initiative measure. (Art. XVIII, Santa Monica City Charter.) Substantively, the charter amendment provides for the establishment of maximum rents for all controlled units and for general and individual adjustments of those rents. It also limits evictions to specified situations constituting sufficient cause.
The charter amendment establishes a rent control board to implement and administer the rent control system. (Section 1803.) Article XVIII confers standard agency powers upon the board. These include the power to promulgate implementing regulations and the power to hear and determine claimed violations of the regulatory system which the board administers. (Sections 1803, subd. (g), 1805, subd. (d) and 1809, subd. (b).)
The charter amendment includes both civil and criminal enforcement provisions. (Art. XVIII, §§ 1809, 1810.) Section 1809, subdivision (a) provides any landlord determined to have charged unlawful rents is liable to the overcharged tenant for the excess, or, if the overcharge was intentional, for $ 500 or three times the amount of the excess, whichever is greater.
At issue in this case is the validity of Section 1809, subdivision (b) of the ordinance which requires the establishment of an administrative remedy for excess rent claims. Section 1809, subdivision (b) provides:
"In lieu of filing a civil action as provided for in Section 1809(a), the Board shall establish by rule and regulation a hearing procedure similar to that set forth in Section 1805(a). After said determination, the tenant may deduct the penalty from future rent payments in the manner provided by the Board."
Read together, section 1809, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide an administrative alternative to a civil suit, authorize administrative penalty awards, and permit tenants to deduct overcharges from their future rent payments in the manner provided by the board. The ordinance contains no administrative enforcement provision for tenants once they vacate the premises.
Any party aggrieved by the board's determination of a complaint alleging excess rental charges may exercise his or her right to challenge that determination in court under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. (Art. XVIII, § 1808.)
3. The Underlying Administrative Matter
The current litigation commenced when tenants Smith and Plevka filed administrative complaints alleging McHugh had charged them excess rent. The board rendered a final administrative decision holding the tenants had been overcharged, imposing penalties, and authorizing rent withholding as to Plevka who remained in possession of the rental unit. No remedy was afforded Smith who vacated the premises prior to the board's ruling on her complaint.
The board's decision provides, in relevant part:
"Complainant Plevka is authorized to recoup a total of $ 2,797.91 . . . . Complainant Plevka may do so by withholding his entire rent in the first month following the Board's decision in this matter and the remaining monies in the months thereafter. The withheld amounts shall not form the basis for an unlawful detainer proceeding based upon non-payment of rent.
"Complainant Smith is entitled to total damages of $ 1,593.08 . . . ."
4. The Trial Court Proceedings
Following the board's decision, and in conformity with section 1808 of the charter amendment, McHugh exercised her right to judicial review by filing a petition for writ of mandate. While this petition was pending the other landlords were permitted to intervene. The petition alleged, in essence, that section 1809, subdivision (b) of the charter amendment violates the separation of powers clause and the judicial powers clause of the California Constitution. (Art. III, § 3, art. VI, § 1.)
The landlords also argued the ordinance denied them their right to a jury trial. The trial court did not reach this issue nor is it advanced by the landlords in this appeal. Therefore, we will not address this question here. Nor do we address the separation of powers argument. Article III, section 3 only applies at the state level. ( County of Mariposa v. Merced Irr. Dist. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 467, 476 [196 P.2d 920].)
5. The Judgment
After reviewing the briefs and hearing the argument of the parties (which we note were of high quality on both sides), the court granted the landlords' motion for summary judgment. The judgment states, in relevant part,
"Section 1809(b) of the Santa Monica City Charter, which requires the Santa Monica Rent Control Board to adjudicate tenant complaints for excess rent and award damages by authorizing tenants to withhold rent, is invalid because it requires the Santa Monica Rent Control Board to exercise judicial powers which fall within the ambit of Article VI, Section 1, of the California Constitution. . . .
"A permanent injunction is hereby issued prohibiting . . . defendant Santa Monica Rent Control Board, . . . from holding any hearings, making any determinations, taking any action, expending any public funds or otherwise proceeding on any complaint for excess rent presently on file or hereafter filed by any person with the Santa Monica Rent Control Board pursuant to Section 1809(b) of the Santa Monica City Charter."
This appeal followed.
THE ISSUE
Article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution provides, "The judicial power of this State is vested in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts. All except justice courts are courts of record."
It is undisputed a local agency cannot exercise "judicial powers" unless specifically authorized to do so by the state Constitution. ( Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 28, 41-42 [112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29].) It is also undisputed the California Constitution does not confer judicial powers on the Santa Monica Rent Control Board. The Constitution does, however, confer on a city the authority to "make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws." (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.) This constitutional provision serves as the general authority for local rent control. ( Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 140-143 [130 Cal.Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001].)
The question we must decide is whether the rent control board, in authorizing a tenant to recover excess rent payments, and in some cases a penalty assessment, by withholding future rent, is exercising a "judicial power" which is prohibited to local agencies under article VI, section 1, or exercising an enforcement power conferred on local agencies under article XI, section 7. In approaching this question we bear in mind constitutional provisions, like statutes, should be harmonized to avoid conflict. ( Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 596 [96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241, 41 A.L.R.3d 1187]) and an ordinance, like a statute, should be construed, if reasonably possible, to preserve its constitutionality. ( Kash Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 19 Cal.3d 294, 305 [138 Cal.Rptr. 53, 562 P.2d 1302].)
Fisher v. City of Berkeley (1984) 37 Cal.3d 644 [ Cal.Rptr. , P.2d ] did not address this issue in upholding a similar rent withholding provision in the Berkeley ordinance. Section 15, subdivision (a) of the Berkeley ordinance provides:
"a. For Violation of Rent Ceilings or Failure to Register. If a landlord fails to register in accordance with Section 8 of this Ordinance, or if a landlord demands, accepts, receives or retains any payment in excess of the maximum allowable rent permitted by this Ordinance, a tenant may take any or all of the following actions until compliance is achieved: "(1) A tenant may petition the Board for appropriate relief. If the Board, after the landlord has proper notice and after a hearing, determines that a landlord has wilfully and knowingly failed to register a rental unit covered by this Ordinance or violated the provisions of Sections 10, 11 and 12 of this Ordinance, the Board may authorize the tenant of such rental unit to withhold all or a portion of the rent for the unit until such time as the rental unit is brought into compliance with this Ordinance. After a rental unit is brought into compliance, the Board shall determine what portion, if any, of the withheld rent is owed to the landlord for the period in which the rental unit was not in compliance. Whether or not the Board allows such withholding, no landlord who has failed to comply with the Ordinance shall at any time increase rents for a rental unit until such unit is brought into compliance." ( Id., at p. 699, fn. 55.) This section was challenged solely on the ground it was preempted by state statutes. ( Id., at p. .) This challenge was rejected. ( Id., at p. .)
The judicial power issue was noted but not discussed in Sterling v. Santa Monica Rent Control Board (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1021, -- [-- Cal.Rptr. --].
DISCUSSION
Our research discloses very few powers that are exclusively reserved to the courts. These include the power to declare a statute unconstitutional (Cal. Const. art. III, § 3.5), the power to punish contempt ( Burns v. Superior Court (1903) 140 Cal. 1, 13 [73 P. 597]) and the power to finally determine what is the law. ( Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 326 [109 P.2d 935].) Other powers, while judicial in the sense they are exercised by courts are not exclusively so. These include the power to hold hearings, determine facts, interpret the law, grant and revoke licenses and permits. (See, e.g., Globe Cotton Oil Mills v. Zellerbach (1927) 200 Cal. 276, 277 [252 P. 1038]; Agricultural Prorate Com. v. Superior Ct. (1936) 5 Cal.2d 550, 571 [55 P.2d 495]; Whitten v. California State Board, etc. (1937) 8 Cal.2d 444, 446 [65 P.2d 1296, 115 A.L.R. 1].)
Since the beginning of this century courts have recognized administrative agencies must exercise some judicial powers if government is to deal with the manifold problems of modern society. (See Ex parte Whitley (1904) 144 Cal. 167, 179 [77 P. 879]; Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 142 [93 Cal.Rptr. 234, 481 P.2d 242].) The question is "the extent to which true judicial powers are and can be vested in 'local agencies.'" ( Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 42, fn. 14, italics in original.) The landlords do not challenge the board's power to investigate alleged violations of the rent control ordinance. Their contention is that the board is engaged in the adjudication of damage claims between private parties. This, they argue, is the exclusive province of the courts.
Our Supreme Court has never held it is unconstitutional for an administrative agency to award restitution or a civil penalty to one private party from another in a case where the award is directly responsive and integral to the enforcement of the law the agency is bound to execute. On the contrary, the court has upheld such awards in Russell v. Miller (1943) 21 Cal.2d 817, 818 [136 P.2d 318] (contractor's license suspended until restitution made to consumer), Stearns v. Fair Employment Practice Com. (1971) 6 Cal.3d 205, 211 [98 Cal.Rptr. 467, 490 P.2d 1155] (landlord ordered to pay damages to victim of racial discrimination), Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 335, 354 [156 Cal.Rptr. 1, 595 P.2d 579] (employer ordered to reimburse workers for their lost earnings). Court of Appeal decisions upholding similar awards include American Funeral Concepts v. Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmers (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 303, 308 [186 Cal.Rptr. 196] (funeral director's license suspended until restitution made to consumers) and Hess v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 232, 234 [187 Cal.Rptr. 712, 33 A.L.R.4th 958] (landlord ordered to pay damages to victims of housing discrimination). In none of these cases was the agency exercising constitutionally conferred judicial power.
Only one decision has found an agency's adjudication of rights between private parties so extraneous to the agency's charter as to violate the constitutional prohibition against the exercise of judicial powers by an administrative agency. In Jersey Maid Milk Products Co. v. Brock (1939) 13 Cal.2d 620 [91 P.2d 577] the court was asked to rule on the constitutionality of the Milk Stabilization Act. The court upheld the act except for one section. That section authorized the Director of Agriculture, after a hearing, to "'determine the amount of damage, if any, to which a complainant is entitled as a result of a failure of the distributor to pay for fluid milk or fluid cream as in this chapter provided, and in such case the director may make an order directing the offender to make reparation and pay to such person complaining such amount on or before the date fixed in the order.'" ( Id., at p. 651.) The plaintiff in Jersey Maid contended this provision was an unconstitutional attempt by the Legislature to clothe the director with judicial power. The Supreme Court agreed. "There can be no answer to this contention. No citation of authority is necessary to support the same." ( Id., at pp. 651-652.) Thus, the matter was dispatched in two crisp sentences.
Although the court did not explain its reasoning it is apparent the court believed the provision authorizing the Director of Agriculture to adjudicate controversies between producers and distributors over payment for milk delivered was not directly responsive or integral to the purpose of the act. That purpose was "protecting the health and welfare of the people of this State" by "eliminat[ing] speculation, waste, improper marketing, unfair and destructive trade practices, and improper accounting for milk purchased from producers." ( Jersey Maid, supra, 13 Cal.2d at pp. 626-627.) The court had no trouble upholding the director's power to grant and revoke licenses to distribute milk (13 Cal.2d at pp. 650-651) or to set minimum wholesale prices ( id., at pp. 652-656). But it was quite another matter to empower the director to "'determine the amount of damage'" resulting from "'a failure of the distributor to pay for fluid milk or fluid cream . . . and . . . make an order directing the offender to make reparation and pay . . . such amount . . . .'" ( Id., at p. 651.) This section of the act authorized the director to adjudicate what were essentially breach of contract actions--an area traditionally reserved to the courts and unrelated to the authority to regulate the price and distribution of milk. It was not contended, for example, payment of damages determined by the director was a legitimate condition for granting a distribution license or retaining a license previously issued, or, indeed, that failure to pay for milk resulted in any of the evils the act was designed to eliminate. ( Id., at p. 652.) (Cf. Russell v. Miller, supra, 21 Cal.2d at p. 818; American Funeral Concepts v. Board of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, supra, 136 Cal.App.3d at p. 308.)
The landlords rely heavily on dictum in Western Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury (1916) 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491] for the proposition "'that power to hear and determine rights of property and of persons between private parties is judicial and can only be conferred on the courts.'" ( Id., at p. 413, quoting from State v. Hawkins (1886) 44 Ohio St. 98 [5 N.E. 228, 232].)
No subsequent California case has relied on that broad language to strike down an agency adjudication. Furthermore, other portions of the court's dictum suggest it was the conclusiveness of the agency's decisions and its court-like enforcement powers that required constitutional sanction.
Western Metal Supply involved powers of the Industrial Accident Commission which included not only the fact finding and decision making powers traditionally exercised by agencies but, in addition, the power to punish for contempt "'in the same manner and to the same extent as courts of record'" and the power to carry its judgment into effect. (172 Cal. at pp. 411-412.) "The Industrial Accident Commission is given the power to make binding orders or judgments. In making an award upon which the clerk must enter a judgment, the action of the commission does not differ from that of a judge who directs the entry of judgment by the clerk of the court. The entry of judgment follows automatically upon the filing of the findings and award of the commission. The clerk acts ministerially, and with no other authority than that of the commission itself, as evidenced by the certified copy of its proceedings. No judicial action on the part of the superior court or a judge thereof is required to give to the commission's award the full force and effect of a judgment." It is no wonder then the court concluded, "The commission, in exercising these powers, is performing precisely the same functions that are performed by any court in passing upon questions brought before it." ( Id., at p. 412.)
There is further evidence that the constitutional issue in Western Metal Supply was not the agency's power to adjudicate property rights between private parties but the power to enforce its judgment. The court acknowledged that cases from other jurisdictions had upheld agency adjudications of private property rights. (172 Cal. at p. 413.) The court then contrasted those cases to the case before it. "[I]n none of these cases was the court considering a statute which gave to a commission powers as extensive as those vested by our law in the Industrial Accident Commission. . . . [T]here is nothing in them which would support the claim that the powers exercised by the Industrial Accident Commission of this state, in making awards of compensation, are not strictly judicial." ( Id., at p. 413.) (Italics added.)
By contrast, in the instant case the rent control board's authority is narrowly confined. It has no authority to compel obedience to its decision a tenant is entitled to recoup excess rent payments. All the board can do is authorize the tenant to deduct the excess rent from future rent payments. If the landlord does not acquiesce in the board's decision and voluntarily refund the excess rent, it is up to the tenant to enforce the decision by withholding future rent. Then, if the landlord seeks to evict the tenant for nonpayment of that rent, it is a judge of the municipal or superior court who, in effect, decides whether to enforce the board's decision by granting judgment in favor of the tenant.
At oral argument the landlords asserted the board itself could seek enforcement of its order authorizing the tenant to withhold rent. Even if this were so it would not change our view as to the constitutionality of the ordinance because it would still be a court, not the board, that enforced the agency determination.
It is unnecessary to decide in this opinion whether or when collateral estoppel applies to decisions of the rent control board. (But see Hazon-Iny Development, Inc. v. Unkefer (1980) 116 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [172 Cal.Rptr. 191].) Even if collateral estoppel precludes the landlord in an unlawful detainer action from relitigating the factual question whether excess rent was charged this does not mean the rent control board's decision is an unconstitutional exercise of judicial power. (See People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 479, fn. 8 [186 Cal.Rptr. 77].)
Were we to accept the proposition the landlords urge we would, in effect, be saying Supreme Court decisions such as Russell v. Miller, supra, 21 Cal.2d 817, Stearns v. Fair Employment Practice Com., supra, 6 Cal.3d 205, and Tex-Cal Land Management, Inc. v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., supra, 24 Cal.3d 335, were wrongly decided. More importantly, we would be holding, by implication, that numerous laws which provide important consumer protection are unconstitutional. (See, e.g. Gov. Code, § 12987 [authority of Fair Employment & Housing Commission to award damages to victims of discrimination]; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 9889.38 [authority of Bureau of Automotive Repair to award restitution to consumer forced to correct faulty repair work].)
On the importance of administrative adjudication to the enforcement of remedial consumer legislation see, Note, The Right To Equal Treatment: Administrative Enforcement Of Antidiscrimination Legislation (1961) 74 Harv. L. Rev. 526-528.
We are in agreement with the view expressed by the New Hampshire Supreme Court on the limiting principle to be applied to agency adjudications involving disputes between private parties. "As a rule which meets most situations, when an executive board has regulatory functions, it may hear and determine controversies which are incidental thereto, but if the duty is primarily to decide questions of legal right between private parties, the function belongs to the judiciary. . . . [P] The creation of an executive board is justified if its service is to determine and maintain a public right or interest. To accomplish its purposes judicial powers may be necessarily exerted. But they must concern matters of an executive character. They are proper if it may fairly be said that there is need of them in order to produce an efficient and effective administrative enforcement of the public interest." ( In re Opinion of the Justices (1935) 87 N.H. 492 [179 A. 344, 345-346, 110 A.L.R. 819].)
Turning to the agency adjudication before us, we find the ordinance involves no administrative intrusion into functions traditionally reserved to the courts. The board possesses no roving commission to try cases and enforce its judgments. It cannot hear and determine all kinds of disputes between landlords and tenants. Its authority is to investigate, make factual findings and determine the difference, if any, between the rent charged a tenant and the rent legally chargeable under the formula fixed by law. If a civil penalty is called for the amount of that penalty is established by the ordinance, not the board.
In Birkenfeld, supra, the court upheld the authority of a municipality to "declare a policy, fix a primary standard, and authorize executive or administrative officers to prescribe subsidiary rules and regulations that implement the policy and standard and to determine the application of the policy or standard to the facts of particular cases." (17 Cal.3d at p. 167.) Although the court in Birkenfeld did not concern itself with how rent control could be enforced, it did uphold the authority of a municipality to prohibit eviction of tenants as a "reasonable means of enforcing rent ceilings by preventing landlords from putting out tenants because of their unwillingness to pay illegal amounts of rent . . . ." (17 Cal.3d at p. 148.) Implicit in this holding is a finding that a prohibition on eviction does not unconstitutionally usurp traditional judicial power; i.e., the power to grant equitable relief between private parties. A fortiori, authorizing a tenant to recoup rent overcharges out of future rent payments does not unconstitutionally usurp the traditional judicial power to award monetary relief between private parties.
We believe the enforcement mechanism of the Santa Monica Ordinance is directly responsive and integral to its purpose: to assure tenants their rents will not be unreasonably increased and that landlords will receive no more than a fair return on their investment. (Art. XVIII, § 1800.) Authorizing tenants to recover excess rent charges by withholding future rent payments is directly linked to the board's duty to maintain rents at the levels permitted under the ordinance. Allowing the landlord to retain the excess rent would be antithetical to the maintenance of authorized rent levels and the prohibition against an unfair return on investment.
The board's enforcement mechanism also promotes the purposes of the ordinance by making its protection easily and speedily available to tenants. Rent withholding is a remedy simple to understand and easy to implement. Unlike execution on a money judgment, it does not involve the payment of fees, preparation of complicated forms, service of those forms or locating the landlord's assets--tasks which may be particularly difficult for the poor, minorities and senior citizens who are specifically intended to be beneficiaries of the rent control ordinance. Contrary to the view expressed by the trial judge, small claims and unlawful detainer actions are not effective methods for enforcing the rent control ordinance. As evidenced by the complaints of Ms. Plevka and Mr. Smith, ante, p. 56, many claims for excess rent will exceed the jurisdiction of the small claims court. In addition, a money judgment in small claims court may be difficult to enforce for the reasons discussed above. A tenant cannot recover excess rent payments in an unlawful detainer action because cross-complaints are not generally allowed. ( Knowles v. Robinson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 620, 625 [36 Cal.Rptr. 33, 387 P.2d 833].)
It has been suggested cross-complaints for excess rent should be allowed in cases where the tenant is raising violation of a rent control ordinance as an affirmative defense. (See, Moskovitz, California Eviction, Defense Manual (Cont.Ed.Bar Supp. 1984) § 9.37, pp. 70- 71.) This issue is not before us here and we express no view on it.
Contrary to the landlords' contention, we find the limited enforcement power wielded by the rent control board in no way conflicts with the intent of the 1950 amendment to article VI, section 1 which deleted "inferior courts" from the bodies authorized to exercise judicial power. (See, Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 38.) Chief Justice Gibson, a leading proponent of the amendment, described the "evils" which the amendment was designed to correct.
"There are 768 courts in this state which exercise jurisdiction inferior to that of the superior court. . . . [These include] city courts, . . . township courts, . . . police courts, [and] city justices' courts . . . I shall not attempt to tell you of the many problems that arise as the result of the confusion existing in our complicated inferior court structure, but it is obvious that we have too many courts and too many kinds of courts."
"One of the principal causes of confusion and waste . . . is that we have city courts and township courts exercising concurrent and overlapping jurisdiction within the same governmental subdivision. . . ."
"In addition to the confusion inherent in our complex inferior court structure, there is an obvious waste of money and judicial manpower." (Gibson, Reorganization of Our Inferior Courts (1949) 24 State Bar J. 382, 384-386.)"
There is no mention of "local agencies" in Justice Gibson's article or in the ballot pamphlet explaining the amendment to article VI. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1950) pp. 4-5.) Indeed, if the measure was intended to include local agencies the figure 768 would be far too low considering the numerous local councils, boards, commissions and authorities then in existence. Thus, while they shared a common constitutional heritage ( Strumsky, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 41) no one dreamed of calling local boards "inferior courts."
Concurrent jurisdiction of agencies and courts has long been a feature of California law. (See, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 449 [189 Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709].) We find nothing in the amendment to article VI suggesting the electorate intended to take a "meat ax" to these overlapping jurisdictional schemes. (Cf. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Brown (1981) 29 Cal.3d 168, 199 [172 Cal.Rptr. 487, 624 P.2d 1215].) There is no evidence overlapping jurisdiction of courts and agencies results in wasteful duplication of manpower, needless public expense, inconvenience and confusion. Instead, ". . . such a procedure will often have the salutary effect of avoiding duplicative hearings and potentially conflicting adjudicatory results." ( Vargas v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 902, 912 [150 Cal.Rptr. 918, 587 P.2d 714].) As the evidence in the case before us demonstrates, enforcement of the ordinance by the rent control board has substantially reduced the burden that would have otherwise been borne by the judiciary. Since enactment of the ordinance in 1979, more than 2,000 tenant complaints of excess rent charges have been filed with the board. Only 34 of these cases have resulted in mandamus petitions in the superior court challenging the board's decision.
In summary, we find the administrative adjudication authorized by the rent control ordinance does not undermine the independence, integrity or strength of the judiciary. The ordinance involves no administrative intrusion into causes of action at law or equity traditionally reposed in the courts. The procedures established by the law are far more conducive to the fulfillment of the legislative goal than a conventional court action. The administrative determination is not self-enforceable. If a tenant wants to enforce the board's determination he or she must do so through the courts. Furthermore, the determination may be judicially reviewed, as of right, through a petition for writ of mandate. For these reasons, we hold the ordinance does not violate article VI, section 1 of the California Constitution.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
Lillie, P. J., and Thompson, J., concurred.