Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-0378, SECTION "K" (1)
August 18, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
Before this Court is Rec. Doc 13, a Motion to Dismiss Defendants Richard Stalder and Elizabeth Stogner, brought by defendants, Richard Stalder and Elizabeth Stogner. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS defendants' Motion to Dismiss in the alternative and ORDERS plaintiff to file a REPLY pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 7(a) addressing defendants' qualified immunity defense by Aug. 22, 2003, at which time defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be taken under submission.
FACTS AND BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed suit against defendants and others, including former Judge Sharon K. Hunter, on February 7, 2003 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988 and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that defendants and others violated his constitutional rights by falsely and wrongfully keeping him imprisoned, making a wrongful seizure of his person, and thus depriving plaintiff of liberty without due process of law. In Count I of plaintiffs complaint plaintiff sues defendants in their individual capacities, alleging that each of these acts were done by defendants under color of law and the authority of their respective positions, and thus in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count n, plaintiff sues defendants in their official capacities, alleging violations of Louisiana law pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 2315. Plaintiff seeks money damages and attorney's fees. At all times relevant to this action, defendant Richard Stalder was Secretary of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections and defendant Elizabeth Stogner was Judicial Administrator for the Criminal District Court for the Parish of Orleans.
Plaintiff was incarcerated as a result of a criminal conviction obtained against him by the state of Louisiana on September 8, 1997 and plaintiff was sentenced in February, 1998. Due to a failed attempt to procure a trial transcript, Plaintiffs conviction was reversed on appeal by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit on July 26, 2000 and plaintiffs case was remanded back to district court for further proceedings. At no time after July 26, 2000 up until plaintiffs release on March 13, 2002 did plaintiff receive an opportunity for bail, nor was he timely re-tried within the one-year limit provided for by law. See La. Code Crim. Proc. art. 582. Upon expiration of the one-year period, plaintiff filed a motion in criminal court to quash the bill of information against him. Inaction from the district court led plaintiff to file a petition for writ of review with the Fourth Circuit which was granted on August 30, 2001. Plaintiff, however, remained in jail until March 13, 2002 when the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans released plaintiff pursuant to an entry of nolle prosequi.
On April 15, 2003, plaintiff filed an amended Complaint, suing defendants and others both individually (Count I) and in their official capacities (Count II). Defendants Stalder and Stogner now move for dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them, arguing that they are both entitled to qualified immunity under the law. Alternatively, defendants Stalder and Stogner ask the Court to order plaintiff to file a more detailed Rule 7(a) reply under the heightened pleading standard applicable when suing a public official in their individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as outlined in Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427 (5th Cir. 1995) (en bane), Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition, Rec. Doc. 14, to the instant motion on July 1, 2003, arguing that (1) plaintiffs complaint is sufficient under Schultea such that a more detailed Complaint is unnecessary; (2) given the facts of plaintiff's claim as alleged, defendants are not entitled to a defense of qualified immunity; and (3) there exist sufficient facts alleged in plaintiffs complaint to show the requisite causal connection between the defendants and plaintiffs alleged constitutional violations such that dismissal is premature and discovery should be allowed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is to be evaluated only on the pleadings; however a complaint sought to be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) may generally be amended to cure its deficiencies. Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1986). In testing the sufficiency of a § 1983 complaint, at issue here, the complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief. Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1418-19 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957); Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1981)). However, conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent a motion to dismiss. Hingle v. Hebert, No. 99-1123, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7054 at *4 (E.D. La. May 16, 2000).
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person withing the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
2. Official vs. Individual Capacity Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment
Although plaintiff sued the defendants in multiple capacities, the Court notes that the complaint and amended complaint fail to delineate what activities by the defendants were carried out in which different capacity. To eliminate confusion the Court has analyzed, based on the record before it, whether the federal claims as currently alleged can go forward against the defendants. To aid in this exercise a brief review over the relevant law is necessary. Because suits against state officials in their official capacity are essentially suits against the State, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), and States are not "persons" under the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a state official sued in their official capacity is also not a "person" within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Therefore a state official cannot be sued in their official capacity under § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 71.
However, personal-capacity suits which seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law are admissible under § 1983. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Through enactment of §§ 1983 Congress sought to 'give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position.' Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961). Thus state officials can be sued in their individual capacities and be held personally liable under § 1983 if it can be shown that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 25-31. Officials sued in their personal capacities, unlike those sued in official capacities, may assert personal immunity defenses such as objectively reasonable reliance on existing law or, as in the instant case, qualified immunity. Id. at 25.
When enacting § 1983, Congress did not, however, intend to violate the Eleventh Amendment and override state immunity. Id. at 30. While the Eleventh Amendment bars suits in federal court "by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury," Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974), it "provides no shield for a state official confronted by a claim that he had deprived another of a federal right under the color of state law." Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237 (1974); see also Ex pane Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Eleventh Amendment erects no barrier against suits to impose "individual and personal liability" on state officials under § 1983. Hafer, 502 U.S. at 30.
Upon review, plaintiff's first amended complaint reveals that defendants are being sued in their individual capacities under § 1983, and as such, under Ex parte Young, the Court finds no Eleventh Amendment bar as to plaintiffs claims. However, as stated above, when sued individually under § 1983, defendants are entitled to assert certain affirmative defenses, including qualified immunity. It is on this basis that defendants now move for dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claims against them and which the Court now considers. 2. Qualified Immunity as to Plaintiffs Federal Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Pursuant to Fifth Circuit jurisprudence, because defendants base their motion on the defense of qualified immunity, this Court must offer the plaintiff an opportunity to file a Rule 7(a) reply to the defendants' assertion. Reyes v. Sazan, 168 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that district court's failure to require a Rule 7 reply to a defense of qualified immunity was an abuse of discretion thereby vacating district court's grant of qualified immunity to arresting officers); see also Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Mahrous v. O'Brien, No. 97-1294, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *2-3 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 1998). Public officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from suit unless it is shown by specific allegations that the officials violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which reasonable individuals would be aware. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 800; Shultea, 47 F.3d at 1431; Mahrous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *3. Thus in order to survive a qualified immunity defense the plaintiff must allege particularized facts that support his allegations. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that when a defendant asserts qualified immunity, a plaintiff must respond by pleading "specific conduct and action giving rise to a constitutional violation") (emphasis added).
While the Court must hold plaintiff to this heightened pleading standard, the Court does not require plaintiff to have anticipated this defense when drafting his original or even amended complaint (as was done in this case). Rather a separate pleading procedure has been developed, wherein plaintiff is first required to file a short and plain statement of his complaint which relies on more than mere conclusions and then, subject to the district court's discretion, file a reply specifically responding to the defendants' assertions of qualified immunity. Mahrous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *4-6. Because the Court's "discretion not to order such a reply is very narrow" and the Court is mindful of the potential for reversal by the Fifth Circuit should the Court not order such a reply, the Court finds that, out of an abundance of caution, it must grant defendant's Motion insofar as it requests that plaintiff specify his allegations in a Rule 7(a) reply. Morin v. Caire, 77 F.3d 116, 121 (5th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff contends that he has sufficiently articulated his factual allegations in his complaint, amended complaint, and memorandum in opposition; however, Fifth Circuit precedent demands the Court to allow plaintiff a Rule 7(a) reply regardless of plaintiff's argument that his factual allegations are sufficient. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 7(a); see also Mahrous, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5201 at *4-6. The Court finds that allowing the plaintiff to file a Rule 7(a) reply does not reflect in anyway on the sufficiency of the allegations currently contained in plaintiffs amended complaint. In fact, contrary to plaintiffs assertions that his complaint is "clearly adequate" and sets forth in "extensive detail" the factual basis for his claims under §§ 1983 and Louisiana law (see Rec. Doc. 17, p. 3), the Court notes that as currently drafted, plaintiffs amended complaint barely alleges a claim against defendants Stalder and Stogner at all.
It is well settled that the qualified immunity analysis entails a two-step process. First, a court must determine whether plaintiff has alleged the violation of a constitutional right. Second, if the plaintiff has alleged a constitutional violation, the court must decide if the conduct was objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law at the time the challenged conduct occurred. Causey v. Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F. Supp.2d 898, 908 (Duval, J.). In his complaint, plaintiff alleges violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eight, and Fourteenth Amendments in that defendants conspired with former Judge Sharon K. Hunter, a co-defendant, to falsely and wrongly imprison plaintiff, wrongfully seize his person, fail to set his bail, and deprive him of his liberty without due process of law.
Despite these allegations, the particularized details of defendants Stalder and Stogner's specific conduct in regards to plaintiffs travails are woefully absent from the complaint. Nowhere in plaintiffs complaint does he allege personal interactions with defendants Stalder and Stogner; nowhere in plaintiffs complaint does he allege that somehow, defendant Stalder, as Secretary of the entire Louisiana Department of Corrections and defendant Stogner, as Judicial Administrator for the Criminal District Court of Orleans Parish, were charged with the authority to set bail for plaintiff and failed to do so; nowhere does plaintiff allege defendants could have released him from prison personally and failed to so; and nowhere does plaintiff allege defendants had anything at all to do with plaintiffs arrest and/or prosecution of his case. Defendants Stalder and Stogner are, quite simply, state administrators, and state administrators, whether acting personally or officially, have no power to arrest, prosecute, set bail, imprison, or much less free, any prisoner. There is no law vesting them with the authority to do so and plaintiff has presented no evidence to the contrary.
Furthermore, as to the contention weaving through plaintiffs brief that defendants are also somehow responsible for their inactions on plaintiffs behalf, based on plaintiffs own complaint this Court finds that defendants (or at least their departments) actually did act on plaintiffs behalf when it was within the scope of their respective authority to do so. Plaintiffs complaint states that on March 6, 2002 the District Attorney for the Parish of Orleans entered a nolle prosequi on the charges against plaintiff. Thereafter, on March 13, 2002, a mere seven days later, plaintiff was released from prison. Clearly plaintiffs release had much to do with the execution of the normal policies and procedures of both the Louisiana Department of Corrections and the administrative functions of the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court, and clearly these policies and procedures were followed and acted on by the defendants and their departments in plaintiffs case. Thus, even though plaintiff, by alleging violations of clearly delineated constitutional rights, satisfies the first prong needed to defeat the qualified immunity doctrine, the defendants would nevertheless be entitled to qualified immunity under the second prong because plaintiffs complaint does not reflect that either defendant acted objectively unreasonably in fulfilling their specific duties as to plaintiffs case.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges specific facts detailing plaintiff's personal experience only-it offers no detail for the claim that it was defendants who actually were responsible. Plaintiff's sole allegations against defendants can be found in paragraphs 15 and 16 of plaintiff's First Supplemental and Amended Complaint-namely that defendants were repeatedly notified to free plaintiff (by plaintiff himself) and took no action in that regard. Rec. Doc.3, ¶ 15-16. Such allegations are not specific enough to support a finding that defendants acted unreasonably towards plaintiff and thus are unentitled to the qualified immunity defense.
Because plaintiff has failed to support his claim with sufficient precision and factual specificity to state a cognizable claim alleging the illegality of the defendants' individual conduct at the time of the alleged acts, and pursuant to the Fifth Circuit holding in Schultea, the Court holds that plaintiff must file a Rule 7(a) reply which contains the requisite level of detail in order to avoid dismissal of plaintiff's § 1983 claims. See Reyes, 168 F.3d at 161.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED THAT plaintiff shall file a reply addressing defendants' qualified immunity defense by September 2, 2003. Defendants shall have until September 9 to respond.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT defendants' motion to dismiss will be taken under submission on, September 10th, 2003.