Summary
relying on Shapemasters Golf Course v. Shapemasters, 602 S.E.2d 83, 86-87 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004), to support dismissal of attempted interlocutory appeal of order refusing to terminate corporate custodian because "an order appointing or continuing the appointment of a custodian, unlike an order appointing a receiver, is a non-appealable interlocutory order"
Summary of this case from Templeton v. RKR Invs. Inc.Opinion
No. 60135.
12-04-2012
Lawrence W. McGARY, Appellant, v. Christopher W. JAMES; Dominic Rossi ; and Rick Espinosa, Respondents.
Santoro Whitmire Gordon Silver Hutchison & Steffen, LLC
Santoro Whitmire
Gordon Silver
Hutchison & Steffen, LLC
ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL
This is an appeal from a district court order refusing to terminate a corporate custodianship. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Susan Scann, Judge.
When our preliminary review of the docketing statement and the NRAP 3(g) documents revealed a potential jurisdictional defect, we ordered appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically, it appeared that the order designated in the notice of appeal was not substantively appealable because the order merely refused to terminate a temporary custodianship and announced the court's intention to appoint receivers in the future. See generally Taylor Constr. Co. v. Hilton Hotels, 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152 (1984) (recognizing that, generally, this court has jurisdiction to consider an appeal only when the appeal is authorized by statute or court rule); Shapemasters Golf Course v. Shapemasters, 602 S.E.2d 83, 86–87 (S.C.Ct.App.2004) (determining that an order appointing or continuing the appointment of a custodian, unlike an order appointing a receiver, is a non-appealable interlocutory order); cf. NRAP 3A(b)(4) (providing for appeals from orders actually appointing, or refusing to vacate an order appointing, a receiver).
After considering the parties' timely responses, in which appellant argues that the court's announcement that it would appoint receivers should be appealable at this time, we conclude that this appeal is not authorized by statute or court rule, cf. NRAP 3A(b)(4), and thus, we
ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.