Opinion
Civil Action No. L-03-CV-172.
December 12, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pending before the Court are Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 84], the Plaintiff's Letter to the Clerk's Office [Doc. No. 92], Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. No. 93], Letter to the Court [Doc. No. 94], Brief [Doc. No. 95], Motion for Injunctive Relief [Doc. No. 96], Request of the Clerk's Office [Doc. No. 97], Letter to the Court [Doc. No. 98], Letter to the Court [Doc. No. 99], Letter to the Court (including a petition for appointment of counsel) [Doc. No. 100], Letter to the Clerk's Office [Doc. No. 101], Letter to the Clerk's Office [Doc. No. 103], Motion to Appoint Counsel [Doc. No. 104], Letter to the Court [Doc. No. 105], "Amendment of Pleadings" [Doc. No. 107], Motion for Subpoenas for Witness for Purposes of Trial [Doc. No. 109], and a Request for Photo Evidence [Doc. No. 110].
Background
The Plaintiff, a prisoner in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice prison system, filed suit against Defendants Robert Wallantas and Dr. James Fitts — as well as against former Defendants TDCJ and UTMB — pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on November 3, 2003. [Doc. No. 1]. On August 4, 2005, the Court granted the Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, which thereby became the live pleading. [ See Doc. No. 40]. The Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants demonstrated "deliberate indifference" to the Plaintiff's serious medical needs, resulting in "injury . . . wanton and needless pain, and . . . clinically diagnosed mental stress." [Doc. No. 40, p. 1]. The Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $1,500,000 from Mr. Wallantas, Dr. Fitts, and UTMB, and $1,000,000 from TDCJ. [Doc. No. 40, p. 23]. By order dated September 26, 2005, the Court dismissed entirely the claims against Defendants TDCJ and UTMB; in addition, the Court dismissed the claims against Defendants Robert Wallantas and Dr. James Fritts in their official capacities. The only remaining claims, therefore, are claims against Defendants Robert Wallantas and Dr. James Fitts in their individual (personal) capacities.
Though the amended complaint included numerous additional defendants, the Plaintiff subsequently reduced the defendants to include only Mr. Wallantas, Dr. Fitts, TDCJ and UTMB.
Amendment of Pleadings
In a filing entitled "Amendment of Pleadings," [Doc. No. 107], the Plaintiff appears to be attempting to modify his original complaint to include a claim against Defendant Robert Wallantas for "FALSE and inflammatory statements with regard to the Medical and Disciplinary Files of plaintiff." [Doc. No. 107, p. 1](emphasis and capitalization in original). However, the Plaintiff had already included this claim in the live pleading before the Court. [ See Doc. No. 40, p. 9]("Wallantas did initiate Multiple Disciplinary Charges against the Plaintiff . . . Wallantas did, with malice and disregard, and the `deliberate indifference' for plaintiff's health, well-being and serious medical needs, file false and misleading medical evaluations and diagnosis of plaintiff's injuries."). Therefore, because these claims are already included as part of the live pleading that is pending before the Court, the motion is superfluous. Because the amended complaint merely reiterates the claims already before the Court as part of the live pleading, the claims contained in the amended complaint will be disposed of simultaneously with the identical claims of the live pleading.
Standard for Summary Judgment
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The initial burden, borne by the moving party, requires a showing to the Court of the basis for the motion, as well as an identification of the portions of the record "which [the moving party] believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The Court reviews the record by drawing all inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962)).
Once a moving party has met its burden, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). The adverse party must show more than "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. If an adverse party completely fails to make a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of that party's case on which they will bear the burden of proof at trial, then all other facts are rendered immaterial and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-323.
However, as Rule 56 "does not impose a duty on the district court to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment," Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 463 (5th Cir. 1996), when evidence "exists in the summary judgment record but the nonmovant fails even to refer to it in the response to the motion for summary judgment, that evidence is not properly before the district court." Smith v. United States, 391 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2004). Therefore, to satisfy the requirement of Celotex that nonmovants "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)), the party opposing the motion for summary judgment must "identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence supported their claim." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Hence, the granting of summary judgment involves a three-tier analysis. First, the Court determines whether a genuine issue actually exists so as to necessitate a trial. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). An issue is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable [trier of fact] could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Second, the Court must ascertain whether that genuine issue pertains to material facts. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). The substantive law of the case identifies the material facts; that is, those facts that potentially affect the outcome of the suit. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Third, assuming no genuine issue exists as to the material facts, the Court will decide whether the moving party shall prevail solely as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).
Qualified Immunity
The individually-named Defendants assert that they have a qualified immunity from suit under § 1983 on the basis of their status as government officials. The qualified immunity doctrine is set out in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), and its progeny. "[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. Once a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to overcome the defense. Foster v. City of Lake Jackson, 28 F.3d 425, 428 (5th Cir. 2002). A "heightened pleading" standard applies, requiring a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 lawsuit against individual defendants who claim Harlow qualified immunity to produce highly fact-specific pleadings. See, e.g., Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 2002). Thus, a case cannot survive a qualified immunity defense if the plaintiff pleads only conclusory statements indicating a mere belief that the defendants had unconstitutional motives. Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1274 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 512 U.S. 1207 (1994).
When considering a qualified immunity defense, the Court must determine:
(1) whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; and
(2) if so, whether the defendant's conduct was objectively reasonable in the light of the clearly established law at the time of the incident.Cantu v. Jones, 293 F.3d 839, 845 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hare v. City of Corinth, 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998)). A constitutional right is clearly established if the contours of the right are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
§ 1983
Section 1983 does not itself create substantive rights, but simply provides remedies for rights "established under the Constitution or federal laws." Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Texas Dept. of Protective and Regulatory Services, 380 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 2002) (Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights; "instead, it provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred"). Therefore, "`an underlying constitutional or statutory violation is a predicate to liability under § 1983.'" Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Johnston v. Harris County Flood Control Dist., 869 F.2d 1565, 1573 (5th Cir. 1989)). Consequently, the "threshold issue presented by any case arising under Section 1983 is whether a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution." Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 879 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)).
According to the live complaint, the Plaintiff claims that various actions on the part of the Defendants amounted to "`deliberate indifference' to serious medical needs" which resulted in "wanton and needless pain." [Doc. No. 40, unnumbered p. 2]. The Plaintiff recently re-emphasized that his claim alleged that "the defendants were `deliberately indifferent' to his serious medical needs." Further, the Plaintiff alleges that the defendants compiled medical records that were "replete with maliciously false, and highly inflammatory reports." The actions of the Defendants, argues the Plaintiff, have "hindered plaintiff's attempts to be `accurately diagnosed.'" [Doc. No. 104, unnumbered p. 2].
Presumably, the Plaintiff is bringing his claim as a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Though he does refer to § 1983 in his original complaint, the plaintiff fails to cite further law or indicate the constitutional basis for his claim.
Therefore, because the Plaintiff failed to specifically indicate the constitutional basis for his claim, but did quote language used in connection with claims under the Eighth Amendment, his complaint is most aptly characterized as such a claim. "Deliberate Indifference" Under § 1983 and the Eighth Amendment
In addition, the Plaintiff is a prisoner complaining about the quality of medical care he received while incarcerated. Therefore, the Eighth Amendment seems the appropriate constitutional home for his claims.
The Eighth Amendment has been held to prohibit not only cruel and unusual punishment, but also punishment that "involve[s] the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976). Out of these basic principals arises the "government's obligation to provide medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In the fulfillment of this obligation, it is the "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners [that] constitutes the `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' Gregg v. Georgia, supra, at 173, proscribed by the Eighth Amendment." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. In order to state a cognizable claim, therefore, a prisoner must allege "acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Id. at 106.
Claims of cruel and unusual punishment "mandate inquiry in a prison official's state of mind;" thus, there is a subjective requirement that must be satisfied. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 838 (1994) (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299 (1991)). Therefore, liability based on deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment only attaches when a person "`consciously disregar[ds]' a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. at 839 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c)). The requisite showing of "subjective recklessness," Id., may be accomplished by demonstration that "the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of harm." Id., at 842. Additionally, "deliberate indifference, i.e., the subjective intent to cause harm, cannot be inferred from a prison guard's failure to act reasonably." Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 649 (5th Cir. 1996). That is, deliberate indifference must be proven by showing that defendant officials "(1) were aware of facts from which an inference of excessive risk to the prisoner's health or safety could be drawn and (2) that they actually drew an inference that such potential for harm existed." Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also Adames v. Perez, 331 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2003).
In the specific context of medical care provided to inmates, "a disagreement between an inmate and his physician concerning whether certain medical care was appropriate is actionable under § 1983 only if there were exceptional circumstances." Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 193-95 (5th Cir. 1993)). Additionally, "medical records of sick calls, examinations, diagnoses, and medications may rebut an inmate's allegations of deliberate indifference." Id. Moreover, an "inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute `an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. Therefore, a claim of negligent diagnosis or treatment does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 106.
Sufficient Harm
The first step in a successful claim of improper medical treatment under the Eighth Amendment is the allegation of acts or omissions " sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106(emphasis added). Therefore, it follows that to be successful, a plaintiff must offer evidence of harm itself. The summary judgment evidence reveals that the Defendants treated the Plaintiff each time he presented himself with an affliction. More importantly, however, the Defendants have provided evidence that suggests that the Plaintiff never suffered from a serious medical condition. Therefore, it is the Plaintiff's duty to provide evidence — rather than merely conclusory statements — that prove that a harm did occur.
The original complaint states that the Plaintiff "incur[ed] injury, [and] suffer[ed] wanton and needless pain." [Doc. No. 40, unnumbered p. 2]. However, as noted above, in order to successfully challenge a motion for summary judgment, a nonmovant must, after the movant has met their initial burden, "go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). The party opposing the motion for summary judgment must "identify specific evidence in the record, and articulate the `precise manner' in which that evidence supported their claim." Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1537 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The Plaintiff has failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment. A pro se complaint, "`however inartfully pleaded,' must be held to `less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)). Even given this leniency, it is not the duty of the Court to search the entire record in order to attempt to breathe life into a dying claim. See Doddy v. Oxy USA, Inc., 101 F.3d 448, 463 (5th Cir. 1996) (Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "does not impose a duty on the district court to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment"). Regardless, it is the duty of the Plaintiff in a situation such as this to provide the Court with evidence of harm sustained by fault of the Defendants. If the Plaintiff did not have any serious medical needs, then the subjective mindset of the Defendants — indifferent or otherwise — is irrelevant. The summary judgment evidence shows that the Plaintiff did not suffer from any serious medical conditions or have serious medical needs. However, even if he were able to show that he suffered from such maladies, the evidence also supports the Defendants' claim that at no time were they deliberately indifferent in their medical treatment of the Plaintiff.
The Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on September 6, 2005. According to the Local Rules of the Southern District of Texas (LR 7.3 and 7.4), Plaintiff had twenty days to respond to the Defendant's motion. Plaintiff failed to respond by September 26. Mindful of Plaintiff's status as a pro se prisoner, the Court delayed consideration of the motion. However, with trial pending and the deadline for a response two months past, the Court must now consider the motion — without a response from the plaintiff. Though the Plaintiff in this case has failed to file any opposition to the summary judgment motion, given the Plaintiff's numerous other communiqués with the Court, it would be disingenuous to characterize the summary judgment motion as unopposed.
Deliberate Indifference
The Defendants have offered significant evidence that suggests that the Plaintiff's course of medical treatment shows that the Defendants listened to the Plaintiff's complaints, performed various diagnostic tests, and acted according to the results of those tests as well as examinations. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Defendants were indifferent to the Plaintiff's medical needs. To the contrary, there is extensive medical documentation to suggest that the Plaintiff's complaints were well-attended to.
The Defendants provide copies of several x-ray reports. The first is an examination of the left foot, left ankle, and left knee, made in response to the Plaintiff's complaints of pain. The result was: no "fracture[s] or dislocation[s] seen" in any part of the left foot, knee or ankle. [Doc. 84, Ex. A, p. 14]. The next report reveals a shoulder x-ray made in response to a complaint of shoulder pain. The conclusion was clear: "[n]o recent fracture or acute bone pathology can be identified. Articular relationships are intact. Soft tissues are within normal limits." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 15]. The next radiology report was conducted in response to the Plaintiff's chronic pain in his left shoulder and right hip. The conclusion was as follows: "[n]o recent fracture or acute bone pathology can be identified. Heights of the vertebral bodies and disc spaces are maintained. There is minimal spurring of the body of L4 and there is slight anterior wedging of the body of T12." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 16]. The subsequent pages of medical notes reveal that tests were performed which did not substantiate the Plaintiff's claims ("lft ankle was essentially benign, except for co/discomfort, discordant w/findings" [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 23]) or that treatment was prescribed ("meds as below: Cont. Motrin 600 mg" [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 22].). Moreover, the record reflects the belief on the part of the doctors that some of the Plaintiff's injuries were not real ("lft ankle: conts. w/discomfort, w/o any edema, erythema, bruising, nor any spasm to the muscles . . . but ffeigns [sic] continued impairment (chronic sick role). [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 22]; "strain, lft ankle — mild, feigns/claims more impairment" [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 21]; "wants rx for nasal congestion — claims did not get med (discordant statement — has CTMs rx'd since 7/28/03 . . . ffeigns [sic] continued impairment (chronic sick role) . . . feigns/claims more impairment." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 45]).
It should be noted that despite the opinion on the part of the medical staff members that the Plaintiff was largely faking most of his injuries, they nonetheless prescribed him medications. Once again, the problem seems to reduce to a disagreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants as to the proper course of medical care.
In addition, not only does the record reflect a belief on the part of the treating physicians that the Plaintiff exaggerated his symptoms — perhaps in order to be put on the type of work duty he desired — but the medical records also reveal that "[o]ffender [was] previously found to have major credibility problems w/excessive demanding behavior and abuse towards many staff, to include making threats against staff. Appears to desire sick role (malingering — to use medical to hamstring security, and has alluded to doing so.)" [Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 20]. While the Court must confess that some of this entry is confusing, the point is clearly made that the Plaintiff made claims of pain that were inconsistent with the medical tests performed, and that the Plaintiff interacted poorly with the medical staff. In short, the evidence reveals a disagreement between the Plaintiff and the medical professionals as to the proper course of treatment. Absent exceptional circumstances, "a disagreement between an inmate and his physician concerning whether certain medical care was appropriate" is not actionable under § 1983. Banuelos, 41 F.3d at 235. There has been no showing that exceptional circumstances were present in this case.
The Plaintiff's allegations of harm arise from the charge that the Defendants improperly lifted his medical restrictions. However, as the Defendants point out, and the evidence corroborates, the removal of the restrictions was done at the request of the Plaintiff. [ See Doc. No. 84, p. 7-8; Doc. No. 84, Ex. A, p. 29]. Certainly, granting the Plaintiff's request to have his medical restrictions lifted does not show deliberate indifference on the part of the Defendants. In addition, the Plaintiff claims that the removal of the restrictions led to his injuries. However, later medical evaluations, including a Court-ordered MRI, indicate that little — if anything — was medically wrong with the Plaintiff. The conclusion of the doctor conducting the MRI was the following: "No significant abnormality involving the left elbow, left hip, and left knee." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. B, p. 10]. The MRI report did continue with the following: "The left ankle shows a small to moderate sized posterior talar beak, is otherwise normal. Mild spondylosis in the thoracic spine without HNP or significant stenosis." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. B, p. 10]. However, the Plaintiff continued to receive medical care and medication. In addition, a doctor examined the Plaintiff before the MRI, and concluded the following:
The offender's verbal history is convoluted with statements of mistreatment and being ignored by both security and the medical department. Offender gives a history of being hurt while working. I cannot find a reference to such in the medical record. The only positive finding in his medical records is the presence of a slight anterior wedging ot T12 and spurring of L4. X rays of the left shoulder, left knee, left ankle and left foot are all negative. The offender c/o severe and continuous pain in the back, left hip, knee and ankle. He also complains of severe pain in the elbow.
The offender ambulates with a limp favoring the left leg. Back exam is normal; there is a full range of motion and normal muscular development. I am unable to appreciate the scioliosis reported by the offender. Full range of motion is present in the left hip. The left knee has a full ROM with no edema, redness, effusion, ligamentious laxity, crepitance, or deformity. The left ankle shows no visual deformity. No elbow deformity is identified.
[Doc. No. 84, Ex. B, p. 12].
After the MRI, the Medical Director for the University of Texas Medical Branch/Texas Department of Criminal Justice Managed Health Care Facility of the San Antonio Cluster Units reviewed the Plaintiff's file — at the request of the Attorney General of the State of Texas — and expressed his professional medical opinion. Among his conclusions are the following: the Plaintiff's "multiple sick call requests were all answered within the standard of care . . . a medical provider saw him at least once a week while on the Cotulla Unit . . . [i]t is documented in these medical records that each time he was seen his complaints were listed and they were addressed during each visit . . . [f]rom reviewing these records I do not see any documentation that Mr. McElwee ever made a medical complaint that was not addressed by medical personal [sic] nor that the medical personal [sic] did not try to solve his medical problems." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. C, p. 3-4](emphasis added).
In addition, the Director of Digital Medical Services of UTMB Correctional Managed Care reviewed the Plaintiff's MRI. In a letter to the Court, Dr. Boultinghouse concluded that "[i]t is my opinion that the MRI images of the left elbow, left knee, left hip with comparison views, and the thoracic spine do not substantiate the plaintiff's claim of significant trauma resulting from a fall. If fact [sic], there is no indication of prior significant injury that would require work restrictions." [Doc. No. 84, Ex. D, p. 3].
False Disciplinary Charges and Falsification of Medical Records
As noted above, the Plaintiff includes language implying a claim based on the Defendants' allegedly filing false disciplinary charges and falsifying medical records. However, these statements of fact are not articulations of a separate claim; rather, they are facts marshalled in support of the Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. Therefore, these unsupported factual allegations fail to both make out an independent claim and to revive the claim of deliberate indifference. As noted above, the Plaintiff cannot rest on unsupported allegations from his pleading in order to overcome a motion for summary judgment. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
Conclusion
The Plaintiff's claims reduce to complaints regarding the type of medical care he received and the improper removal of restrictions. The only competent summary judgment evidence has been provided by the Defendants. That evidence indicates that the Plaintiff did not suffer any serious medical conditions. The evidence also shows that the Plaintiff was promptly treated by medical staff when he presented himself for treatment. It is clear from the Defendant's numerous filings that he believes his medical care was not proper. However, he fails to offer any evidence to bolster this claim. While it may be unfortunate that the treatment he received was not the treatment he desired, it does not give rise to a legal claim.
The Court appreciates that it is difficult to conduct a lawsuit while in prison. Yet, the Plaintiff has managed to inundate the Court with letters, requests, demands, and various other filings. Plaintiff has at various times added and subtracted claims, demanded money, and excoriated the Court for what he perceived to be deliberate inaction. The Court has given the Plaintiff every opportunity to provide evidence to sustain a claim. He has failed to do so.
The Defendants do not contest that the Plaintiff has made a claim based on the violation of a clearly-established constitutional right; namely, the guarantee to adequate medical care while incarcerated as provided by the Eighth Amendment. However, in order to overcome a defense of qualified immunity, the Plaintiff must also show that the Defendants' conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established law.
The evidence offered by the Defendants indicates that the Plaintiff has not suffered from any serious medical issues. Furthermore, the evidence shows that when the Plaintiff requested medical care, it was provided promptly and competently. The Plaintiff has made unsupported allegations and conclusory statements in his complaint and pleadings, but has not provided any evidence for summary judgment purposes. He certainly has failed to show the specific facts necessary to overcome a qualified immunity defense. The Defendants have met their burden by showing that no fact issues exist for trial, and the Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to rebut the Defendants' assertions. Therefore, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment is hereby GRANTED. The Plaintiff's case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Thus, the Plaintiff's motions and letters pending before the Court, Documents Number 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 107, 109, and 110, are hereby DISMISSED AS MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.