Opinion
No. 31646.
April 1, 1935.
1. PUBLIC LANDS.
Sixteenth sections and money derived therefrom are held in trust by state for school purposes for benefit of inhabitants of township in which particular section lies.
2. PUBLIC LANDS.
County in which sixteenth section lies is agent of state to act for state in dealing therewith, with authority to institute and defend suits relative thereto.
3. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
Under statute authorizing state tax collector to collect debts due state, county, municipality, and other taxing district, state tax collector held entitled to maintain suit to collect loan of sixteenth section funds and to foreclose deed of trust given to secure loan, notwithstanding statute authorizing county superintendent of education to sue for all past-due loans of sixteenth section funds (Code 1930, sections 6770, 6986).
4. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
Statutes conferring power on both county superintendent of education and state tax collector to institute suits for past-due loans of sixteenth section funds held authorized (Code 1930, sections 6770, 6986).
5. SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS.
Statute authorizing county superintendent of education to sue for all past-due loans of sixteenth section funds did not withdraw from state tax collector similar authority conferred on him by another statute, notwithstanding that suit by county superintendent involved no expense to county or reduction of amount collected, while suit by state tax collector did (Code 1930, sections 6770, 6986).
APPEAL from the chancery court of Leflore county.
HON. R.E. JACKSON, Chancellor.
Suit by J.B. Gully, State Tax Collector, against Pearl McClellan. From an order overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint, the defendant appeals. Affirmed and remanded.
See, also, Gully v. McClellan, 170 Miss. 405, 153 So. 524.
Means Johnston and Pollard Hamner, all of Greenwood, for appellant.
The state tax collector has no power to collect sixteenth section school funds.
Jones v. Madison County, 72 Miss. 777; Sections 6756 to 6785, Code of 1930.
By statute the management of sixteenth section and lieu lands is entrusted to the several counties wherein any such lands are situated.
After March 19, 1926, the state revenue agent had no power to bring suits for the collection of sixteenth section school funds loaned to individuals and secured by deed of trust on real estate.
Chapter 288, Laws of 1926, p. 405.
The law pertaining to the collection of sixteenth section school funds that have been loaned out and that are past due is found in Section 6770, Laws of 1930.
It could not be plainer that the legislature intended to place the collection of these funds in the hands of the superintendent of education than the statute itself makes it by the use of the terms "it shall be the duty of the county superintendent of education to collect all such as is past due."
The state tax collector derives his authority, if any, from a general statute and the superintendent of education derives his authority from a statute dealing with the particular matter under consideration, that is with the collection of sixteenth section school funds that have been loaned out and it is our contention that the statute dealing with the particular topic shall control.
59 C.J. 1056, section 625 (d); White v. Lowry, 162 Miss. 751, 139 So. 874; Graves v. Hinds County, 166 Miss. 89, 145 So. 900.
Under the provisions of section 6770, the township funds would be protected; under the provisions of section 6986, said funds would be dissipated.
Gully, State Tax Collector v. McClellan, 153 So. 523.
The case at bar is settled by the decision rendered by this court in the case of Gully, State Tax Collector, v. McClellan et al., 153 So. 524.
The suit was unwarranted and unauthorized.
Barbour Henry, of Yazoo City, for appellee.
All the principles in this case were settled in the case of Gully v. McClellan, 170 Miss. 405, 153 So. 524.
There was no question in the court's mind in rendering the opinion that the state tax collector had authority to bring these suits and there is not even a suggestion in the opinion to the contrary.
Robertson, State Revenue Agent, v. Monroe County, 118 Miss. 520, 79 So. 184; Gully v. Copiah County, 147 So. 300; Section 6986, Code of 1930.
It cannot be seriously questioned that both sections 6770 and 6986, Code of 1906, are general statutes, each vesting certain authority and easily reconcilable. They do not even have to be distinguished. One simply imposes an additional duty on the superintendent of education to collect sixteenth section loans as fast as they become due and imposes on the chancery clerk the duty to provide the superintendent of education a list of the amounts due so that he can take steps to collect them. Section 6986 simply gives the state tax collector the authority to collect all past due indebtedness due the state or any subdivision thereof.
Gully v. Copiah County, 147 So. 300.
There is no conflict between section 6770 and section 6986, and no reason to suppose that the legislature when it passed section 6770 had any intention of taking away from the state tax collector his concurrent right. If they had meant so they would have stated it.
Robertson v. Bank of Batesville, 116 Miss. 501; Greaves v. Hinds County, 145 So. 900; Board of Supervisors v. Bay St. Louis, 157 Miss. 459; Coker v. Wilkinson, 142 Miss. 1; Dugger v. Panola County Board of Supervisors, 139 Miss. 552; Holly Springs v. Marshall County, 104 Miss. 752.
Apparently conflicting statutes should be so construed as to reconcile the conflict, if that can be done by reasonable construction, and both be given full force and effect.
Hancock County v. City of Bay St. Louis, 128 So. 331; State ex rel. Weems v. U.S.F. G. Co., 128 So. 503; Board of Supervisors v. City of Meridian, 149 Miss. 145; Darnell v. Johnson, State Revenue Agent, 109 Miss. 570; Greaves v. Hinds County, 145 So. 900.
The appellant borrowed two thousand dollars from the sixteenth section funds of township 21, range 2 west, Leflore county, Miss., executed her note therefor secured by a trust deed to the county, and failed to pay it when due. This suit is by the state tax collector to collect the debt and to foreclose the deed of trust.
A demurrer filed to the bill of complaint was overruled. In support of her demurrer, the appellant says that the state tax collector is without authority to bring the suit.
Section 6986, Code 1930, provides that the state tax collector "shall have the power and it shall be his duty to proceed by suit in the proper court against all persons . . . for all past due . . . obligations and indebtedness of any character due and owing" to the state, county, municipality, drainage, levee, or other taxing district, or any subdivision thereof.
The appellant says, first, this suit is not within the provisions of that statute, and, second, if it is, it has been withdrawn therefrom by section 6770, Code 1930. On the first proposition the appellant contends that sixteenth section funds do not belong to the state or any of its subdivisions, but constitute a trust fund belonging to the inhabitants of the township. Sixteenth sections and the money derived therefrom are held in trust by the state for school purposes for the benefit of the inhabitants of the township in which the particular section lies. The county in which a sixteenth section lies has been appointed as the state's agent to act for it in dealing therewith, with authority to institute and defend suits relative thereto. This suit, therefore, is within section 6986, Code 1930.
Section 6770, Code 1930, appears in the chapter of the Code dealing with schools, and it authorizes the county superintendent of education to sue for all past-due loans of sixteenth section funds. This, and the former section, must be construed together, and harmonized, if possible. This can be easily done, for the effect of the two sections, in this connection, is only to confer power on each of two public officers to institute suits of this character. Such a purpose appears in other statutes involving the duties of the state tax collector, and is within the power of the Legislature. That a suit under the second statute may involve no expense to the county, or a reduction of the amount collected, while the former does, is not sufficient to indicate that the Legislature intended to withdraw from the state tax collector the power conferred on him by the first section.
Affirmed and remanded.