Opinion
No. CV-18-08026-PCT-SPL
10-22-2019
Donna McClellan, Plaintiff, v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, Defendant.
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 24).
On October 2, 2018, this Court granted the parties' Stipulated Motion for Remand (Docs. 19, 20). On remand, Plaintiff was awarded $67,811.50 in back benefits due, and a Notice of Award was issued on August 20, 2019 (Doc. 24-1). Plaintiff now seeks an award of $16,952.88 in attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 24).
The Social Security Administration send Plaintiff an initial payment of $50,858.62 and withheld $16,952.88 in potential attorneys' fees for a total of $67,811.50 in back benefits due.
The Social Security Act provides that the Court may award reasonable attorneys' fees for representation before the Court, not to exceed twenty-five percent of past-due benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court in Gisbrecht v. Barnhart provides district courts with guidance on how to evaluate such Section 406(b) contingent-fee requests for reasonableness.
Most plausibly read, . . . § 406(b) does not displace contingent-fee agreements as the primary means by which fees are set for successfully representing Social Security benefits claimants in court. Rather, § 406(b) calls for court review of such arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular cases.Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). In determining whether such a fee award is reasonable under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), the Court may look to factors including the character of the representation, the results achieved, delay, and proportionality. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808; Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009).
Defendant does not object to the motion (Doc. 25). Upon review, the Court finds the request for $16,952.88 is twenty-five percent of Plaintiff's past-due benefits and does not exceed the statutory cap. In addition, the instant record provides no indication of substandard performance, dilatory litigation tactics, or disproportionality. Accordingly, this Court concludes that a consideration of the Gisbrecht factors warrants a finding that the fee requested is reasonable.
The fee request results in an effective hourly rate of $1,215.26 (Doc 24 at 11). "In cases of this type, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc has approved effective hourly rates of $519, $875, and $902 without finding that they are unreasonable." Young v. Colvin, No. CV-11-538-PHX-SMM, 2014 WL 590335, at *2 (D. Ariz. 2014) (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153); see also Claypool v. Barnhart, 294 F.Supp.2d 829, 833-34 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (finding Defendant's argument that an effective hourly rate of $1,433.12 for 12.56 hours of work represents a windfall to the attorney to be without merit); Palos v. Colvin, No. CV 15-04261-DTB, 2016 WL 5110243, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2016) (approving a hourly rate of $1,546.39); Villa v. Astrue, No. CIV-S-06-0846 GGH, 2010 WL 118454, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2010) (approving a rate in excess of $1,000 per hour and noting that "[r]educing § 406(b) fees after Crawford is dicey business."). Taking into account the risk inherent in contingent-fee arrangements, the Court concludes the hourly rate is reasonable.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for an Award of Attorneys' Fees Under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) (Doc. 24) is granted. /// /// /// /// ///
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Counsel is awarded $16,952.88 in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). Upon receipt of this sum, Counsel shall refund the previously awarded EAJA fees of $2,800.88 to Plaintiff.
Dated this 22nd day of October, 2019.
/s/_________
Honorable Steven P. Logan
United States District Judge