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holding that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a need for better training or supervision where the plaintiff listed and detailed seventeen other complaints over a seven-year period raising similar allegations against the same defendants
Summary of this case from Dumel v. Westchester Cnty.Opinion
14 CV 556 (VB)
11-21-2014
RACHEL T. McCANTS, Administratrix of the Estate of Michael F. Lembhard, CHRISTINA CRUMP, Mother and Natural Guardian of MICHAEL LEMBHARD, JR., an Infant, and ASHLEY RICH, Mother and Natural Guardian of NIYEMA LEMBHARD and MILANEI F. LEMBHARD, Infants, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF NEWBURGH, CITY OF NEWBURGH POLICE DEPARTMENT, NICHOLAS CARDINALE, and ERIC HENDERSON, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION :
Rachel T. McCants, on behalf of the Estate of Michael F. Lembhard; Christina Crump, on behalf of Michael Lembhard, Jr.; and Ashley Rich, on behalf of Niyema Lembhard and Milanei F. Lembhard, bring this Section 1983 action against the City of Newburgh (the "City"), the City of Newburgh Police Department, Nicholas Cardinale, and Eric Henderson.
A police department is not a suable entity because it has no legal identity separate from the municipality it serves. Hall v. City of White Plains, 185 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Accordingly, the City of Newburgh Police Department is dismissed from this action.
Now pending is defendants' motion to dismiss some of plaintiffs' claims. (Doc. #14). For the following reasons, defendants' motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367.
BACKGROUND
For purposes of ruling on this motion, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the amended complaint and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs.
Plaintiff McCants, the mother of the deceased, Michael F. Lembhard, is the administratrix of Lembhard's estate. Plaintiffs Crump and Rich are the mothers and natural guardians of the infant plaintiffs and natural children of Lembhard. Defendants Cardinale and Henderson (collectively, the "Officers") were at all times relevant acting as officers of the City of Newburgh Police Department.
Plaintiffs allege the Officers, attempting to arrest Lembhard, went to the home of Lembhard's sister on March 7, 2012. The Officers broke down the front door of the home and discharged at least twenty-one rounds. As a result, Lembhard was killed. Plaintiffs allege the multiple injuries causing Lembhard's death also caused him to experience conscious pain and suffering.
As against the Officers, plaintiffs allege a host of constitutional and state law violations on behalf of Lembhard, seek damages for Lembhard's constitutional violations and conscious pain and suffering on behalf of the estate, and seek damages for Lembhard's constitutional violations and the deprivation of the right to familial association on behalf of Lembhard's children. As against the City, plaintiffs allege Monell violations for the City's custom of failing to discipline its officers adequately or train them in the restrained use of force.
Plaintiffs did not raise any arguments opposing defendants' motion regarding several claims. Thus, the following claims have been abandoned: (i) on behalf of Lembhard, all constitutional claims, except for excessive force, and state law claims for false imprisonment and negligent training and supervision, (ii) on behalf of the estate, claims for familial association and wrongful death, and (iii) on behalf of the infants, claims for Lembhard's constitutional violations. See Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see also Jackson v. Fed. Express, 766 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 2014). As such, the Court need not address defendants' arguments regarding these abandoned claims.
Defendants argue, inter alia, (i) the infants' familial association claim should be dismissed because plaintiffs have not alleged the Officers intended to disrupt the Lembhard family unit, (ii) if the Court finds a deprivation of the infants' right to familial association, the Officers are immune, and (iii) plaintiffs have failed to adequately allege Monell violations.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the complaint under the "two-pronged approach" announced by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). First, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements," are not entitled to the assumption of truth and are thus not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678; Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 161 (2d Cir. 2010). Second, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the allegations in the complaint must meet a standard of "plausibility." Id. at 678; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 564 (2007). A claim is facially plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.
II. Intimate Association on Behalf of Lembhard's Children
The relationships between children and their fathers are among those that "receive the greatest degree of protection because they are among the most intimate of relationships." Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 136 (2d Cir. 2002). Thus, the integrity of the father-child relationship "has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Ninth Amendment." Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (internal citations omitted). Courts within the Second Circuit "specifically addressing the right to intimate association vis-à-vis parent-child relationships have analyzed the right under the principles of substantive due process." Licorish-Davis v. Mitchell, 2013 WL 2217491, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013).
Defendants argue the Officers' actions must have been intentionally directed at disrupting the Lembhard family unit for the infants to establish a violation of the right to familial association under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiffs assert Second Circuit precedent does not require intentional interference; therefore, they have pleaded facts sufficient to state a substantive due process claim due to the Officers' conscience-shocking behavior.
In Patel v. Searles, the Second Circuit recognized the right to familial association, but declined to rule on whether intentional interference is necessary to state a familial association claim, stating, "[the Second Circuit] has never held that a challenged action must be directed at a protected relationship for it to infringe on the right to intimate association." 305 F.3d at 137. Because plaintiff had alleged facts "sufficient to prove that the officers' conduct was intentionally directed at [plaintiff's] family," there was no need for the court to define the contours of plaintiff's right had the officers lacked intent. Id. However, Patel did establish that intentional interference with the family unit gives rise to a Fourteenth Amendment violation.
While the Second Circuit has declined to rule on the issue, there is currently a split among several Courts of Appeals as to whether an allegation of specific intent to interfere with the relationship is necessary to make out a constitutional claim. See Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 894 F. Supp. 2d 443, 470-71 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases); Phillips v. Cnty. of Orange, 894 F. Supp. 2d 345, 380 n.32 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (collecting cases). Further, district courts within the Second Circuit are split on the issue. Compare Dusenbury v. City of New York, 1999 WL 199072, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1999) (recognizing a claim for familial association "where the state action that affected the parent-child relationship was more than merely negligent without further allegations that the official was trying to break up the family"), and Greene v. City of New York, 675 F. Supp. 110, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]o require . . . a specific awareness on the defendant's part that the plaintiff had children who would be deprived of his companionship if he were killed would effectively nullify the right altogether in the wrongful death context."), with Laureano v. Goord, 2007 WL 2826649, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007) ("[A]ctions that indirectly affect" familial relationships are insufficient to state a constitutional claim; the action must be intentionally targeted at "the intimate associations of a person"), and Busch v. City of New York, 2003 WL 22171896, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2003) (limiting a claim for familial association to a "situation where there was an obvious attempt to interfere with the familial relationship").
Some courts have bypassed the question of intentional interference by determining conduct not directed at the integrity of the family unit is not clearly unlawful, entitling defendant police officers to qualified immunity. See McGarr v. City of Peekskill, 975 F. Supp. 2d 377, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (finding "anything less than conduct intentionally directed at the familial relationship was not clearly established as unlawful within the Second Circuit" at the time of defendant's behavior). Defendants take up this torch, arguing that even if the Court finds intent to interfere is not required to state a constitutional claim, the Officers are immune because the law was not clearly established on March 7, 2012. The Court agrees.
Qualified immunity shields government officials whose conduct "does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The scope of qualified immunity is broad, and it protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). "A qualified immunity defense is established if (a) the defendant's action did not violate clearly established law, or (b) it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law." Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The right to familial association was clearly established in 2012. See Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d at 138 ("[A]t least the general right to intimate association has been clearly established since 1984."). However, plaintiffs do not allege Cardinale's and Henderson's behavior was intentionally directed at the children's relationships with Lembhard. Therefore, their alleged misconduct does not fall within the category of behavior that is undoubtedly a violation of the right. In fact, their alleged misconduct falls right within the category of behavior that some Courts of Appeals and Second Circuit district courts consider a constitutional violation and others do not. The Second Circuit's declination to rule on the issue further indicates the murkiness of the law regarding the level of intent necessary to find a deprivation of the right to familial association. Thus, the Officers' actions did not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818. The law in the Second Circuit regarding intent to interfere was, and remains, undecided.
Plaintiffs argue Cardinale's and Henderson's deliberate indifference to the fact that they might be killing someone's father should be enough to demonstrate intent. However, to allow deliberate indifference to substitute for intent would permit a plaintiff to meet the intent standard in any wrongful death case because a familial relationship will always exist (there must be one to assert the claim). This would render the specific intent standard meaningless in the courts that have adopted it. As such, plaintiffs have not adequately alleged the Officers' intent to interfere with the relationship between Lembhard and his children because they were deliberately indifferent to the fact that Lembhard was a father. --------
Therefore, the Court leaves the question of intent to interfere for another day, but finds Cardinale and Henderson are immune from the infants' familial association claim. III. Monell
A municipality is liable for a deprivation of a citizen's rights pursuant to Section 1983 "when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those who edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent the official policy, inflicts the injury." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
"A § 1983 plaintiff injured by a police officer may establish the pertinent custom or policy by showing that the municipality, alerted to the possible use of excessive force by its police officers, exhibited deliberated indifference." Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d 1040, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995). To prove deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must show an obvious need for more or better supervision to protect against constitutional violations. See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989). "An obvious need may be demonstrated through proof of repeated complaints of civil rights violations" or may be inferred "if the complaints are followed by no meaningful attempt on the part of the municipality to investigate or to forestall further incidents." Vann v. City of New York, 72 F.3d at 1049.
The amended complaint alleges the City failed to monitor officers and train them in the use of excessive force, then details seventeen excessive force claims made against the City in the seven-year time period prior to Lembhard's death in 2012. Defendants argue plaintiffs' evidence does not establish a custom or policy because a majority of the claims were settled for nuisance value, did not involve deadly force, and are removed in time from the instant action.
The Court is unpersuaded by defendants' arguments.
Defendants are correct the seventeen instances simply demonstrate "other individuals [] plausibly alleged that they experienced similar violations . . . not that these violations actually occurred." See Simms v. City of New York, 480 Fed App'x 627, 630 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order). However, it matters not that the instances only prove a claimant asserted a violation, because they evidence the City was on notice to the possible use of excessive force by its police officers on seventeen different occasions. See Fiacco v. City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 328 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he evidence that a number of claims of police brutality had been made by other persons against the City . . . was relevant. Whether or not the claims had validity, the very assertion of a number of such claims put the City on notice that there was a possibility that its police officers had used excessive force.").
Plaintiffs allege the City, in the face of these instances of alleged police misconduct, failed properly to discipline its officers or train them in the use of excessive force. This evidences deliberate indifference because, at least at this stage in the proceedings, the Court must take as true plaintiffs' allegations the police officers involved were not disciplined or sanctioned for their conduct. See Reynolds v. Giuliani, 506 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2007) (A municipality may be found to have a custom that causes a constitutional violation when "faced with a pattern of misconduct" it "does nothing, compelling the conclusion that [it] has . . . tacitly authorized . . . unlawful actions").
Further, it matters not that only one of the instances involved deadly force, as plaintiffs allege a failure to monitor and train officers adequately in the correct and restrained use of force in general. And, the seventeen instances of alleged police misconduct, as well as the alleged police misconduct resulting in Lembhard's death, involve a pattern of excessive force likely to be proven by evidence of the officers' correct or incorrect use of force. See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1360-61 (2011) ("A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train." (internal quotation marks omitted)). And finally, although the claims span a seven-year period, with a majority occurring from 2005 to 2007, this simply evidences the City has allegedly long condoned police misconduct.
Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss plaintiffs' Monell claim.
CONCLUSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the infants' familial association claim.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is DENIED as to the Monell violations asserted against the City.
The Clerk is instructed to terminate the motion (Doc. #14), and to terminate this case as to defendant "City of Newburgh Police Department" only. Dated: November 21, 2014
White Plains, NY
SO ORDERED:
/s/_________
Vincent L. Briccetti
United States District Judge