Opinion
NO. COA10-1612 No. 09 CVD 22
08-02-2011
WIILIAM McCALL and HELLANA McCALL, Plaintiffs, v. HENRY NORMAN and SHEILA NORMAN, Defendants.
Donald H. Barton, P.O., by Donald H. Barton, for plaintiffs-appellants. Pisgah Legal Services, by M. Mae Creadick, for defendants-appellees.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Transylvania County
Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 7 July 2010 by Judge Athena Brooks in Transylvania County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 11 May 2011.
Donald H. Barton, P.O., by Donald H. Barton, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Pisgah Legal Services, by M. Mae Creadick, for defendants-appellees.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Plaintiffs William and Helena McCall appeal from the trial court's order in which the court concluded that, "by the greater weight of the evidence," the McCalls had failed to prove their claims against defendants Henry and Sheila Norman and that the Normans had proven their counterclaims against the McCalls. After careful review, we vacate and remand.
Facts
In March 2007, the Normans entered into a year lease to rent the McCalls' property in Brevard, North Carolina for $800.00 a month. The parties renewed the lease for another year around 1 March 2008. Sometime during Spring 2008, the McCalls had the entire home pressure washed, after which the Normans allegedly began experiencing problems with moisture and mold inside the house. On 20 August 2008, the Normans gave the McCalls written notice of their concerns regarding the mold in the house, and, on 27 August 2008, the McCalls personally inspected the property. That same day, the Normans, along with their children, began sleeping in a room above Ms. Norman's salon. On 1 September 2008, the McCalls issued the Normans an eviction notice to vacate the rental property.
On 2 December 2008, the McCalls filed a complaint in the small claims division of Transylvania County District Court to recover past due rent and for damages to the premises. At the conclusion of the small claims proceeding, at which the Normans were not present, the court entered judgment in favor of the McCalls in the amount of $1,2 07.54. The Normans appealed to the district court for a trial de novo and counterclaimed for damages to personal property, breach of warranty of habitability, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, breach of contract, unfair and deceptive acts or practices, negligence, violation of the Tenant Security Deposit Act, and punitive damages. After conducting a bench trial on 15-16 March 2010, the trial court entered an order on 7 July 2010 in which it concluded that the McCalls had failed to establish their claims for past rent and damages to the premises, but that the Normans had established their claims for damage to personal property, negligence, and breach of warranty of habitability. The trial court, consequently, awarded the Normans $12,427.00 in damages. The McCalls timely appealed to this Court.
The trial court's order indicates that the Normans abandoned their claims at trial for unfair and deceptive acts or practices, violation of the Tenant Security Deposit Act, and punitive damages.
Discussion
While the McCalls present several arguments for reversal of the trial court's order, we find dispositive their contention that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law to support its judgment and to enable this Court to conduct meaningful appellate review. Consequently, we vacate the trial court's order and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Under Rule 52(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, "[i]n a trial without a jury, it is the duty of the trial judge to resolve all issues raised by the pleadings and the evidence by making findings of fact and drawing therefrom conclusions of law upon which to base a final order or judgment." Small v. Small, 107 N.C. App. 474, 477, 420 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1992); N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1). Rule 52(a)(1) requires the trial judge to perform "three separate and distinct acts": the judge must "(1) find the facts specially, (2) state separately the conclusions of law resulting from the facts so found, and (3) direct the entry of the appropriate judgment." Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446, 451, 290 S.E.2d 653, 657 (1982).
With respect to the requirements of Rule 52(a)(1), this Court has explained:
The requirements of Rule 52 are not simply rules of "empty ritual." The purpose of detailed findings of specific facts is to allow a reviewing court to determine from the record whether the judgment and the underlying legal conclusions represent a correct application of the law. The purpose for requiring conclusions of law to be stated separately is to enable the reviewing court to determine what law the court applied to the facts found.Waynick Construction v. York, 70 N.C. App. 287, 289, 319 S.E.2d 304, 305-06 (quoting Coble v. Coble, 300 N.C. 708, 712, 268 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980) (internal citations omitted), disc. review denied, 312 N.C. 624, 323 S.E.2d 926 (1984) .
The trial court's order in this case, after stating that the matter was heard on appeal from small claims court for a "trial de novo" without a jury, provides in pertinent part:
Based on the Testimony and Evidence presented during trial the Court finds the Following:Without setting forth any determinations denominated as "conclusions of law" based on these "[f]ind[ings]," the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Normans in the amount of "$10,659 for damages for mold/Negligence" and "$1768 for Warranty of Habitability."
As to the Plaintiff[s' ] Claim for past rent, the Court finds this to be not proven by the greater weight of the evidence and/or since the premises were not habitable during the time frame[,] no rent is due or owing.
As to the Plaintiff [s'] Claim for damages[,] the Court finds this to be not proven by the greater weight of the evidence.
As to the Defendant [s' ] Claim for damage to personal property due to mold, the Court finds this to be proven. The amount of damages is limited to one half the value of the clothing items as these were used and worn clothing; the amount of the mattresses and pillows as they are not cleanable; the amount of the cloth furniture and carpets and the amount of items used for the defendant's business as these are not reusable by standard within the cosmetology business. This total amount is $10,659.
As to the Def endant [ s' ] claim for Habitability, the Court finds this to be proven by the greater weight of the evidence and orders the amount of rent during th final months and the amount of rent for a temporary location in the amount of $1768.00 .
As to the Defendant[s'] claim of Quiet Enjoyment, the Court finds this to be nonproven as separate from the above claims.
As to the Defendant[s'] claim of Negligence, the Court finds this to be non-proven as separate from the above claims.
As the order reflects, the trial court simply determined that, "by the greater weight of the evidence," the McCalls had failed to prove their claims for past rent and damages and that the Normans had proven their counterclaims for damages to personal property, negligence, and breach of warranty of habitability.
The classification of a determination as either a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is admittedly difficult. As a general rule, however, any determination requiring the exercise of judgment, or the application of legal principles, is more properly classified a conclusion of law. Any determination reached through logical reasoning from the evidentiary facts is more properly classified a finding of fact.In re Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 510, 491 S.E.2d 672, 675 (1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As the trial court's determinations in this case that the McCalls had failed to prove their claims and that the Normans, in contrast, had proven theirs requires the exercise of judgment and involves the application of legal principles, they are more appropriately considered conclusions of law, rather than findings of fact. See Johnson v. Adolf, 149 N.C. App. 876, 878, 561 S.E.2d 588, 589 (2002) (holding that determination of whether movant has satisfied burden of proof is conclusion of law); Chloride, Inc. v. Honeycutt, 71 N.C. App. 805, 806, 323 S.E.2d 368, 368 (1984) ("The court's 'conclusions of law' consisted of statements that plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof on various issues."); Lowe's of Winston-Salem, Inc. v. Thompson, 26 N.C. App. 198, 199, 214 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1975) (holding that trial court's determinations that "plaintiff had failed to carry its burden in proving the obligation of defendants for money due and that the defendants were not indebted to the plaintiff in any amount are not findings of fact within the meaning of Rule 52(a)(1)").
Our appellate courts have held that a bare assertion that a party is entitled — or not — to relief, without providing any basis supportive of the conclusion, is deficient under Rule 52(a). See Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 429, 215 S.E.2d 102, 107 (1975) ("The mere assertion that 'plaintiff is not entitled to the relief prayed for by her,' without stating the grounds for such a bare legal conclusion, does not comply with the requirements of Rule 52(a)(1)."); Chapel Hill-Carrboro City Schools System v. Chavioux, 116 N.C. App. 131, 132, 446 S.E.2d 612, 613 (1994) (holding that trial court's "bare conclusion" that, "[h]aving reviewed the pleadings and having heard the evidence[,] . . . the plaintiff should recover nothing of the defendant" did not "meet the requirements of Rule 52(a)(1)"); see generally Appalachian Poster Advertising Co. v. Harrington, 89 N.C. App. 476, 480, 366 S.E.2d 705, 707 (1988) ("A bare conclusion unaccompanied by the supporting grounds for that conclusion does not comply with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1).").
The Normans maintain that, because the McCalls failed to request that the trial court make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, they have "waived their right to raise the issue on appeal." Contrary to the Normans' contention, "[t]he language of Rule 52[(a)(1)] is mandatory; in nonjury actions, the trial court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law." Pineda-Lopez v. North Carolina Growers Ass'n, 151 N.C. App. 587, 589, 566 S.E.2d 162, 164-65 (2002) (emphasis in original). It is under Rule 52(a)(2), where the trial court is not sitting as the trier of fact in a non-jury "action," but rather is ruling on the parties' "motions," that the court has the discretion to make findings of fact and conclusions of law but is not required to do so in the absence of a request by a party. Epps v. Duke University, 116 N.C. App. 305, 308, 447 S.E.2d 444, 446 (1994); N.C. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(2). In any event, this Court has held that "[i]f a court does enter conclusions of law, they must be supported by adequate findings." Epps, 116 N.C. App. at 308, 447 S.E.2d at 446.
Where, as here, the appellate court "cannot determine what the [trial] judge's factual and legal grounds for his [or her] judgment were," appellate review is not possible, and the appellate court must vacate the trial court's judgment or order and "remand the case for more complete findings of fact and conclusions of law." Chavioux, 116 N.C. App. at 132-33, 446 S.E.2d at 613-14. For purposes of making sufficient findings of fact on remand, we note that "Rule 52(a)(1) does not require the trial court to recite all of the evidentiary facts; it is required only to find the ultimate facts, i.e., those specific material facts which are determinative of the questions involved in the action and from which an appellate court can determine whether the findings are supported by the evidence and, in turn, support the conclusions of law reached by the trial court." Mann Contractors, Inc. v. Flair with Goldsmith Consultants-II, Inc., 135 N.C. App. 772, 774, 522 S.E.2d 118, 120-21 (1999).
Vacated and remanded.
Judges BRYANT and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).