holding National Motor Vehicle Theft Act's definition of "motor vehicle" as "automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" did not include airplanes, as each specified vehicle "is a vehicle running on land"

holding that the defendant deserved lenity because the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act did not unambiguously apply to stolen airplanes

holding that "any other self-propelled vehicle," when preceded by "automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, and motorcycle" did not include aircraft

holding that an airplane did not constitute a "motor vehicle" under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act

adopting the meaning assigned to a word "in everyday speech," even though "[n]o doubt etymologically it is possible to use the word to signify" something else

In McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, this Court held that a statute making it a federal crime to move a stolen "motor vehicle" in interstate commerce did not apply to a stolen airplane.

relying on the idea of a "picture" "evoke[d] in the common mind"

refusing to expand a criminal statute’s reach without "a fair warning ... given to the world in language the common world will understand"

In McBoyle, Justice Holmes famously concluded that the words "any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" did not include airplanes where the more specific words in the statute referred only to vehicles that ran on land.

In McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931), Justice Holmes stated that "in everyday speech `vehicle' calls up a picture of a thing moving on land."

In McBoyle, Justice Holmes wrote that "[a]lthough it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed."

noting that fair warning should apprise people "in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed"

utilizing the ejusdem generis principle in determining that "automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" did not apply to an airplane

utilizing the ejusdem generis principle in determining that "automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motor cycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails" did not apply to an airplane

examining how “vehicle” is defined in later acts in interpreting the term as used in the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act

noting that “[a]irplanes were well known in 1919 when this statute was passed, but it is admitted that they were not mentioned in the reports or in the debates in Congress” in holding that an airplane is not a vehicle

In McBoyle, the second requirement (the penalty for crossing the line) was undisputed, and thus the only issue before the Court was the first: whether the "line" had been made "clear" by the Congress.

In McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, at page 27, 51 S.Ct. 340, at page 341, 75 L.Ed. 816 the court said: "Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, or what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.

In McBoyle v. United States, 1931, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340, 341, 75 L.Ed. 816, wherein an airplane was held not to be a "vehicle" within the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 408, Mr. Justice Holmes said: "Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.

In McBoyle v. United States (1931), 283 U.S. 25, 26, 51 Sup. Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816, the United States supreme court held that an airplane was not a motor vehicle within the meaning of the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act. For other cases holding that an airplane is not a motor vehicle see Byrd v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc. (1962), 256 N.C. 684, 124 S.E.2d 880; Estate of Hayden (1953), 174 Kan. 140, 254 P.2d 813; Rich v. Finley (1949), 325 Mass. 99, 89 N.E.2d 213.

In McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816, the Court said: "... in every day speech `vehicle' calls up the picture of a thing moving on land."

stating that "[a]lthough it is not likely a criminal will carefully consider the text of the law before" committing a crime "it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given * * * in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed"

observing that judicial statutory construction cannot proceed "upon the speculation that, if the legislature had thought of it, very likely broader words would have been used"