Opinion
Case Number: 98-74705
June 18, 2001
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
I. Introduction
Petitioner Silas T. McAdoo, a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the petition.
II. Facts
Petitioner's conviction arises out of the stabbing death of his wife, Alicia Kelley, and the stabbing of their two daughters, Yolanda and Sherry Kelley. During the preliminary examination, Yolanda Kelley, ten years old, testified that during the early morning hours of April 19, 1994, she was sleeping when she heard her mother screaming. She got up from bed, went to the kitchen, and saw her mother lying on the floor with her father sitting on top of her, stabbing her. Yolanda further testified that her father then chased her into the living room and stabbed her in her arm and her leg.
Sherry Kelley, fourteen years old, testified that she was asleep in her upstairs bedroom on the night of April 19, 1994, when she heard screaming coming from downstairs. She went downstairs and saw her father stabbing her sister Yolanda in the living room. She then ran to the kitchen and saw her mother lying on the kitchen floor bleeding. Her father was screaming at her to find money in the house and give it to him. Sherry testified that her father then ran into the kitchen, grabbed her, and began stabbing her.
Finally, after repeatedly demanding that his daughters find some money in the house, Petitioner's oldest daughter Tolanna found some money, gave it to Petitioner and he left the house.
Alicia Kelley died as a result of the stab wounds. Yolanda and Sherry Kelley survived multiple stab wounds.
III. Procedural History
Petitioner was charged in Wayne County Circuit Court with first-degree murder and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder. On January 9, 1995, Petitioner pleaded guilty to one count of second-degree murder and two counts of assault with intent to commit murder. The written plea agreement indicated that Petitioner would receive three life sentences.
On February 1, 1995, Petitioner was sentenced to parolable life for the murder conviction and two concurrent terms of twenty years imprisonment for the assault convictions. Following sentencing, Petitioner moved to withdraw his guilty plea and the prosecutor filed a motion to conform the sentence to the sentencing agreement. At a hearing on March 24, 1995, the trial court judge held that the sentence had been imposed in error and failed to conform to the plea agreement and resentenced Petitioner, in conformity with the plea agreement, to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on the murder conviction and on each of the assault with intent to murder convictions. The trial court delayed ruling on the motion to withdraw plea to allow Petitioner's counsel an opportunity to present testimony regarding whether Petitioner was under the influence of prescription drugs at the time of his guilty plea.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and denied the motion on May 9, 1996. Hearing Tr., May 9, 1996.
Petitioner then filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, presenting the following claims:
I. Where a sentence has been set aside and defendant thereafter moves to withdraw his plea before imposition of a new sentence, M.C.R. 6.310 governs.
II. A sentence of "parolable" life imprisonment is in actuality equivalent to a sentence of natural life, and where a plea is entered with a sentence bargain of "parolable" life imprisonment, the bargain is illusory, and further, where defendant believed a life sentence was 20 years, the plea should be withdrawn.
III. Trial counsel was ineffective.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. McAdoo, No. 198623 (Mich.Ct.App. Feb. 25, 1997).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, presenting the same claims presented to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. McAdoo, No. 109167 (Mich. Dec. 30, 1997).
Petitioner then filed the pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus, presenting the following claims:
I. The state court erred in finding Mr. McAdoo's plea was knowing and voluntary where the plea was involuntary because of a misunderstanding regarding the meaning of a statutory "life" term of imprisonment.
II. Mr. McAdoo's plea was illusory where the sentence reduction from mandatory to statutory life had no practical effect on the sentence Mr. McAdoo would in fact be required to serve.
III. Counsel was ineffective for misadvising his client regarding the meaning of a life sentence under Michigan law and failing to investigate a diminished capacity defense.IV. Standard of Review
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 ("AEDPA") altered the standard of review federal courts must apply when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus. The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the act, April 24, 1996. Because petitioner's application was filed after April 24, 1996, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review that a federal court must utilize when reviewing applications for a writ of habeas corpus:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 1998). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ; see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir. 1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous").
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) provides, in pertinent part:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.
The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:
A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.
A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 1519-20 (2000).
With respect to the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause when "a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 1521. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:
[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable . . .
[A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. . . . Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.Id. at 1521-22.
With this standard in mind, the Court proceeds to the merits of the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
V. Analysis A. Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Petitioner argues that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he misunderstood the terms of his plea agreement. Petitioner claims he mistakenly believed that, pursuant to the plea agreement he would be sentenced to life imprisonment, but that a sentence of life actually meant twenty years imprisonment with eligibility for parole after seventeen-and-a-half years imprisonment.
The United States Supreme Court has held that, to be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntarily and intelligently made. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748-49 (1970). The plea must be made "with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Id. at 748. The voluntariness of a plea "can be determined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it." Id. at 749.
The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing regarding Petitioner's motion to withdraw guilty plea. Petitioner presented three witnesses at the evidentiary hearing: his trial counsel, Michael Patrick Martin, and Mark Carrico. Petitioner's trial counsel, Michael Bachelor, testified that he communicated the prosecutor's offer of a plea agreement to his client and that the offer allowed Petitioner to plead guilty to a lesser charge of second-degree murder with a sentence agreement of life imprisonment on the murder count. Mr. Bachelor further testified that he felt that the advantage of the plea bargain was that with a sentence of life for second-degree murder Petitioner would be eligible for parole; whereas, if Petitioner received a life sentence for first-degree murder he would not be eligible for parole.
Michael Patrick Martin, a prison advocate, testified that he visited Petitioner while Petitioner was incarcerated at the Wayne County Jail. Mr. Martin did not provide any substantive testimony because the trial court did not permit him to testify regarding Petitioner's state of mind.
Petitioner also presented witness Mark Carrico, an employee with the Team for Justice, who visited Petitioner in jail prior to entry of Petitioner's guilty plea. Mr. Carrico testified that Petitioner discussed the plea agreement with him and that Petitioner's understanding of the plea agreement was that he would be eligible for parole after seventeen years imprisonment. Petitioner did not testify at the evidentiary hearing.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court judge held that Petitioner's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary:
If I look at the testimony and my view of the witnesses that testified this afternoon, he stated — Mr. Carrico stated he met the defendant back in 1994, and that the defendant's mother called him because he's a member of the Team for Justice. He further testified that he visited weekly with the defendant before he was sent to Jackson [prison], and Mr. Carrico also testified he was at the sentencing. Mr. Carrico further testified that defendant told him he would be eligible for parole in 17 years. That' [sic] what your witness means to the understanding the defendant had at that time.
Upon questioning Mr. Bachelor, he indicated there was, in fact, a plea bargain that was made on the day of trial. He testified further that he, being Mr. Bachelor, was of the opinion that the plea offered the defendant would give him a better opportunity to put his client in the best possibl[e] posture the he could be in, and he made it know[n] to his client what his options were at the time.
Upon examination counsel asked Mr. Bachelor whether or not Mr. Bachelor had made a recommendation to the defendant of whether he would recommend he take the plea or whether he did not recommend he take the plea. I believe Mr. Bachelor testified he did not make a recommendation either way.
In listening to the testimony of Mr. Bachelor as well as Mr. Carrico and defense counsel's argument for that matter, when he states he reiterated the fact that Mr. Bachelor testified he neither made a recommendation against or for the agreement, but defense counsel also brought out the fact that the witness, being Mr. Bachelor stated that trial was not in his client's be[s]t interest, counsel made a point of bringing out that the two statements were in contradiction to each other.
This Court, after listening to the witnesses and the testimony that was presented in terms of the defendant's state of mind, the defendant stated it was his understanding he would be parolable in 17 years which, in fact, is the truth. And this Court, when taking a plea from any defendant as best as I can recall, I'm very meticulous in terms of whether or not the defendant has an
understanding of what it is he's doing. of course, I cannot and I do not go behind the scene to ask questions as to w[he]ther or not — what the defendant's particular understanding is of what a certain word means to a particular defendant. That I do not do. So, based upon the testimony I've heard, I deny the defendant's motion.
Hearing Tr., 5/9/96, pp. 31-33.
Petitioner argues that the trial court's decision was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent because he was misinformed as to the amount of time he would be required to serve in custody. He claims that both the trial court and his attorney informed him that he would serve twenty years in prison on a life sentence.
As discussed above, for a plea to be valid, the defendant must be informed of all the direct consequences of a guilty plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 755. The Constitution does not require a "State to furnish a defendant with information about parole eligibility in order for the defendant's plea of guilty to be voluntary." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). Thus, "as long as the defendant understands the length of time he might possibly receive, he is fully aware of the plea's consequences. A defendant's mere expectation about the . . . parole process is simply no ground for habeas relief." James v. Cain, 56 F.3d 662, 666-67 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).
The trial court concluded that Petitioner understood he was receiving a life sentence and had an expectation that he would be eligible for parole after seventeen years. Petitioner has failed to show that the trial court's finding was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Petitioner argues that his circumstances are identical to those presented by the petitioner in Hart v. Marion Correctional Institution, 927 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1991).
The petitioner in Hart pleaded guilty to six counts of rape. He argued that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered because he was incorrectly informed that his maximum period of incarceration would be fifteen years, when he could, in fact, serve up to seventy-five years imprisonment. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the petitioner's guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered "because the trial judge and [petitioner's] attorneys incorrectly informed Hart that his maximum period of incarceration would be 15 years and because he was incorrectly informed of the possible term of incarceration before the plea was entered," and therefore granted habeas corpus relief. Id. at 258-59 (emphasis supplied).
In contrast to the petitioner in Hart, Petitioner in this case has failed to establish that he was not aware that his possible term of incarceration was life imprisonment. At the original sentencing, the trial judge sentenced Petitioner to "a term of statutory life which is 20 years," for the second-degree murder conviction. Sentence Tr., 2/1/95, p. 4. Petitioner argues that this misstatement by the trial court judge lends credibility to his claim that he was misinformed as to his potential period of incarceration. However, in contrast to the judge's incorrect statement in Hart, the judge's misstatement in the instant case was made after Petitioner's guilty plea was entered. Other contemporaneous evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Petitioner understood the potential sentence. The pretrial settlement offer and notice of acceptance form, which is signed by Petitioner, indicates that the maximum penalty for each of the offenses to which Petitioner pleaded guilty was life and that the sentence agreement was for a life sentence on each of these offense. In addition, just before the plea was accepted, Petitioner's attorney stated that the sentence would be life imprisonment, and Petitioner stated that no promises were made to him in exchange for his guilty plea.
Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that the state court's decision that Petitioner understood the consequences of his guilty plea was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
B. Alleged Illusory Plea Bargain
Petitioner next claims that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because the plea bargain was illusory. He claims that, because the Michigan Parole Board so rarely grants parole to prisoners sentenced to parolable life, a sentence of parolable life is, in practice, the same as the mandatory life sentence he faced had he gone to trial and been convicted of first-degree murder.
If Petitioner had been convicted of first-degree murder, he faced a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to three concurrent terms of parolable life. It is possible that he will be released on parole. Thus, Petitioner did gain something from his plea bargain. See Daniel v. Overton, 845 F. Supp. 1170, 1175 (E.D. Mich. 1994). The relative reluctance of the Michigan Parole Board to grant parole to prisoners sentenced to life does not render his plea illusory. Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to this claim.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
Finally, Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner argues that his trial attorney, Michael Bachelor, was ineffective for giving him incorrect information regarding the meaning of a life sentence under Michigan law and for failing to investigate a diminished capacity defense.
Petitioner presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his application for leave to appeal in both the Michigan Court of Appeals and Michigan Supreme Court. Both state courts denied leave to appeal in one sentence opinions which did not address the merits of the claims. Where a state court declines to address the merits of a properly raised issue, this Court conducts an independent review of the issue. See Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that where a state court, although deciding a claim, does not offer some explanation of its decision, a federal court must conduct an independent review of the state court's decision). See Ely v. Matesanz, 983 F. Supp. 21, 44-45 (D. Mass. 1997) (suggesting that a state court decision is not entitled to deference under the AEDPA if it is not an adjudication on the merits). However, the independent review "is not a full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA." Harris, 940 F.3d at 943.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test for determining whether a petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was deficient, which "requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687. Second, a petitioner must show that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner. A petitioner may establish prejudice by "showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial." Id.
The Supreme Court emphasized that, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the reviewing court should afford counsel a great deal of deference:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.Id. at 689 (internal citations omitted).
The Court further explained that, to establish deficient performance, a petitioner must identify acts that were "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. To satisfy the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. The Sixth Circuit, applying the Strickland standard, has held that a reviewing court therefore must focus on whether counsel's alleged errors "have undermined the reliability of and confidence in the result." McQueen v. Scroggy, 99 F.3d 1302, 1311 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1257 (1997).
The two-part Strickland test applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based upon counsel's conduct prior to the entry of a guilty plea. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985). In the context of guilty pleas, the first half of the Strickland v. Washington test is the same standard set forth above. Id. The second, or "prejudice," requirement, on the other hand, focuses on whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the "prejudice" requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Id.
First, Petitioner claims that his attorney was ineffective because he gave Petitioner incorrect information regarding the terms of the plea agreement. Petitioner claims that Attorney Bachelor told him that he would serve twenty years in prison and that he based his acceptance of the plea agreement on that belief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court held that Petitioner's understanding of the plea agreement was that he would be sentenced to life imprisonment, but that he would be eligible for parole after seventeen-and-a-half years. Other than simply disagreeing with that conclusion, Petitioner has failed to show that it was erroneous. Thus, at the time that he accepted the plea agreement, Petitioner had an accurate understanding of the agreement. Given that Petitioner had an accurate understanding of the plea agreement, he cannot establish that his attorney was ineffective in failing to correctly inform him regarding the terms of the plea agreement.
Petitioner also claims that his attorney was ineffective for failing to pursue a diminished capacity defense. Under Michigan law, diminished capacity is not a defense to second-degree murder. People v. Schmitz, 586 N.W.2d 766 (Mich. 1998). Petitioner fails to allege that he would have declined to plead guilty to second-degree murder, a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, had his attorney investigated the feasibility of a defense to first-degree murder. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to show that his attorney's performance was deficient or that he suffered any prejudice as a result of his attorney's representation.
VI. Conclusion
The Court notes that Petitioner is represented by counsel, who filed a Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which the Court considered. Then on May 8, 2001, Petitioner filed a Supplemental to Supplemental Brief in Support of Petitioner for Writ of Habeas Corpus, which he wrote without aid of counsel. After speaking with counsel, Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Pro Se Supplemental Brief on June 4, 2001. The Court hereby GRANTS Petitioner's Motion to Withdraw Supplemental Brief and states that all other pleadings have been carefully considered.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and that matter is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.