Opinion
August 7, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Becker, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Pursuant to CPLR 3212(f), the trial court has discretion to deny a motion for summary judgment, or to order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had, if "facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot then be stated". For the court to delay action on the motion, there must be a likelihood of discovery leading to such evidence (see, Frierson v. Concourse Plaza Assocs., 189 A.D.2d 609, 610). The "mere hope" that evidence sufficient to defeat the motion may be uncovered during the discovery process is not enough (Jones v Gameray, 153 A.D.2d 550, 551; see, Kennerly v. Campbell Chain Co., 133 A.D.2d 669, 670; see also, Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 636; Gateway State Bank v. Shangri-La Private Club for Women, 113 A.D.2d 791, affd 67 N.Y.2d 627). Since there was only hope and speculation as to what additional discovery would uncover in the present situation, the court properly granted the motion for summary judgment. Moreover, the court properly found that the plaintiff had more than an ample opportunity, over a two year period, to locate the remaining defendant, Eyup Ulu, to secure his testimony. Balletta, J.P., Thompson, Santucci, Altman and Hart, JJ., concur.