Opinion
No. A11A0768.
2012-08-29
MAYOR & ALDERMEN OF the CITY OF SAVANNAH v. BATSON–COOK COMPANY et al.
Andrew Dean Shore, Gregory Kenneth Morgan, Elizabeth Bloom Hodges, Atlanta, James B. Blackburn, Savannah, Peter Antonio Giusti, for Appellant. Charles Jerry Willis, Robert S. Glenn Jr., Stanley Karsman, Brian J. Vella, Mark Lawrence DeGennaro, La Grange, for Appellee.
Andrew Dean Shore, Gregory Kenneth Morgan, Elizabeth Bloom Hodges, Atlanta, James B. Blackburn, Savannah, Peter Antonio Giusti, for Appellant. Charles Jerry Willis, Robert S. Glenn Jr., Stanley Karsman, Brian J. Vella, Mark Lawrence DeGennaro, La Grange, for Appellee.
McFADDEN, Judge.
In Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Batson–Cook Co., 291 Ga. 114, 728 S.E.2d 189 (2012), the Supreme Court reversed and remanded with direction Division 1 of our decision in Mayor & Aldermen of the City of Savannah v. Batson–Cook Co., 310 Ga.App. 878, 714 S.E.2d 242 (2011), in which we affirmed the trial court's denial of the City of Savannah's motion to recuse the trial court judge. The Supreme Court held that the trial court judge should have assigned the motion to recuse to another judge for resolution, and directed us to remand the case to the Superior Court of Troup County for disposition of the motion to recuse by a different judge. 291 Ga. at 122(2)(b)(ii), 728 S.E.2d 189.
Because the Supreme Court's decision addressed only one of the Divisions in our opinion, we are required
(1) to read [the Supreme] Court's opinion within the context of the opinion being reversed; (2) to determine whether any portions of the opinion being reversed were neither addressed nor considered by the Supreme Court; and (3) [to] enter an appropriate disposition with regard to those portions that is consistent with the issues addressed and considered by this Court.
Shadix v. Carroll County, 274 Ga. 560, 563–564(1), 554 S.E.2d 465 (2001). After so doing, we find that Divisions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of our opinion are consistent with and were not affected by the Supreme Court's decision. Accordingly, Division 1 of our opinion is vacated and the judgment of the Supreme Court is made the judgment of this court for Division 1. The judgment of the trial court denying the motion to recuse is vacated, and the case is remanded for assignment of the motion to recuse to another judge for resolution. If the motion to recuse is granted, “then the proceedings that occurred after the filing of that motion are invalid and an interlocutory appeal of the grant of the motion may be sought.” (Citations omitted.) Morgan v. Propst, 301 Ga.App. 402, 405(1)(c), 688 S.E.2d 357 (2009). If the motion is denied, the trial court may reenter the judgment on the jury verdict. Id.
Judgment affirmed in part, vacated in part and case remanded with direction.