Opinion
Civil Action 01-000 Section "T"(5)
October 31, 2001
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss the claims of Plaintiff, Nancy Mayer, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) as Plaintiff's complaint is time barred. The Court having studied the legal memoranda submitted by both parties, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASON
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Nancy Mayer, is an alleged victim of work related sexual harassment. Plaintiff filed an action for sex discrimination, retaliatory discharge, and failure to pay overtime work, in violation of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e), et seq., as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a), La.R.S. § 23:967 (West), as well as 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. of the amended Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) against the Defendant, Southeast Battery, a subsidiary of Advantage Battery. Plaintiff began working as a secretary for the Defendant on November 10, 1997. Plaintiff alleges that, from September 1998 to December 1998, Ron Battenfield, her sales manager, nude inappropriate sexual comments. Following these comments, Plaintiff discussed her employment situation with her manager. However, when asked by her manager to sign an affidavit summarizing these events. Plaintiff refused. Plaintiff contends that her employment benefits were denied after she refused to sign the affidavit.
On December 31, 1998, her employment with the Defendant terminated. Five months later, on May 23, 1999, Plaintiff filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 300 days of the commission of the last discriminatory employment practice. A notification of the Right to Sue was received by Plaintiff from the EEOC on or about November 3, 2000. Plaintiff's complaint was filed on January 4, 2001 , within 90 days of the issuance of the Right to Sue Notice.
In addition to the sexually hostile environment and the escalating retaliation, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant failed to pay for Plaintiff's overtime work. Plaintiff asserts that, despite her repeated requests to several supervisors, Defendant has not compensated Plaintiff for roughly 7-10 hours of overtime. Plaintiff claims that Defendant's actions were a willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").
Defendant has filed this Motion to Dismiss and also seeks costs, as well as it's attorney's fees pursuant to La.R.S. § 23:967(D).
Subsequent to the filing of this motion, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint whereby the La.R.S. § 23:967 retaliation claim has been voluntarily waived. As such, this Court will not address these arguments.
II. ARGUMENTS OF THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES:
A. Arguments of the Defendant in Support of the Motion to Dismiss:
Defendant contends that the two, alleged Title VII violations, count I for sexual discrimination and count II for retaliatory discharge, exceed the statute of limitations and must be dismissed in their entirety. Defendant asserts that a private right of action for Title VII violations calls for the exhaustion of all administrative remedies. This administrative process requires that the moving party first timely file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. In Louisiana, the sworn charge must be filed within 300 days of the discriminatory act. The charging party then has 90 days to file suit from issuance by the EEOC of a notice of its intention not to proceed administratively.
Defendant alleges that the 300 day period for initiating administrative proceedings expired October 28, 1999. However, Plaintiffs discrimination action was not properly initiated until October 17, 2000. Therefore, Plaintiff failed to timely initiate the necessary administrative proceedings so her Title VII claims have prescribed.
Similarly, the ELSA action for recovery of unpaid overtime is barred by the lapse of two years set out in 29 U.S.C. § 225(a). In the alternative, defendant submits that the overtime earnings occurred between November 10, 1997 and January 3, 1998, and Plaintiff must plead specific allegations to overcome the two- year limitation period.
B. Arguments of the Plaintiff in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss:
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant has not met its burden under Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) to dismiss the Title VII claims and FLSA claim. Plaintiff satisfied the notice pleading a requirement and established viable complaints in both the original and First Supplemental and Amended Complaint. Moreover, the complaint provides timely filed issues of material fact, defeating a motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff timely filed her Title VII claims. Despite Defendant's allegations, Plaintiff completed a questionnaire and filed a summary of her allegations with the EEOC on May 23, 1999. The EEOC received Plaintiff's completed questionnaire and summary of events within 300 days of the discrimination. Plaintiff maintains that the EEOC's receipt of the completed questionnaire and summary of events is sufficient to constitute a properly filed charge.
Plaintiff has sufficiently pled her claim for unpaid overtime wages. Defendant does not dispute plaintiff's claim for willfully violating the FLSA from January 4, 1998 until December 31, 1998. Defendant acknowledges the Plaintiff's claim, but alleges that the Plaintiff bears the burden of showing the willfulness of the FLSA violation. However, Defendant relies on case law addressing summary judgment burdens as opposed to the burdens imposed on the parties in a motion to dismiss. With respect to a motion to dismiss, the standard of review is whether one party may allege facts entitling that party to relief Plaintiff has adequately alleged facts to support a valid claim for relief; therefore, Defendant's motion to dismiss is misplaced.
III. LAW AND ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted."Lowery v. Texas AM University System. 117 F.3d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1997); Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff, and all facts pleaded in the original complaint must be taken as true. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1980). A district court may not dismiss a complaint under FRCP 12(b)(6) "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." §Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Blackburn v. Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). The Fifth Circuit defines this strict standard as, "[t]he question therefore is whether in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for relief." Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247, citing 5 Charles A. Wright Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1357, at 601 (1969).
B. Law on Title VII Claims:
It is well established that a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives, from the person making the charge, a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." 29 C.F.R. § 1601. 12(b). See also Bordelon Sons v. Southern Farm Cas. Ins. Co., 1999 WL 19552 (E.D. La. 4/5/99). The EEOC's receipt of the completed questionnaire is sufficient to constitute a properly filed charge. See Id. Filing a timely charge of discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional requirement to file suit in federal court but a requirement that like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling." Zipes v. Trans World Airlines Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132 (1982).
Furthermore, a reprisal claim under state law is barred by the one year tort prescription period set out in La. C.C. art. 3492. Hughes v. Arveson 924 F. Supp. 735, 738 (M.D.La. 1996). Prescription begins to run on an employment tort on the date of the adverse employment action, despite the fact that consequences (lost wages) may continue to accumulate after that date. Id. at 738, relying on McGregor v. Louisiana State Univ. Bd. Of Sup's, 3 F.3d 850, 867 (5th Cir. 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1131, 114 S.Ct.1103 (1994).
C. Law on Willful Violations of the Fair Labor Standard Act:
The three year statute of limitations applies to actions arising out of "willful" violations of the Fair Labor Standard Act. McLaughlin v. Richardland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 108 S.Ct. 1677 (U.S.Pa. 1988). The standard for a willful FLSA violation is satisfied when the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard as to whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute. Id. In other words, an employer who knows or has reason to know that his conduct is governed by the Fair Labor Standards Act and willfully violates the Act, subjects himself to three years of liability. Donovan v. Sabine Irrigation Co. Inc., 695 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1983) cert. and rehear. denied Donovan v. Alberding, 463 U.S. 1207, 103 S.Ct. 3537 (U.S.La. 1983). A willful violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act must be unreasonable and reckless. Lopez v. Corporacion Azucarerz de Puerto Rico, 938 F.2d 1510, 1514 (1st Cir. 1991). Willful is synonymous with voluntary, deliberate, and intentional for the purposes of the three year statute of limitations for willful violations of the Equal Pay Act. Salmons v. Dollar General Corp., 989 F. Supp. 730 (D.Md. 1996) affirmed. 133 F.3d 916 (4th Cir. 1993).
The continuing-violation doctrine has as its underlying premise, "the equitable notion that the statute of limitations ought not to begin to run until facts supportive of the cause of action 'are or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly situated.'" Alldread v.City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1433 (5th Cir. 1993).
D. The Court's Analysis:
With regard to the Plaintiff's Title VII claims, Defendant supplemented its memorandum in support conceding that, based upon the allegations of the amended complaint, Plaintiff adequately stated a valid cause of action. while reserving the right to address the claim at a later time via summary judgment.
Second, looking to both Plaintiff's original and mending complaint, the Court finds dismissal of Plaintiff's claim with respect to the willful violation of the FairLabor Standards Act to be unwarranted. Further, the Court determines the need for a more definitive statement from Plaintiff to be unnecessary at this time. The completion of discovery should provide the necessary information required by the Defendant to frame a responsive pleading. Moreover, the Court may take up the issue of timeliness of the claim at a later time, once discovery has been undertaken.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss, as it relates to Plaintiff's Title VII claims for retaliatory discharge and sex discrimination, filed on behalf of the Defendant, Advantage Battery Corporation, is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss, as it relates to Plaintiff's FLSA claim, filed on behalf of the Defendant, Advantage Battery Corporation, is hereby DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss, as it relates to Plaintiff's claims under Louisiana law, filed on behalf of the Defendant, Advantage Battery Corporation, is hereby rendered MOOT based upon the allegations contained in the amended complaint.