Opinion
01 Civ. 4443 (MBM)
May 23, 2003
MICHAEL REYNOLDS, ESQ., Querrey Harrow, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.
PETER A. MEISELS, ESQ., LALIT K. LOOMBA, ESQ., Serchuk Zelermyer, LLP, White Plains, NY, for Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Gregory Mayer filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the City of New Rochelle, the City of New Rochelle Police Department, and several police officers. Mayer asserts claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, deprivation of due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. Defendants move for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ. p. 56. For the reasons stated below, defendants' motion is granted.
The Second Amended Complaint names the following individual defendants: Police Officers Raymond Andolina, William Walsh, and Kenneth Hurst; Sergeants Timothy Kelly and William Olszelwsky; and Lieutenant Eric Halbekath. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 4-8).
I.
The following facts are undisputed except as described otherwise. Mayer was involved in a traffic accident in the City of New Rochelle on the evening of February 23, 2000. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 1) Members of the New Rochelle Police Department ("NRPD"), including Lieutenant Eric Halbekath and Police Officers Raymond Andolina, Kenneth Hurst, and William Walsh, responded to the scene. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 2; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 2)
Andolina called the New Rochelle Police Headquarters and requested a Department of Motor Vehicles ("DMV") check through the New York State Police Information Network ("NYSPIN") on the vehicles and drivers involved in the accident. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3) After a few minutes, Police Headquarters informed Andolina that Hector Ruiz, one of the drivers involved in the accident, had a suspended driver's license. Police Headquarters also told Andolina that the registration of the vehicle driven by and registered to Mayer was suspended. (Id. ¶ 4) Andolina arrested Ruiz for driving with a suspended license. (Id. ¶ 7) Andolina told Halbekath the information about Mayer's registration (id. ¶ 6), and Mayer was informed that he was going to be arrested because of the suspension (id. ¶ 8). Mayer protested, arguing that he had a valid insurance card. (Id.) Mayer showed his insurance card to members of the NRPD (id. ¶ 9; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 3), but he did not show any documentation issued by the DMV (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 10). Halbekath instructed Andolina to place Mayer under arrest. (Id. ¶ 11)
Defendants assert that it is standard NRPD procedure to request a "DMV check" on vehicles and drivers involved in accidents. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 3; Andolina Aff. ¶¶ 5-7)
Defendants provide a certified copy of the NYSPIN report, which shows that Mayer's vehicle's registration was marked as suspended. (Loomba Aff. Ex. 3)
Defendants provide a copy of Mayer's insurance card. During Mayer's deposition, he said that he presented this card to the officers upon his arrest. (Loomba Aff. Ex. 4; Mayer Dep. at 18-19) The card states that Mayer's coverage was effective from 8/4/99 through 8/4/00. (Loomba Aff. Ex. 4) The company name on the card is "CU Midwest Insurance Co." and the agency issuing the card is "The Rollins Agency, Inc." (Id.)
Under Section 512 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, operating a motor vehicle with a suspended registration is a misdemeanor. Halbekath asserts that it was the policy of the NRPD to arrest motorists for this offense. (Halbekath Aff. ¶ 9)
After Mayer was inside the police car, Andolina placed handcuffs on him and brought him to the New Rochelle Police Headquarters. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 14) They arrived at approximately 10:30 p.m. (Id. ¶ 14) Andolina placed Mayer in a holding cell located near the central booking area of Police Headquarters. (Id. ¶ 15) At approximately 10:40 p.m., Sergeant Timothy Kelly booked Mayer on the charge of driving with a suspended registration. (Id. ¶ 17) Kelly set Mayer's bail at $100. (Id. ¶ 18) At approximately 11:00 p.m., Kelly was relieved by Sergeant William Olszelwsky. (Id. ¶ 19) Olszelwsky changed Mayer's bail from $100 to $200. (Id. ¶ 20) At 11:40 p.m., after his bail was posted, Mayer was released from custody. (Id. ¶ 21) Before Mayer was released, Andolina gave him a "traffic ticket," which required Mayer to appear at the New Rochelle City Court on March 14, 2000. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 22; Loomba Aff. Ex. 8)
Defendants assert that placing Mayer in handcuffs was consistent with Article 1.01, paragraph 4, of the NRPD Manual of Procedure. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 13; Andolina Aff. ¶ 13)
Olszelwsky said that it was NRPD policy to set bail for this offense between $100 and $200, and that it was his understanding that $200 was the preferred amount. (Olszelwsky Aff. ¶ 5)
The next day, February 24, 2000, Mayer went to the DMV office in Yonkers, New York. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 23) Mayer was informed by the DMV that in order to rescind the suspension of his registration, the DMV required a letter from Mayer's automobile insurance carrier that confirmed that Mayer's insurance card was valid. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 24) Mayer arranged to have the letter faxed to the DMV from his insurance agent, the Rollins Agency, and according to Mayer, the letter was in fact sent to the DMV that day. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 25; Mayer Dep. at 36) The DMV issued a form entitled "Receipt of Satisfactory Proof/Rescission of Reg. Suspension" to Mayer. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 26)
Defendants provide a copy of this form. (See Loomba Aff., Ex. 9) Mayer said during his deposition that this was the form that he had received. (Mayer Dep. at 38-39) The form provides in pertinent part:
INSURANCE TERMINATED 9/12/99 OLD INS GEICO GEN INS CO NEW COVERAGE 8/04/99 NEW INS COMMERCIAL UNION MIDWEST . . . SUSPENSION WAS TO BEGIN 12/13/99
(Loomba Aff. Ex. 9)
The same day, Mayer went to the New Rochelle City Court and had his case called on the Court's calendar. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 27) Mayer presented to the District Attorney and the Judge the DMV form showing the rescission of the suspension of his registration. (Id.) The Judge dismissed the case. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 28)
Defendants provide a copy of the transcript from this proceeding. (See Loomba Aff. Ex. 10) The District Attorney told the Judge: "There was a D.V.M. error. I have been presented with proof that the suspension that is alleged on the RALL should not have occurred. There was a switch in insurance companies. There was, in fact, no lapse. People would move to withdraw, dismiss the charges at this time." (Id.)
Mayer asserts that there was no lapse in his insurance, and he claims that he was never informed that his registration was suspended. (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 6) Mayer claims that Halbekath knew that the DMV computer records were "susceptible to errors of the exact kind which occurred in this case." (Id. ¶ 7) Mayer says that after his bail was set at $100, he called a friend to come and post his bail. (Id. ¶¶ 9-10) According to Mayer, after he made this phone call, he was informed that his bail was raised to $200. (Id. ¶ 11) Mayer says he was "given no rational explanation for the increased station house bail." (Id. ¶ 12) Mayer claims that he was told by a police officer that failure to post bail would result in his transfer from the City of New Rochelle facility to the Westchester County Correctional Center, where he could not be released prior to arraignment. (Id. ¶ 13) However, Mayer says that this statement by the police officer was not in fact true. (Id. ¶ 14) Mayer asserts that he was in handcuffs from the time of his arrest until his bail was posted. (Id. ¶ 15)
II.
Mayer brings claims against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including false arrest, malicious prosecution, deprivation of due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. Regarding the claim of cruel and usual punishment, Mayer says that he was deprived of his rights under the U.S. Constitution as well as the "New York State Correction Law" and the "New York State Civil Rights Law." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 59) Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Mayer's claims.
Mayer labels his first and second claims for relief as "False Arrest" and "False Imprisonment/Incarceration," respectively. To the extent Mayer's second claim asserts false imprisonment, this claim is the same as a claim for false arrest. See Posr v. Doherty, 944 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1991) (citing Jacques v. Sears, Roebuck Ca., 30 N.Y.2d 466, 473, 334 N.Y.S.2d 632, 638 (1972)). However, his second claim for relief also states a claim of malicious prosecution. (See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 47).
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The movant for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion" and identifying which materials "demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the non-movant who "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).
III.
A. False Arrest
Under New York law, "a plaintiff claiming false arrest must show, inter alia, that the defendant intentionally confined him without his consent and without justification." Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir. 1996). "A § 1983 claim for false arrest, resting on the Fourth Amendment right of an individual to be free from unreasonable seizures, including arrest without probable cause, is substantially the same as a claim for false arrest under New York law." Id. (citations omitted);accord Jocks v. Tavernier, 316 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2003). "The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and "is a complete defense to an action for false arrest,' whether that action is brought under state law or under § 1983." Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852 (citing Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir. 1995); Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir. 1994);Broughton v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 458, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 95 (1975)).
An officer has probable cause to arrest when he has "knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances that are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a crime."Weyant, 101 F.3d at 852; accord Jocks 316 F.3d at 135; O'Neill v. Town of Babylon, 986 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1993).
Defendants argue that the officers were entitled to rely on the information in the NYSPIN report that indicated that Mayer's registration was suspended to establish probable cause for the arrest. Defendants point to Moscatelli v. City of Middletown, 252 A.D.2d 547, 675 N.Y.S.2d 639 (2d Dep't 1998), a case where the plaintiff asserted a false arrest claim after he was arrested for driving with a suspended registration. The plaintiff in Moscatelli was involved in a car accident, and the officer who responded to the scene transmitted information from the plaintiff's license, registration, and insurance card to the police station. Id. at 547, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 639. The officer was informed that the NYSPIN report showed that the plaintiff's license and registration were suspended because her insurance had lapsed. Id. The plaintiff showed the officer a letter from her insurance agent, dated the previous day — March 31, 1995 — which advised the State of New York Financial Security Bureau that plaintiff's vehicle was insured by State Farm Insurance Company, effective December 28, 1994. Id. The Second Department held that the trial court had erred in denying summary judgment to the defendants.Id. The Court noted that "` [a] cause of action to recover damages for false arrest does not lie if the defendant can establish the existence of probable cause for the plaintiff's arrest.'" Id. (citations omitted). The Court held: "Under the circumstances of this case, the officer properly relied upon the information in the NYSPIN computer and the defendant established the existence of probable cause for arresting the plaintiff."Id. at 547-48, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 639.
The Court said, "We recognize that probable cause may not be predicated on information in criminal justice system records such as those maintained by the NYSPIN computer `which, though correct when put into the records, no longer applies and which, through fault of the system, has been retained in its records after it became inapplicable."` Id. at 548, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 639 (quoting People v. Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d 518, 520, 446 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (1981)). In Jennings, the New York Court of Appeals held that "an arrest made in reliance upon the computerized criminal record file of defendant, which showed as outstanding a parole violation warrant which had in fact been executed nine months before and vacated four months before the arrest, is made without probable cause."Jennings, 54 N.Y.2d at 520, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 230. The Court in Jennings held that under the circumstances, the arrest was invalid, and the evidence taken pursuant to the arrest would be suppressed. Id. at 522, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
The Second Department in Moscatelli distinguished Jennings, stating that there was "no indication that the information in the NYSPIN computer was `inapplicable' at all, or that it was retained after it became inapplicable through fault of the system." Moscatelli, 252 A.D.2d at 548, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 640. Rather, the Court found:
The only evidence submitted by the plaintiff was a copy of the unsworn letter dated March 31, 1995, one day before the plaintiff's arrest. Because the plaintiff failed to produce evidence in admissible form to demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact as to the accuracy of the information contained in the NYSPIN computer or as to whether it was erroneously retained through the fault of the system, and she offered no explanation for her failure to come forward with such evidence, the defendant's motion should have been granted.Id.
Defendants argue that in the present case, as in Moscatelli, the officers properly relied on information in the NYSPIN records to establish probable cause. Mayer does not discuss Moscatelli — or any other false arrest cases — in his Memorandum in Oppositdon to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. However, at least underMoscatelli, it appears that if Mayer could establish that the information in the NYSPIN records was "inapplicable" at the time of his arrest and "was retained after it became inapplicable through fault of the system,"Moscatelli, 252 A.D.2d at 548, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 640, then his arrest would be considered without probable cause under New York law.
In his Memorandum, Mayer argues only that the change in bail from $100 to $200 was an "arbitrary" change that violated Mayer's rights. (See Pl.'s Mem. at 2-4)
It bears noting that New York law on this issue is not well developed. Moscatelli has not been cited for this proposition. Jennings has been cited in cases when arrests were made pursuant to previously vacated warrants and defendants moved to suppress evidence. However, with the exception of Moscatelli, Jennings has not been cited in a case where a plaintiff asserts a false arrest claim involving an error in NYSPIN or other computer records. The Second Circuit reached a conclusion contrary to Jennings in United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1989). InTowne, in considering whether evidence had been properly suppressed, the Second Circuit held that an officer had probable cause to arrest the defendant even though the warrant upon which the arrest was based had been improperly kept in the "active" files of the National Computer Information Center ("NCIC"). Id. at 884. However, this case did not apply New York law to determine whether probable cause existed, as the arrest occurred in Vermont. Id. at 882.
I need not decide whether the officers had probable cause for the arrest, because the officers are plainly entitled to qualified immunity — even if probable cause was lacking because of an error in the records that was the fault of the system. See Coons v. Casabella, 284 F.3d 437, 442 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Because [the officer] had arguable probable cause and thus was entitled to summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, we need not reach his claim that he had actual probable cause to issue the appearance ticket."). The Second Circuit has explained that generally courts should first ask the threshold question of whether "`[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . . the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right.'" Loria v. Gorman, 306 F.3d 1271, 1281 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)). "Addressing this initial question serves the important role of providing a clear standard against which officers can measure the legality of future conduct." Id. "Thus, although we have under certain circumstances bypassed this first step and proceeded directly to the qualified immunity inquiry, that is the exception rather than the rule." Id.
In the present case, assuming that Moscatelli applies, the determination of whether probable cause existed for the arrest turns not on the conduct of the officers at time of the arrest, but on whether the error in Mayer's NYSPIN record was the fault of the NYSPIN system — rather than the fault of Mayer's insurance company or his own fault. Determining whether Mayer has presented sufficient facts regarding this matter to survive a motion for summary judgment would not help to provide "a clear standard against which officers can measure the legality of future conduct." Loria, 306 F.3d at 1281. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate to address the qualified immunity question first.
The qualified or "good faith" immunity enjoyed by police officers shields them from personal liability for damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known, or insofar as it was objectively reasonable for them to believe that their acts did not violate those rights." Golino v. City of New Haven, 950 F.2d 864, 879 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A person has a clearly established right not to be arrested without probable cause. See Cook v. Sheldon, 41 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 1994). However, an arresting officer is entitled to qualified immunity from a suit for damages on a claim for arrest without probable cause if either "(a) it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that probable cause existed, or (b) officers of reasonable competence could disagree on whether the probable cause test was met." Golino, 950 F.2d at 879; accord Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1995) "[I]f any reasonable trier of fact could find that the defendants' actions were objectively unreasonable, then the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment. An officer's actions are objectively unreasonable when no officer of reasonable competence could have made the same choice in similar circumstances." Lennon, 66 F.3d at 420-21 (citing Malley v.Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). "Thus, if the court determines that the only conclusion a rational jury could reach is that reasonable officers would disagree about the legality of the defendants' conduct under the circumstances, summary judgment for the officers is appropriate." Id. at 421.
Here, it was objectively reasonable for Andolina and Halbekath to believe, based on the NYSPIN record, that probable cause existed for Mayer's arrest. The Court in Moscatelli held that a NYSPIN report indicating that a driver's registration was suspended was sufficient to establish probable cause to arrest the driver. See Moscatelli, 252 A.D.2d at 547, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 639; see also United States v. Owens, 142 F. Supp.2d 255, 263 (D. Conn. 2001); (officer had probable cause to arrest defendant when DMV printout indicated that defendant's license was suspended); Johnson v. Harron, No. 91 Civ. 1460, 1995 WL 319943, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995) (DMV computer information showing driver's license was suspended established probable cause for arrest); James v.United States, 709 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.D.C. 1989) (computer report indicating suspended license established probable cause).
Andonlina and Halbekath were the only defendants personally involved in the arrest of Mayer. Kelly, Olszelwsky, Walsh, and Hurst were not so involved and thus cannot be liable for false arrest. "It is well settled in this Circuit that `personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.'" Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Moffitt v. Town of Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1991)). "We have construed personal involvement for these purposes to mean direct participation, or failure to remedy the alleged wrong after learning of it, or creation of a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or gross negligence in managing subordinates." Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). "[W]hat we have meant by using phrases such as `direct participation' as a basis of liability is personal participation by one who has knowledge of the facts that rendered the conduct illegal." Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted) Kelly and Olszelwsky were not present for the arrest, and thus cannot be liable. Walsh and Hurst responded to the scene of the accident but they assert that they did not participate in Mayer's arrest. (Hurst Aff. ¶ 7; Walsh Aff. ¶ 5) Mayer states in his Rule 56.1 Statement that "[w]ith the exception of Sgts. Kelly and Olszelwsky, all defendants were present at the time of the plaintiff's arrest and participated in the investigation of the accident." (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 18) However, Mayer cites no evidence to support this statement and thus the statement is not sufficient to defeat summary judgment on this issue. See S.D.N.Y. E.D.N.Y. R. 56.1(d) ("Each statement of material fact by a movant or opponent must be followed by citation to evidence which would be admissible, set forth as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)."); see also Delaware Hudson Ry. Co. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 902 F.2d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Conclusory allegations will not suffice to create a genuine issue."). In any event, even if Hurst and Walsh did have some role in Mayer's arrest, they too would be protected by qualified immunity.
In cases where a police officer has arrested a person in reliance on a computer record that showed an outstanding arrest warrant, courts have held that the police officer is entitled to qualified immunity, even when the warrant had in fact been withdrawn or vacated, so long as the officer's reliance on the information in the computer records was objectively reasonable. See Edwards v. Baer, 863 F.2d 606, 608 (8th Cir. 1988); Wise v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ. A. 97-2651, 1998 WL 464918, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Lauer v. Dahlberg, 717 F. Supp. 612, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Taggart v. Macomb County, 587 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (D.C. Mich. 1982); cf. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1995) (holding that exclusionary rule should not apply when there was "no indication that the arresting officer was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer record" in which a clerical error caused an outstanding misdemeanor warrant entry, despite warrant having been quashed two weeks earlier); United States v. Santa, 180 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 1999) (exclusionary rule did not apply because officers' reliance on NYSPIN record erroneously showing existence of outstanding arrest warrant for defendant was objectively reasonable).
Mayer asserts in his Rule 56.1 Statement that he was arrested "even though defendant Halbekath knew that the DMV computer records are susceptible to error of the exact kind which occurred in this case." (Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 7) Halbekath was asked in his deposition whether he knew of "a situation where a person has obtained a new insurance policy and that reporting of the new policy either hasn't been filed by the insurance company or hasn't been acknowledged by the DMV." (Halbekath Dep. at 16) Halbekath responded that one of his sergeants had switched his insurance company, the previous insurance company mailed the notice that they no longer had the sergeant as a client, and "either the new insurance company didn't send out the notice that they're currently insuring the sergeant or the Department of Motor Vehicles lost it." (Id.) Halbekath's statement that he knew of one past instance where there was a mistake by the insurance company or the DMV is insufficient to show that his reliance on the NYSPIN records to establish probable cause for Mayer's arrest was unreasonable.
Mayer asserts also in his Rule 56.1 Statement that he presented "a valid insurance card" to the officers. However, it was not unreasonable for Halbekath and Andolina to arrest Mayer even though he showed them his insurance card. In Moscatelli, before her arrest, the driver showed the officer a letter that stated that she was insured, yet the officer arrested her because the NYSPIN record showed that her insurance had lapsed. Moscatelli, 252 A.D.2d at 547, 675 N.Y.S.2d at 639. The Court held that under these circumstances the officer had properly relied on the NYSPIN records to establish probable cause. Id.
Finally, the City of New Rochelle cannot be liable for false arrest. A municipality may be held liable if the plaintiff shows that a violation of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy or custom.See Board of County Comm'rs of Bryan County, Okla. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). I have not reached the question of whether Mayer's arrest was without probable cause and therefore a violation of his constitutional rights. However, even if probable cause was lacking, Mayer has neither alleged nor submitted evidence that shows that New Rochelle had a custom or policy that caused arrests to be made without probable cause. Therefore, the City of New Rochelle is not liable and is entitled to summary judgment.
All of Mayer's claim against the New Rochelle Police Department are also dismissed. See East Coast Novelty Co. v. City of New York, 781 F. Supp. 999, 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("As an agency of the City, the Police Department is not a suable entity [for suit under § 1983].");see also Fanelli v. Town of Harrison, 46 F. Supp.2d 254, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
B. Malicious Prosecution
"To sustain a § 1983 claim of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must demonstrate conduct by the defendant that is tortious under state law and that results in a constitutionally cognizable deprivation of liberty." Kinzer v. Jackson, 316 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (citingSinger v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 116-17 (2d Cir. 1995)). To state a claim under New York law for the tort of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show: "(1) that the defendant commenced or continued a criminal proceeding against him; (2) that the proceeding was terminated in the plaintiff's favor; (3) that there was no probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) that the proceeding was instituted with malice." Id.
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the malicious prosecution claim because the belief that probable cause to charge Mayer existed was objectively reasonable. "In assessing whether [the officers] were objectively reasonable in their belief that they had probable cause to charge the plaintiff with a violation of [the offense], we apply the same standard that we used to evaluate qualified immunity in the false arrest context. That is, was it objectively reasonable for the officers to believe that probable cause existed or could officers of reasonable competence disagree on whether the probable cause test was met?" Lennon v. Miller, 66 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations omitted); see also Bonide Products, Inc. v. Cahill, 223 F.3d 141, 145-46 (2d Cir. 2000).
Under New York law, "even when probable cause is present at the time of arrest, evidence could later surface which would eliminate that probable cause." Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571 (2d Cir. 1996). "In order for probable cause to dissipate, the groundless nature of the charges must be made apparent by the discovery of some intervening fact."Id. (citing Callan v. State, 73 N.Y.2d 731, 535 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1988)). Mayer has not alleged that, after his arrest and before he appeared in court, any officer received any other information regarding whether he had committed the offense. Therefore, the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The City of New Rochelle is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim, as Mayer has pointed to no custom or policy of the city that results in prosecutions proceeding without probable cause.
Andolina issued Mayer a "traffic ticket," or appearance ticket — a document that required Mayer to appear at the New Rochelle City Court on March 14, 2000 — at some point prior to his release. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 22) The issuing of this document constituted the commencement of the prosecution for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. See Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies Garment Cutters' Union Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979); Lopez v. City of New York, 901 F. Supp. 684, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). The next day, when Mayer presented the district attorney with new information regarding his registration — the DMV form rescinding his suspension — the charge was withdrawn. (Loomba Aff. Ex. 10)
C. Due Process Violation
Mayer's third claim for relief alleges a deprivation of his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. As part of this claim, Mayer argues that he was "prosecuted, imprisoned, and forced to be present in court" even though the City of New Rochelle "knew that there was no merit to the continuance of the prosecution and that the prosecution was malicious and the incarceration was illegal." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 54) A § 1983 claim of criminal prosecution without probable cause may not be based upon denial of due process rights, but only upon denial of Fourth Amendment rights. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994). As discussed above, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Mayer's Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claim.
Mayer also alleges as part of his due process claim that "defendants ignored Plaintiff's well-being in callous and reckless disregard of Plaintiff's constitutional rights." (Second Am. Compl. ¶ 57) Under the Fourteenth Amendment, pretrial detainees may not be subjected to conditions that constitute punishment, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979), or government conduct that "shocks the conscience," see County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998). Mayer asserts that he was in handcuffs from the time of his arrest until his bail was posted, and that the majority of that time he spent locked in a holding cell. (Mayer Aff. ¶ 12) Mayer does not allege that he was injured during the course of his detention, or even that he suffered any pain or discomfort. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Mayer, his treatment does not rise to the level of a due process violation. See Barratt v. Joie, No. 96 Civ. 0324, 2002 WL 335014, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 4, 2002) (no due process violation where plaintiff was handcuffed for five hours in a holding cell); Sulkowska v.City of New York, 129 F. Supp.2d 274, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("Plaintiff's restraint by handcuffs was merely an incident of her detention, and does not amount to the type of punishment that violates the Fourteenth Amendment."). Therefore, the officers are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. As there was no underlying constitutional violation, the City of New Rochelle cannot be liable either.
The Fifth Amendment is not applicable here, as it applies only to violations of due process committed by federal officials. See Birdsall v. City of Hartford, 249 F. Supp.2d 163, 170 (D. Conn. 2003) (citingPublic Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 461 (1952)).
Defendants say that Mayer arrived at the police station at approximately 10:30 p.m. and left at 11:40 p.m. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 14, 21) Defendants also state that after Mayer was arrested, he was brought directly to the police station. (Id. ¶ 14) Mayer does not dispute these statements.
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Mayer labels his fourth, and final, claim for relief "Cruel and Unusual Punishment." Mayer alleges he was deprived of his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, as well as under New York State Correction Law and the New York State Civil Rights law. (Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 59-60)
Any claim by Mayer based on the Eighth Amendment fails because "the Eighth Amendment's protection does not apply "until after conviction and sentence.'" United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotingGraham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n. 6 (1989)); see also Ingraham v.Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977) ("Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal prosecutions."). Mayer was never convicted nor sentenced, thus the Eighth Amendment does not apply.
Any claim under the Fourth Amendment fails as well. To the extent that Mayer asserts in his fourth claim that he was arrested without probable cause, this merely repeats his claim of false arrest, and this court has held that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim. The use of excessive force in the course of an arrest can violate the Fourth Amendment. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). However, Mayer does not allege that any officer used excessive force during his arrest. He does not allege any injury or pain in connection with being handcuffed, nor that any other force was used against him. Restraint by handcuffs under the circumstances present here does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Barratt, 2002 WL 335014, at *7-8; Sulkowska, 129 F. Supp.2d at 290-91; Scott v. County of Nassau, No. 94 CV 4291, 1998 WL 874840, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 1998); Johnson v. City of New York, 940 F. Supp. 631, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Haussman v. Fergus, 894 F. Supp. 142, 149 S.D.N.Y. 1995).
In his fourth claim, Mayer refers to a violation of New York State Correction Law and the New York State Civil Rights law. However, Mayer fails to point to any specific sections of these laws, and makes no arguments in his Memorandum as to these alleged violations of state law. To the extent that Mayer is claiming violations of state law, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims, as all of Mayer's federal claims have been dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(3) (2000); Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994).
E. Bail Claim
Mayer devotes his entire Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment to arguing that the change in his bail from $100 to $200 was "arbitrary" and violated his rights. Mayer argues that "having set bail, the police were not free to arbitrarily change and thus deny the bail they had already set." (Pl.'s Mem. at 3) Mayer cites Arteaga v.Conner, 88 N.Y. 403 (1882), which involved an action for false arrest and imprisonment. The Court held in Arteaga that the plaintiff's rearrest after he was released on bail violated certain New York statutory provisions. The Court said in its discussion: "When the sheriff makes the arrest, if the defendant offers sufficient bail he must take it and discharge him. It is not discretionary with him whether or not he will take bail: he is bound to take it, and if he refuses, acts oppressively, or declines to accept reasonable bail, he can be held responsible for misconduct in some form." Id. at 408. However, in the present case, Mayer has made no showing that the police refused to accept reasonable bail and release him. Rather, Mayer was released as soon as bail was posted. This statement in Arteaga, even if it is still good law in New York, cannot be read as holding that police officers are liable for misconduct if they raise the bail amount before the money is posted. In any event, Mayer fails to ground this claim in a federal constitutional right. To the extent that he is asserting a claim arising under New York law, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it.
Mayer cites one other case, Derenoncourt v. Costco Cos., No. 97 Civ. 3618, 1998 WL 883305 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1998), which does not bear on the present case.
Defendants point out that the statutory provisions at issue inArteaga are no longer in effect. (Defs.' Reply Mem. at 10).
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For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted.