Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:10-CV-01676 (VLB)
02-03-2014
MARIUS MAYE, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION DENYING PETITION TO VACATE,
SET ASIDE OR CORRECT THE SENTENCE [Dkt. 1]
I. Introduction
The petitioner, Marius Maye, petitioned this Court on October 29, 2010 for relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence related to a previous criminal matter. The petitioner argues that this relief should be granted on two grounds: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; and (2) abuse of prosecutorial authority. For the reasons the follow, the petition is DENIED.
II. Background
On December 5, 2006, the petitioner was indicted on three counts of knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute and distributing a mixture of substance containing five grams or more of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(b). United States v. Maye, 3:06-cr-00318(ANH), Dkt. 10 (Dec. 5, 2006). On August 21, 2007, the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count One of the Indictment before a United States Magistrate Judge. [Id. at Dkt. 65 (Aug. 21, 2007)]. The plea agreement entered into by the Petitioner provided for a waiver of the right to appeal or collaterally attack any sentence that did not exceed 327 months' incarceration, 8 years' supervised release, and a $4,000,000 fine. [Id. at Dkt. 67, p. 4 (Aug. 21, 2007) ("Plea Agreement")].
During the plea colloquy, the government reviewed the terms of the plea agreement before the Magistrate Judge canvassed the petitioner on the rights and waivers contained therein. [Id. at Dkt. 139 (Transcript dated Aug. 21, 2007)]. In its summary, the government stated that the plea agreement "sets forth Mr. Maye's waiver in his—of his right to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence, wherein it's agreed that Mr. Maye will not appeal or collaterally attack his sentence or conviction, if that sentence does not exceed 327 months imprisonment, an eight-year term of supervised release, and a four million dollar fine." [Id. at 22:4-10]. The Magistrate Judge then asked the petitioner if he understood "that in this agreement, if you enter it, you give up certain rights, including your right to appeal your sentence . . . ." [Id. at 25:6-8]. The petitioner responded "yes" to that question. [Id. at 25:22]. The Judge later asked if the petitioner understood that he faced "a supervised release term of as much as eight years to life?" [Id. at 27:21-22]. The petitioner also responded "yes" to that question. [Id. at 27:23]. The Judge concluded, after an extended canvass, that the petitioner "voluntarily, knowingly ad understandingly" entered into the plea agreement. [Id. at 35:9-10].
Subsequently, on November 21, 2008, District Judge Nevas sentenced the defendant within the appeal waiver threshold. He sentenced Maye to a term of 72 months incarceration, less than one-third of the bottom of the guideline range, and to eight years' supervised release. [Id. at Dkt. 134 (Judgment dated Dec. 1, 2008)]. At the sentencing hearing, there was argument related to whether two of the petitioner's previous crimes, a drug conviction from North Carolina and a manslaughter conviction from Connecticut, established his status as a career offender pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. Judge Nevas found that both prior convictions qualified as sufficient crimes to prove that the petitioner was as a career offender. [Id. at Dkt. 140, p. 2 (Transcript dated Nov. 21, 2008)].
On July 21, 2009, the petitioner appealed the sentence, and the defendant's counsel on appeal submitted a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1976) requesting the right to withdrawal. The government moved for summary affirmance based on the defendant's appellate waiver in the valid plea agreement and that no non-frivolous claims remained. On April 20, 2010, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals granted the defense counsel's motion to withdraw and granted the government's motion for summary affirmance stating that the "Appellant's waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable under United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d, 319 (2d Cir. 2000)." United States v. Maye, 3:06-cr-00318(AHN), Dkt. 152 (Mandate from the USCA dated April 20, 2010).
On October 29, 2010, the petitioner filed this pro se petition seeking to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The petitioner raises the following claims:
1. Ineffective assistance of counsel for (a) failing to get the transcript of one of his underlying convictions from North Carolina which may have affected his designation as a career offender; (b) refusing to challenge the prosecutor for changing the plea agreement; (c) showing the petitioner the 5k motion and memorandum the government filed on November 18, 2008 on November 21, 2008; and (d) for telling the petitioner days before his sentencing that he should represent himself, claiming that his lawyer showed no interest in his matters.[Dkt. 1, Petition Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody ("Petition"), p. 7].
2. Abuse of prosecutorial authority by (a) changing the terms of the plea agreement by adding in an appeal and collateral attack waiver and changing the supervised release provision from five to eight years; and (b) by refusing to file a Rule 35(b) motion based on the petitioner's cooperation involving the conviction of Claude Lee.
III. Legal Standard
"A federal court may not vacate a sentence of a prisoner in federal custody unless it 'was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or . . . the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.'" United States v. Pitcher, 559 F.2d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a)). "The grounds provided in section 2255 for collateral attack on a final judgment in a federal criminal case are narrowly limited, and it has 'long been settled law that an error that may justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral attack on a final judgment." Napoli v. United States, 32 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1994). "As a general rule, 'relief is available under § 2255 only for a constitutional error, a lack of jurisdiction in the sentencing court, or an error of law that constitutes 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Id. (quoting Hardy v. United States, 878 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1989)). Habeas relief for constitutional errors, therefore, is only available when the errors caused "substantial and injurious effect" resulting in "actual prejudice" or when the claim is one of actual innocence. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 637-38 (1993); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998).
There are also "strictly limited . . . circumstances under which a guilty plea may be attacked on collateral review." Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. After a guilty plea, a 2255 motion may raise the claim that the plea was not voluntary or intelligently given or that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 618-19; Zhang v. United States, 506 F.3d 162, 166 (2d Cir. 2007). Even so, a habeas petitioner must not have procedurally defaulted his claims by failing to raise them at trial or on direct appeal because habeas petitions are not allowed to serve as appeals. See Zhang, 506 F.3d at 166.
For a court to properly review procedurally defaulted claims, the petitioner must show either "(1) 'cause' for the failure to bring a direct appeal and 'actual prejudice' from the alleged violations; or (2) 'actual innocence.'" Zhang, 506 F.3d at 166 (quoting Bousley, 523 at 622). There is, however, an exception to the procedural default rule for ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 505-06 (2003). In order to prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must show: (1) that his attorney's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," and (2) "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id. at 687-88.
Furthermore, "[i]t it well established that a § 2255 petition cannot be used to relitigate questions which were raised and considered on direct appeal." Pitcher, 559 F.3d at 123 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
A petitioner may also waive his right to appeal or collaterally attack a sentence within an agreed-upon guideline range. See, e.g., Garcia-Santos v. United States, 273 F.3d 506, 509 (2d Cir. 2001)(per curiam)("We have long enforced waivers of direct appeal rights in plea agreements, even though the grounds for appeal arose after the plea agreement was entered into."); United States v. Fisher, 232 F.3d 301, 303 (2d Cir. 2000)("From the defendant's standpoint, this narrow form of appellate waiver is similar to an agreement to waive appellate rights as long as the sentence is within or below an agreed-upon Guidelines range, and we have regularly enforced waivers of that sort."); United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000)("In some cases, a defendant may have a valid claim that the waiver of appellate rights is unenforceable, such as when the waiver was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently . . ., when the sentence was imposed based on constitutionally impermissible factors, such as ethnic, racial or other prohibited biases . . ., when the government breached the plea agreement . . ., or when the sentencing court failed to enunciate any rationale for the defendant's sentence, thus amounting to an abdication of juridical responsibility subject to mandamus" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
A waiver is generally enforceable against the defendant as long as the record clearly demonstrates that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. United States v. Liriano-Blanco, 510 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir. 2007)("Waivers are upheld provided they are given knowingly, voluntarily and competently."). Moreover, "in no circumstance . . . may a defendant, who has secured the benefits of a plea agreement and knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to appeal a certain sentence, then appeal the merits of a sentence conforming to the agreement. Such a remedy would render the plea bargaining process and the resulting agreement meaningless." United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)(per curiam). The Second Circuit has similarly enforced collateral attack waivers. See Fredrick v. Warden, 308 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 2005)("There is no general bar to a waiver of collateral attack rights in a plea agreement.").
Exceptions to the enforceability of waivers have been found in the following circumstances: (1) "when the waiver was not made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently"; (2) "when the sentence was imposed based on constitutionally impermissible factors, such as ethnic, racial or other prohibited biases"; (3) "when the government breached the plea agreement"; and (4) when the sentencing court "failed to enunciate any rationale for the defendant's sentence." Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d at 319. Ineffective assistance of counsel is also a claim that, if successfully made, can render a waiver void. Frederick, 308 F.3d at 195.
However, even where a petitioner claims ineffective assistance of counsel, he must do more than simply allege the claim, he must demonstrate such ineffectiveness based on the record. United States v. Monzon, 359 F.3d 110, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2004)("[W]e reject the notion that an appeal waiver becomes unenforceable simply because a defendant 'claims' . . . ineffective assistance of counsel," and "if the record on appeal shows that the claim lacks merit, the appeal should be dismissed because the waiver should be enforced.")
Finally, if the court upholds the "constitutionality of the process by which the plea agreement was consummated," then the waiver becomes enforceable as to all "issues that fall within the scope of that waiver." United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2001)(per curiam).
IV. Discussion
The petitioner's first claim is that his plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel because his lawyer did not "challenge" the prosecutor for allegedly changing the plea agreement. [Dkt. 1, Petition, p. 7].
As stated above, to prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must establish (1) that the counsel's performance "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and (2) that the performance actually prejudiced the petitioner. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 668 (1984). Under this standard, "'[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential,' and 'a court must indulge a strong presumption that the counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 124 (2009)(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Furthermore, a petitioner must show that the counsel's errors actually prejudiced him, meaning that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. A defendant must meet both requirements of this the Strickland test to succeed on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. If a defendant fails to satisfy one prong, the court need not consider the other. Id. at 697. The petitioner has failed to meet either prong of this test, and, therefore, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failing to challenge the prosecutor for changing the words of the plea agreement must fail.
The petitioner does not allege that the plea agreement that he signed and agreed to in front of the magistrate judge was subsequently changed by the prosecutor, he alleges that the final plea agreement he signed was changed from a previous draft he reviewed. Specifically, he alleges that a prior draft included a reservation of his rights to appeal and included an agreed-upon term of five years' supervised release upon completion of the term of incarceration. However, there is no proof in the record supporting the petitioner's claim.
First, the plea agreement that the petitioner, the prosecutor, and defense counsel signed on the day the petitioner entered his guilty plea, which the government summarized and on which the petitioner was canvassed, contains an appellate and collateral attack waiver stating that, among other things, the "defendant will not appeal or collaterally attack in any proceeding, including but not limited to a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and/or § 2241, the conviction or sentence of imprisonment imposed by the Court if that sentence does not exceed 327 months' imprisonment, [and] an 8-year term of supervised release . . . ." [Plea Agreement, p. 5]. The plea agreement also sets out a guideline stipulation of 262-327 months' imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of ten years, and a fine range of $15,000 to $4,000,000 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and the penalty provision sets forth that the defendant faced a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, a $4,000,000 fine, a mandatory minimum penalty of ten years' imprisonment, and a minimum term of supervised release of at least eight years. [Id. at p. 2]. The Petitioner read the plea agreement, was canvassed on the plea agreement, and acknowledged his understanding that the plea agreement, calculated under U.S.S.G § 4B1.1, was based partly on his prior convictions. [See Plea Agreement, p. 4 ("The Government and the defendant calculate the defendant's applicable Sentencing Guidelines to be at a range of 262-327 months' imprisonment and a fine range of $15,000 to $4,000,000 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1."; Dkt. 139, 20:1-5 ("On page 2 of the Plea Agreement, it sets forth the penalties, including that Count One carries a maximum penalty of life, and a mandatory minimum penalty of ten years, because a second-offender information has already been filed in this case.")]. Even if prior drafts of the plea agreement contained different clauses, the final copy, which the defendant signed, contained the provisions he now alleges were changed without his approval. However, by signing the document and acknowledging and agreeing to the waivers during the plea colloquy conducted by the Magistrate Judge, the petitioner attested that he agreed to the terms in the final draft.
Moreover, the judge expressly canvassed the defendant on these provisions before permitting him to enter a guilty plea. First, the prosecutor summarized the plea agreement, including that the defendant faced "up to a four million dollar fine, and a term of supervised release of at least eight years," and waived "his right to appeal or collaterally attack the sentence . . . if the sentence does not exceed 327 months imprisonment, an eight-year term of supervised release, and a four million dollar fine." [Dkt. 139, 20:6-9; 22:4-10]. After this summary, the judge asked the defendant if "the written agreement, as outlined by [the prosecutor], fully and accurately reflect[ed] your understanding of the agreement that you've entered into with the government?" [Id. at 24:24-25:3]. The defendant responded "Yes." [Id. at 25:4]. Next, the judge asked the defendant if he understood "that in this agreement, if you enter it, you give up certain rights, including you right to appeal your sentence," and the defendant said that he understood. [Id. at 25:6-22]. Later, the judge asked the defendant if he understood that he faced "a supervised release term of as much as eight years to life?" [Id. at 27:21-22]. Again, the defendant said "Yes," he understood. [Id. at 27:23]. At the end of the hearing, the magistrate judge found that the defendant had entered into the plea agreement "voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly." [Id. at 35:9-11]. After the canvass, the defendant signed the plea agreement and pled guilty to charge one of the indictment. Considering the defendant's affirmations under oath that he understood each of the terms of the plea agreement and that he had discussed the effects of his plea with his lawyer, there is no evidence that shows that counsel was ineffective by not challenging the prosecutor for allegedly changing the words of the plea agreement. Indeed, there is no proof in the record that shows that the final draft of the plea agreement signed by the defendant is anything but what was anticipated by all parties involved.
As support for his claim, the petitioner provides an email correspondence dated April 17, 2007 from defense counsel to the prosecutor stating that defense counsel was "in receipt of the draft plea agreement for Marius Maye. I would request that you remove from the agreement the first paragraph on page four concerning neither party to the agreement seeking a departure of non-guideline sentence. Mr. Maye also requests that you delete Section V of the plea agreement concerning waiver of rights to appeal." [Dkt. 9, p. 15]. While this email does show that some negotiation prior to the plea hearing took place, and indeed the first draft of the plea agreement contains a supervised release provision of five years, not eight, this email alone simply reflects the fact that the petitioner made a counteroffer to the government, not that the government accepted his counteroffer. On the contrary, the inclusion of the appeal waiver and the petitioner's acceptance of the plea agreement with the waiver evinces the government's rejection of the petitioner's counteroffer and the petitioners acquiescence to that rejection. This email cannot overcome the defendant's knowing and voluntary affirmation at the plea hearing.
This Court was not privy to the discussions and negotiations that occurred over several months between counsel and the defendant regarding the provisions of the plea agreement. What the record irrefutably shows is that the plea agreement was changed to include a provision of a minimum of eight years of supervised release and included a waiver of collateral attack should the sentence not exceed the stipulated amount. It is also irrefutable, as reflected in the court transcript of the plea hearing, that the petitioner read the version of the plea agreement he signed, the agreement was summarized aloud in his presence in open court on the record, and the defendant affirmed to the court under oath and in the presence of counsel that he understood and accepted all of the terms of the plea agreement and in particular those terms in question here. This is more than sufficient to rebut any claim that the prosecutor altered the terms of the agreement without the petitioner's knowledge and acquiescence. Accordingly, his lawyer was not ineffective for failing to challenge the final draft of the plea agreement at the plea hearing.
Similarly, the petitioner raises what appears to be a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for altering the terms of the plea agreement. For the reasons stated above, the Court does not find that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct or abused her authority by negotiating a plea agreement with the petitioner over the course of several months, the final draft of which the defendant voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly signed and entered into on the record in the presence of counsel before the Magistrate Judge following a thorough canvas in which the disputed terms were highlighted.
The remainder of the petitioner's claims relate to issues that arose after the plea agreement was entered into. Therefore, if the plea agreement is valid, these claims must fail if they are barred by the collateral attack provisions. The petitioner does not contest in this petition, nor could he, that the plea agreement was not entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and competently. Indeed the Second Circuit has already held, albeit in a summary affirmance, that the petitioner's "waiver of his appellate rights is enforceable under United States v. Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d 315, 319 (2d Cir. 2000)." [Dkt. 152, Mandate of USCA dated 5/25/10, p. 1]. Moreover, in its brief to the Second Circuit, the government argued that the plea agreement was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and competently. [Dkt. 8, Government's Response to Defendant's Motion Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, p. 15-16]. The waiver's validity, therefore, was raised and already decided on direct appeal. See United States v. Pitcher, 559 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2009)(issues barred in section 2255 motion because issues had been raised on direct appeal); United States v. Jones, 918 F.2d 9, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1990)(rejecting the argument that appellate decision's failure to discuss explicitly an issue permitted prisoner to raise the issue again in habeas); see also Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998)("In this case, petitioner contested his sentence on appeal, but did not challenge the validity of his plea. In failing to do so, petitioner procedurally defaulted the claim he now presses on us" and now must demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence).
Since the collateral attack waiver is valid, all issues presented here that fall within "the scope of that waiver" are precluded from review as a matter of law. United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2001). The defendants remaining contentions all relate to the length of the sentence imposed, which was less than one-third of the bottom of the recommended guideline range, namely: ineffective assistance of counsel based on his designation as a career offender, ineffective assistance of counsel based on not giving him sufficient time to review the 5K motion filed by the government, ineffective assistance of counsel based on telling the defendant he should represent himself at sentencing, prosecutorial misconduct by refusing to file a Rule 35(b) motion for petitioner's cooperation leading to the conviction of Claude Lee. These claims do not affect the validity of the waiver itself and do not fall in one of the other exceptions to the enforceability of waivers doctrine. See Gomez-Perez, 215 F.3d at 319. Since the petitioner was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 72 months and to a term of supervised release of 8 years and a special assessment fee of $100, the collateral attack waiver in the plea agreement is triggered. Therefore, these claims are barred from collateral review.
Even if these claims were not barred from review, they are meritless. First, the defendant argues ineffective assistance of counsel due to his lawyer's failure to request a trial transcript from North Carolina. However, as stated above, the petitioner agreed that he was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 in the plea agreement. Moreover, the district court reviewed and analyzed the petitioner's prior convictions pursuant to United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959, 965-67 (2d Cir. 2008). Under this analysis, the district court used the modified categorical approach in determining that the petitioner's North Carolina drug conviction qualified as a controlled substance offense because the North Carolina corrected judgment, an official court record, established that the conviction was for possession with intent to distribute cocaine or cocaine base. United States v. Maye, 3:06-cr-00318(ANH), Dkt. 142, 10-26 (Transcript dated Nov. 21, 2008), Dkt. 140, p. 2. Thus, it was not necessary to consult the underlying transcript to establish that the conviction constituted a qualifying offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Furthermore, the court heard argument on whether the petitioner's Connecticut conviction for manslaughter qualified as a crime of violence pursuant to United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2008), and it held that the Connecticut conviction qualified on its face as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. United States v. Maye, 3:06-cr-00318(ANH), Dkt. 142, p 2-3. Therefore, the petitioner has filed to prove either that his counsel's failure to request a transcript fell below an objective standard of performance or that he was actually prejudiced by his counsel's actions.
His remaining claims for ineffective assistance of counsel relate to the conduct of his attorney in preparing for the defendant's sentencing. The petitioner claims that his counsel failed to timely review the government's 5K motion with him and made comments that the petitioner should represent himself at sentencing. Even so, the petitioner has not demonstrated either that the behavior fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or actual prejudice. The petitioner's counsel did review the 5K motion with the defendant before sentencing and was prepared to go forward when the defendant was sentenced. At that hearing, the district court ensured that the defendant and his counsel read and discussed the presentence report and that the petitioner had an opportunity to go over it with defense counsel. [Id. at Dkt. 142, p. 2-4]. The court specifically inquired numerous times whether the defendant had any questions, which the defendant, after consulting with his lawyer, replied "[n]o, your Honor." [Id. at Dkt. 142, p. 3]. Therefore, there is no basis to conclude that the lawyer's assistance was ineffective because counsel did review the relevant motions with the petitioner and the petitioner affirmed under oath that he had time to consult with his lawyer and his lawyer did represent him at the sentencing.
The remaining claims for abuse of prosecutorial authority are also without merit. The petitioner alleges that the government refused to file a Rule 35(b) motion based on his cooperation and assistance with the conviction of Claude Lee. The government, however, specifically addressed his cooperation by filing a 5K motion for a reduction in sentence. The district court reviewed this motion and sentenced the defendant 190 months below the bottom of the applicable guideline range. Moreover, the court confirmed that the petitioner read the 5K motion and stated that it had "read that carefully, and it's a strong message that the government has conveyed to the court, without going into the details." [Id. at Dkt. 140, 15:25-16:3]. Therefore, the petitioner's cooperation was addressed by the government, and there is no basis for a Rule 35(b) motion. Accordingly, the petitioner has failed to prove an abuse of prosecutorial authority.
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the petition to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence filed by the petitioner is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
__________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: this 3rd day of February 2014