Summary
noting that appellee conceded that damages award was excessive and requested that the court of appeals reform the trial court's judgment and stating, "We construe this request as accepting the suggested remittitur. We, therefore, modify the trial court's judgment to reflect an award of $450 for past lost wages. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment."
Summary of this case from Melton v. StateOpinion
No. 05-16-00750-CV
05-03-2017
MAYA WALNUT, LLC D/B/A EL RIO GRANDE LATIN MARKET STORE 5, Appellant v. ELFEGO LOPEZ-RODRIGUEZ, Appellee
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-05961
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Whitehill, and Boatright
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
Elfego Lopez-Rodriguez severed a portion of his left thumb while working as a meat cutter for Maya Walnut, LLC d/b/a El Rio Grande Latin Market Store 5 (Maya). Lopez-Rodriguez sued Maya for negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace. A jury found Maya's negligence was a proximate cause of Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries and awarded him $106,950 in damages. In one issue, Maya challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support (1) the jury's findings that Maya breached a duty of care to Lopez-Rodriguez and that any breach proximately caused Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries, and (2) the jury's award of $4,450 in damages for past lost wages. As to the award of past lost wages, Maya asserts the evidence at trial supports a recovery of only $450 for past lost wages. Lopez-Rodriguez concedes the evidence supports a finding of past lost wages only in the amount of $450 and "that part of the verdict should be reformed to reflect an amount of $450.00 for the past lost wages[.]" Construing Lopez-Rodriguez's concession as consent to the remittitur of damages not supported by the evidence, see TEX. R. APP. P. 46.3, we modify the trial court's judgment to award Lopez-Rodriguez $450 for past lost damages. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand this case to the trial court for the purpose of recalculating prejudgment interest.
Background
Lopez-Rodriguez was hired by Maya in 2007 or 2008 to work in the seafood department. He was responsible for selling seafood to customers and preparing sauces and salads. After approximately six months of employment, Lopez-Rodriguez was promoted to assistant manager of the meat department. Lopez-Rodriguez testified he received no training for the assistant manager's position. His responsibilities as the assistant manager consisted of attending to the needs of customers and supervising store personnel, including supervision of meat cutters and the manner in which they performed their duties. He was also expected to ensure that "by a certain hour," all the "cases" were full and there was a sufficient supply of meat to satisfy customer demand. As an assistant manager, Lopez-Rodriguez occasionally cut meat with the meat saw because there were not enough meat cutters available to ensure the required production. According to Lopez-Rodriguez, even though he had "always been attending to the public in a butcher shop," he had no personal experience using a meat saw prior to working for Maya.
At some point, Maya instituted a training program for new personnel. Lopez-Rodriguez testified that "all the personnel who beforehand had been working" at Maya were also required to attend the training. Lopez-Rodriguez requested that he receive the additional training on several occasions, but was not allowed to attend because he was a supervisor.
Although there was conflicting evidence about whether it occurred in May or October of 2013, Lopez-Rodriguez was replaced as assistant manager by Cesar Granados and given the option of becoming a meat cutter or terminating his employment with Maya. Lopez-Rodriguez accepted the meat cutter position and testified that "[f]rom that moment on, without asking if I had received training, without asking if I knew how to cut, from that moment on, my job was to cut meat."
According to Lopez-Rodriguez, he learned how to cut meat based on information he received from individuals with more experience and a video training course he completed at Maya that showed him "that was how it was cut in order to avoid dangers." Lopez-Rodriguez watched the video training course in the office. He also watched a PowerPoint presentation concerning meat cutting on the computer and listened to a speaker "going through it." Lopez-Rodriguez testified the training he received did not include information on the difference between cutting frozen and fresh meat or how to safely handle the cutting of a large volume of meat.
The PowerPoint presentation viewed by Lopez-Rodriguez was admitted into evidence along with an acknowledgement, signed by Lopez-Rodriguez on May 25, 2013, that he had received the "Cutting Safety Training." The PowerPoint presentation contained slides on a meat cutter's responsibilities; lifting safety; hazards in the meat department, including cuts and amputations from meat processing machinery; preventing slips and falls; general injury prevention measures; personal protective equipment; keeping a clean and neat uniform; personal hygiene; safe knife handling practices; using the meat saw; how to cut pork feet, beef feet, and "seven steak;" and keeping the workplace clean. As to proper use of the meat saw, the PowerPoint presentation (1) instructed Lopez-Rodriguez that he should always use the guards on the saw; (2) indicated the saw should be cleaned at least twice a day, and preferably after every use, and power to the saw should be disconnected before it was cleaned; (3) provided general instructions on how to clean the saw; and (4) informed Lopez-Rodriguez the saw was designed to "cut side" and "should never be cut from the front." The slide regarding meat saw safety stated:
Image materials not available for display. Lopez-Rodriguez was also cautioned in the PowerPoint presentation to review and understand the operating instructions for the meat saw, but the record does not reflect he was provided with those instructions during the training. Lopez-Rodriguez passed a "Knowledge Test" on the information provided during the training.
Granados, who had six or seven years' experience as a meat cutter prior to being hired by Maya, testified that, after he began working for Maya, he was required to review the videos and to attend a two-day training program at another store. Granados agreed this other store provided "hands-on training using the meat saw and other things that you would use at [sic] a meat cutter." Granados testified he observed Lopez-Rodriguez cutting meat and Lopez-Rodriguez "was doing it the correct way." Lopez-Rodriguez never asked Granados for additional training and, based on his observations of Lopez-Rodriguez's work, Granados did not believe Lopez-Rodriguez needed additional training. Granados conceded, however, that during his deposition he testified he did not "pay a lot of attention" to Lopez-Rodriguez while he was cutting meat because the department was busy.
According to Lopez-Rodriguez and his coworker, Israel Anguiano, demand for meat increased significantly during the 2013 holiday season. During the holiday season, all the meat had to be cut by 2:00 p.m. each day and there was "a lot of hurry as to cutting it." Lopez-Rodriguez admitted, however, that during his deposition, he testified the volume of meat he was required to cut on December 2, 2013, was the "usual" volume. Granados testified November and December are busy months in the meat department, and he has occasionally hired extra personnel to handle the additional volume. In November and December 2013, he did not hire additional meat cutters because Maya had sufficient personnel to cut the required amount of meat. According to Anguiano, Maya did not have sufficient workers on December 2, 2013, to cut the required amount of meat.
Lopez-Rodriguez testified that on December 2, 2013, he was cutting pork chops and, because of the amount of meat he was required to cut, was "cutting fast." As he was running a piece of frozen meat through the meat saw, it "jumped up" and his left hand was exposed to the blade. A portion of Lopez-Rodriguez's left thumb was severed by the saw. Efforts to reattach the severed portion of his thumb were unsuccessful.
Lopez-Rodriguez was on medical leave for approximately six weeks. During that period, Maya paid him approximately seventy percent of his regular weekly earnings of $250. Lopez-Rodriguez returned to work, but his employment with Maya was terminated on April 28, 2014, based on "unsatisfactory performance" and "excessive warnings."
Lopez-Rodriguez sued Maya alleging common law claims of negligence in failing to provide a safe workplace. When the case was presented to the jury, Lopez-Rodriguez's specific claims were that Maya was negligent by failing to properly train him in the use of the meat saw and to hire sufficient personnel during the busy holiday season. The jury found Maya negligent and awarded actual damages of $106,950. The trial court rendered judgment on the verdict.
Standard of Review
When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof at trial, it must demonstrate there is no evidence to support the adverse finding. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 348 S.W.3d 194, 215 (Tex. 2011); Croucher v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983). In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). We must credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Id. at 807, 827. "The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review." Id. at 827.
A complaint that the evidence is legally insufficient will be sustained when: (a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (b) the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (d) the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of the vital fact. See id. at 810; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003). "Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding." Formosa Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. Presidio Eng'rs & Contractors, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998). There is more than a scintilla of evidence "when the evidence as a whole rises to a level enabling reasonable and fair-minded people to have different conclusions." Waste Mgmt. of Tex., Inc. v. Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434 S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014). "However, if the evidence is so weak that it only creates a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, it is regarded as no evidence." Id.
In a factual sufficiency review, we consider and weigh all of the evidence, both supporting and contradicting the finding. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Tex. 1998). We may set aside the finding only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Id. at 407; Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 (legal sufficiency review); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003) (factual sufficiency review). We may not substitute our own judgment for that of the factfinder merely because we might reach a different result. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819, 822; Golden Eagle Archery, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 761.
Analysis
Maya challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support (1) the jury's findings Maya breached a duty owed to Lopez-Rodriguez and the breach proximately caused Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries, and (2) the jury's award of $4,450 for past lost wages.
The Texas Workers' Compensation Act permits private Texas employers to elect whether to subscribe to workers' compensation insurance. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.002(a) (West 2015); Tex. W. Oaks Hosp., L.P. v. Williams, 371 S.W.3d 171, 186 (Tex. 2012). If, as in this case, the employer elects to be a nonsubscriber, it is subject to suits at common law for damages, to which it can raise only limited defenses. Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 187 (citing TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(a), (d) (West 2015)). An employee injured on the job must file suit and prove the employer's negligence. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 406.033(d); Williams, 371 S.W.3d at 187. To prevail on the negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish a duty that is owed to him, a breach of that duty, and damages proximately caused by the breach. Kroger Co. v. Elwood, 197 S.W.3d 793, 794 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam).
An employer in Texas owes certain continuous, non-delegable duties to its employees. Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 754 (Tex. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by Parker v. Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978); Kroger Co. v. Milanes, 474 S.W.3d 321, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.). These include the duties to warn employees of the hazards of their employment, supervise their activities, and furnish a reasonably safe place in which to labor, Farley, 529 S.W.2d at 754, the duty to provide adequate help under the circumstances for the performance of the required work, Werner v. Colwell, 909 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. 1995), and the duty to provide necessary equipment, training, or supervision and to furnish reasonably safe equipment necessary for the performance of the job. Austin v. Kroger Tex., L.P., 465 S.W.3d 193, 215 (Tex. 2015). Although not an insurer of its employees' safety at work, an employer has a duty to use ordinary care, based on standard negligence principles, in carrying out these duties. Leitch v. Hornsby, 935 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1996); Werner, 909 S.W.2d at 869; see also Elwood, 197 S.W.3d at 794 ("An employer has a duty to use ordinary care in providing a safe workplace.").
Preservation of Error
To preserve a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's finding, the party must raise the specific complaint in the trial court either by: (1) a motion for directed verdict; (2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV); (3) an objection to the submission of the jury question; (4) a motion to disregard the jury's finding on a vital fact issue; or (5) a motion for new trial. Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 510-11 (Tex. 1991); Pearcy v. Brewer, No. 05-16-00194-CV, 2016 WL 7473907, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 29, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.). To preserve a factual sufficiency challenge, the party must present the specific complaint to the trial court in a motion for new trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2), (3); Cecil, 804 S.W.2d at 510; Defterios v. Dallas Bayou Bend, Ltd., 350 S.W.3d 659, 664 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied).
The party is required to adequately apprise the trial court of any alleged deficiencies in such a way that its objection can be clearly identified and understood. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1); see also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. McKenzie, 997 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam); Lake v. Premier Transp., 246 S.W.3d 167, 174 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, no pet.) (objection must be specific enough to enable trial court to understand precise nature of error alleged); City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331, 335 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (arguments in motion for new trial did not adequately apprise trial court of argument made on appeal that testimony of expert witnesses had no probative value and could not be considered on issue of damages). Further, the objection to the trial court must comport with the argument made on appeal. Basic Energy Serv., Inc. v. D-S-B Props., Inc., 367 S.W.3d 254, 264 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2011, no pet.); Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d at 335. An objection on appeal that is not the same as that urged at trial presents nothing for review. Basic Energy Serv., Inc., 367 S.W.3d at 264; Ferrara v. Moore, 318 S.W.3d 487, 495-96 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. denied) (complaint in motion for new trial that attorney's fees were not reasonable or necessary did not preserve for appeal complaint that fees were not segregated).
Maya filed a motion for JNOV in which it asserted the evidence was legally insufficient to support the verdict and a motion for new trial in which it asserted the evidence was factually insufficient to support the verdict. The grounds for both motions were there was insufficient evidence that Maya's negligence proximately caused his injury and of the damages the jury awarded for past lost wages. Under the first ground, Maya specifically stated "the focus of this motion is cause-in-fact." Maya argued there was insufficient evidence of the type of additional training Lopez-Rodriguez claimed he needed; even if there was evidence as what this training comprised, there was insufficient evidence as to how this training would have prevented the injury; and Lopez-Rodriguez was not qualified to render an opinion regarding the training he allegedly lacked and how it would have prevented the injury because he did not know what the additional training entailed. Maya concluded both the motion for JNOV and motion for new trial by stating that Lopez-Rodriguez's failure "to satisfy the cause-in-fact prong of the element of proximate cause" and to provide sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of damages for lost wages required the trial court to grant the motion.
Breach of Duty
We turn first to Maya's argument the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the judgment because Lopez-Rodriguez failed to present expert testimony regarding the appropriate standard of care and how Maya breached that standard. However, Maya's motion for JNOV and motion for new trial asserted only that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of cause-in-fact and award of $4,450 in past lost wages. Because Maya did not argue in either its motion for JNOV or its motion for new trial that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Maya breached the appropriate standard of care, it has failed to preserve this argument for appellate review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); Basic Energy Serv., Inc., 367 S.W.3d at 264; Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d at 335.
Causation
Maya next argues the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that Maya's negligence proximately caused Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries. Maya specifically argues there is no evidence that its failure to provide live training or increasing the volume of meat Lopez-Rodriguez was required to cut served as the "but for" cause of Lopez-Rodriguez's injury or that the injury was foreseeable as a result of any negligence.
Lopez-Rodriguez frames his issue as, "The jury's finding that Maya's negligence proximately caused injury to Lopez-Rodriguez is not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence." However, Maya substantively argued there was no evidence to support the jury's finding and requested, under this argument, that we reverse the judgment and render judgment in favor of Maya. We conclude Maya has failed to challenge the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding that Maya's negligence proximately caused Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); Port of Houston Auth. of Harris Cty. v. Zachry Constr. Corp., No 14-10-00708-CV, 2016 WL 7323304, at *3 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 15, 2016, pet. filed).
"The components of proximate cause consist of cause in fact and foreseeability." Rogers v. Zanetti, No. 15-0557, slip. op. at 8, 2017 WL 1553154 (Tex. Apr. 28, 2017). Foreseeability means that a person of ordinary intelligence should have anticipated the danger created by his negligence. Excel Corp. v Apodaca, 81 S.W.3d 817, 820 (Tex. 2002); see also Rogers, slip op. at 9 (foreseeability or legal cause component "asks whether the harm incurred should have been anticipated and whether policy considerations should limit the consequences of a defendant's conduct"). Cause in fact, or "but for" causation, means the defendant's negligence "was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury and without which harm would not have occurred." Rogers, slip. op. at 8-9 see also Transcont'l Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 222 (Tex. 2010) (describing elements of proximate cause as "cause in fact (or substantial factor) and foreseeability"). Proximate cause may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 459 (Tex. 1992); McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903-04 (Tex. 1980). It may not, however, be established by "mere conjecture, guess, or speculation." W. Invests., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 551 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Doe v. Boys Club of Greater Dallas, Inc., 907 S.W.2d 472, 477 (Tex. 1995)).
Maya did not assert in its motion for JNOV that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries were foreseeable. It, therefore, failed to preserve that argument for appellate review. See Cecil, 804 S.W.2d 510-11; Pearcy, 2016 WL 7473907, at *2. Accordingly, we consider only Maya's argument the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that Maya's negligence was the cause in fact of Lopez-Rodriguez's injuries.
The test for cause in fact is whether the defendant's negligence was a substantial factor in causing the injury without which the harm would not have occurred. Rogers, slip op. at 10. To constitute a "cause in fact" of the plaintiff's injury, the act or occurrence must be both a substantial factor and a but-for cause of the injury or occurrence. Id. However, the defendant's negligence need not be the sole cause of the injury. Havner, 825 S.W.2d at 459. The issue is whether there is any evidence from which reasonable minds could draw an inference that the failure to provide a safe place to work was a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. "Whether other possible inferences may be drawn from the evidence is not the relevant inquiry." Id.; see also McClure, 608 S.W.2d at 904-05.
Maya argues Lopez-Rodriguez was injured when the meat he was cutting "jumped up," exposing his left hand to the saw blade, and there was no evidence that with additional training or a smaller volume of work his injury would not have occurred. Maya specifically points to Lopez-Rodriguez's failure to offer any evidence of what he would have learned if additional training had been available to him, how such training would have prevented his injury, or the volume of meat that Lopez-Rodriguez could have cut without injury.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's findings, shows Maya recognized the potential dangers, including a cut or amputation, posed to the meat cutters from the operation of the meat saw. It trained the meat cutters with a video training course and a PowerPoint presentation, followed by a knowledge test, but also established a two-day training program for new hires as well as existing employees that included hands-on training on the meat saw. Lopez-Rodriguez requested to attend the additional two-day training, but Maya denied his request because he was a supervisor at the time. However, it required Granados, Lopez-Rodriguez's replacement as assistant manager, who had six years of experience cutting meat with a meat saw prior to being employed by Maya, to attend the two-day training as well as review the video training course.
Lopez-Rodriguez had limited experience as a meat cutter before being employed in that capacity by Maya, and the only formal training he received on safely cutting meat was viewing a video training course and PowerPoint presentation provided by Maya. These training materials contained only general information on the safe use of a meat saw and did not include instruction concerning differences between cutting frozen and fresh meat or the safe cutting of a large volume of meat. While Lopez-Rodriguez worked for several months as a meat cutter without incident, the volume of meat he was required to cut increased dramatically during the 2013 holiday season. Maya did not hire additional meat cutters during that period of increased demand, and Lopez-Rodriguez was injured when he "hurried" to complete his increased workload in the time allocated by Maya.
Applying the proper standard of review, we conclude there was more than a scintilla of evidence from which the jury could reasonably have drawn the inference that Maya's failure to provide Lopez-Rodriguez with adequate training and then increasing his workload during the 2013 holiday season caused him to react when the meat he was cutting "jumped" in a way that led to the meat saw severing a portion of his left thumb. See Truco Props., Inc. v. Charlton, 749 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, writ denied) (concluding there was sufficient evidence that failure to instruct employee was cause of injury when employer recognized injury could be caused by lifting buckets and knew employee was required to lift buckets, but failed to train employee on how to safely lift buckets); see also Havner, 825 S.W.2d at 459; McClure, 608 S.W.2d at 904. Accordingly, the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury's finding that Maya's negligence was a cause in fact of Lopez's injury.
Past Lost Wages
Maya finally argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the jury's award of $4,450 in past lost wages. Lopez-Rodriguez testified he was on leave for six weeks after the accident. His weekly pay was $250, and Maya paid him seventy percent of that amount while he was on leave. Therefore, the evidence established Lopez-Rodriguez lost wages in the amount of $450.
We conclude that, although there is evidence to support an award of past lost wages to Lopez-Rodriguez, the $4,450 awarded by the jury is not supported by the evidence. If, as we conclude here, part of a damages award lacks sufficient evidentiary support, the proper course is to suggest a remittitur of that part of the verdict. Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 46.3 (court of appeals may suggest a remittitur); Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. v. Nat'l Dev. & Research Corp., 299 S.W.3d 106, 124 (Tex. 2009). Consequently, we suggest a remittitur of $4,000 of the past lost wages awarded by the trial court. As the prevailing party at trial, Lopez-Rodriguez must be given the option of accepting the remittitur or having the case remanded for a new trial. TEX. R. APP. P. 46.3; Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641; McLeod v. Gyr, 439 S.W.3d 639, 650 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. denied).
In his brief, Lopez-Rodriguez concedes the evidence supports an award of past lost damages only in the amount of $450 and requests that we reform the trial court's judgment to reflect that amount for past lost wages. We construe this request as accepting the suggested remittitur. We, therefore, modify the trial court's judgment to reflect an award of $450 for past lost wages. As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment. We remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of recalculating prejudgment interest.
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE 160750F.P05
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the 192nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. DC-14-05961.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Whitehill and Boatright participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is MODIFIED as follows:
The amount of damages awarded to Elfegio Lopez-Rodriguez is modified to $102,950.00, to reflect a remittitur of $4,000.00 of the jury's award for past lost wagesIt is ORDERED that, as modified, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this case to the trial court for a recalculation of prejudgment interest.
It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal. Judgment entered this 3rd day of May, 2017.