Opinion
Civil Action No. 18-cv-02692-DME-NRN
2019-06-10
Ilona MAXWELL, Plaintiff, v. JAMES RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, a foreign corporation, and Twin City Fire Insurance Company, a foreign corporation, Defendants.
Sean Bradley Walsh, Lampert & Walsh, LLC, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff. Jessica Clark Collier, Kimberly Lynn Koehler, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants.
Sean Bradley Walsh, Lampert & Walsh, LLC, Denver, CO, for Plaintiff.
Jessica Clark Collier, Kimberly Lynn Koehler, Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker, LLP, Denver, CO, for Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
David M. Ebel, U.S. Circuit Court Judge
Before the Court are Defendant James River Insurance Company's and Defendant Twin City Fire Insurance Company's Motions for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. This case involves a dispute between an Uber driver, who was injured in a car accident with an underinsured motorist while she was logged into the Uber application as a driver but without an active fare, and the two insurers who provided the Uber driver with some automobile insurance coverage. After each insurer denied Plaintiff's claims for underinsured motorist benefits, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, asserting claims of (1) breach of contract and (2) the unreasonable delay or denial of benefits pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and - 1116 against each defendant. The insurers now argue that they denied Plaintiff's claims for benefits because their policies did not cover the injuries Plaintiff suffered in her accident, coverage which comported with all statutory obligations. The Court GRANTS both defendants' motions for summary judgment (Docs. 37, 41), agreeing that neither insurer's policy provided uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) coverage under these circumstances and that both policies comported with all applicable statutory and public policy requirements.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court finds that the following facts are undisputed. Plaintiff Ilona Maxwell was logged into the Uber rideshare application as an available driver on January 11, 2018, when she was injured in a motor vehicle accident with a third party. At the time of the accident, Maxwell was neither on her way to pick-up a passenger, driving a passenger, nor dropping a passenger off. In other words, although she was available as a driver, the application had not yet connected her with a fare. The third party was determined to be at-fault in the accident, but he was underinsured. Maxwell recovered the full policy limits from the third party to pay for her injuries in part, but she alleges that her damages exceeded the amount available from his policy. As a result, Maxwell filed claims for UM/UIM benefits with two insurance companies with whom she had policies.
First, Maxwell filed a claim with Twin City Fire Insurance Company ("Twin City"), Maxwell's private automobile insurer with whom she had a policy that covered the vehicle she was driving at the time of the accident. That policy provided for "uninsured motorist coverage" of up to $100,000 per person injured, maxing out at $300,000 per accident (and used the term "uninsured" to describe both uninsured and underinsured motorists). Doc. 37-3 at 187, 190. However, the policy contained an exclusion that read:
(B) We do not provide Uninsured Motorist Coverage for bodily injury sustained by any insured:
2. While occupying your covered auto when it is being used as a public or livery conveyance. This includes but is not limited to any period of time your covered auto is being used by any insured who is logged into a transportation network platform as a driver, whether or not a passenger is occupying the vehicle.
This exclusion (2.) does not apply:
(a) to a share-the-expense car pool; or
(b) if a specific premium charge is shown in the Declaration page for Transportation Network Driver coverage with respect to the vehicle described in the Declarations.
Doc. 37-1 at 381 ("Twin City Exclusion Provision"). Separately, in three nearly identical provisions, the policy stated that it also did not provide (1) liability coverage, (2) Uninsured Motorists Coverage for property damage, or (3) Medical Payments Coverage for damages that resulted while the insured was "logged into a transportation network platform as a driver, whether or not a passenger is occupying the vehicle." Id. at 379, 380, 382-83. The policy defines "transportation network platform" as an online-enabled application or digital network used to connect passengers with drivers using vehicles for the purpose of providing prearranged transportation services for compensation." Twin City denied Maxwell's claim for UM/UIM motorist benefits arising from the January 2018 accident.
Second, Maxwell filed a claim for UM/UIM benefits with James River Insurance Company ("James River"), the automobile insurer for Rasier LLC, the transportation network company responsible for providing certain limits of automobile insurance for Maxwell (and other Uber drivers) by Colorado law, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10.1-601, et. seq. Rasier LLC purchased two corporate automobile insurance policies from James River to cover the "Rideshare Drivers" with whom it had contracts during times they were driving for Uber. Both policies were in place and applied to Maxwell at the time of the accident.
Policy Number CA436100CO-02 ("JR 100 Policy") provided liability and UM/UIM coverage for Uber drivers that were en route to pick up a passenger, dropping off a passenger, exiting the premises of a public airport, or logged into the Uber application and "available to receive requests" for rides while on the premises of a public airport. Doc. 41-2 at 485, 508.
Policy Number CA436200CO-02 ("JR 200 Policy") provided only liability coverage for an Uber driver who had logged into the Uber application and made themselves "available to receive requests" for rides but "ha[d] not yet accepted a request through the UberPartner application and [wa]s not en route to or providing transportation services in response to a request accepted in the UberPartner application." Doc 41-3 at 66, 89. James River denied Maxwell's claim for UM/UIM benefits.
Then, Maxwell filed this lawsuit. Maxwell's Second Amended Complaint alleges claims against Twin City and James River for breach of contract and violations of Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 10-3-1115 and - 1116 ("statutory bad faith"). Both defendants have filed motions for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (Docs. 37, 41), which are now fully briefed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law" based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits in the record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court must view the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Maxwell, the nonmoving party. Allen v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 907 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2018). Where, as here, federal jurisdiction is predicated upon diversity, the court applies the substantive law of the forum state, Colorado. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Csaszar, 893 F.3d 729, 734 (10th Cir. 2018).
Under Colorado law, the interpretation of an insurance policy, like any written contract, presents a question of law. Tynan's Nissan, Inc. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 917 P.2d 321, 323 (Colo. App. 1995). "In the absence of ambiguity, an insurance policy must be given effect according to the plain and ordinary meaning of its terms." Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92, 100 (Colo. 1995). "However, even if a policy provision is unambiguous, the provision is void and unenforceable if it violates public policy by attempting to ‘dilute, condition, or limit statutorily mandated coverage.’ " Id. When an insurance company seeks to limit or exclude coverage under the terms of an insurance policy, "the insurer bears the burden of proving that a particular loss falls within an exclusion in the contract." Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency v. Northfield Ins. Co., 207 P.3d 839, 842 (Colo. App. 2008). However, "[i]f a limitation or exclusion in a contract is unambiguous, that limitation or exclusion must be enforced." Id. Finally, except in the case of insurance policy renewals where the contents of a policy have changed, which is not the case here, a party to an insurance contract, like any contract, can be presumed to know the content of that contract. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 246 P.3d 651, 658 (Colo. 2011). When it comes to interpreting the substance of insurance contracts in Colorado, the test is "what the ordinary reader and purchaser would have understood insurance provisions to mean had they been read." Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1051 (Colo. 2011).
Although this Court is "not bound by a lower state court decision," but must instead predict what the Colorado Supreme Court would do if presented with the issue, see, e.g., Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 319 F.3d 1234, 1240–41 (10th Cir. 2003), "decisions of a state's intermediate appellate courts are some evidence of how the state supreme court would decide the issue," and the Court can consider them as such. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Twin City
1. No Breach of Contract, No violations of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1115
The Court concludes that the Twin City exclusion provision unambiguously operates to exclude Maxwell from UM/UIM coverage while logged into the Uber application as an available driver, including during time periods when she was not connected with a fare. Maxwell does not dispute that the Uber application is a "transportation network platform," and no facts in the record suggest that it is not. Maxwell admits that she was logged into that application at the time of the accident. Maxwell argues that the term "used" is ambiguous in the policy where it states the UM/UIM benefits are not available to cover injuries sustained
While occupying your covered auto when it is being used as a public or livery conveyance. This includes but is not limited to any period of time your covered auto is being used by any insured who is logged into a transportation network platform as a driver, whether or not a passenger is occupying the vehicle.
(Emphasis added.) When read all together, however, the provision makes clear that the exclusion applies when an insured is "occupying" their covered vehicle and "logged into a transportation network platform as a driver." The exclusion does not require the driver to be connected with or en route to pick-up or drop-off a passenger in order to apply. Because Maxwell was occupying her vehicle and logged into the Uber application as a driver at the time of the accident, Twin City did not breach its contract by denying Maxwell's claim for UM/UIM benefits. Likewise, Twin City did not act in bad faith by denying that claim under section 10-3-1115 because it was expressly excluded by its policy.
2. Twin City Exclusion Provision Not Void Against Public Policy
Maxwell argues that Twin City's exclusion provision is void as against public policy. Maxwell specifically argues that the Twin City policy is void because it withholds UIM coverage in violation of the mandate for that coverage contained in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-609(1) (2018). That section provides:
No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle licensed for highway use in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom; except that the named insured may reject such coverage in writing.
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-609(1)(a). Under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-609(4), uninsured motorist coverage includes underinsured motorist coverage. In short, section 10-4-609(1)(a) requires any automobile insurance policy providing liability coverage to provide parallel UM/UIM coverage unless the named insured has affirmatively rejected UM/UIM coverage in writing.
However, where a policy lawfully excludes liability coverage in a specific circumstance, the insurance company has no obligation to provide UM/UIM coverage for that circumstance. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Csaszar, 893 F.3d 729, 737 (10th Cir. 2018) ("[B]ecause the Auto-Owners policy bars Ms. Csaszar from liability coverage, it does not violate Colorado public policy for it to also bar her from UM/UIM coverage."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Feghali, 814 P.2d 863, 867 (Colo. 1991) (holding that legislative intent does not require court "to permit recovery of uninsured motorist benefits if liability coverage is denied under a valid household exclusion"). The Twin City policy expressly states that it does not provide either liability coverage or UM/UIM coverage to an insured while they are logged-into and available as a driver through a rideshare application. Colorado law explicitly allows private automobile insurance companies to decline to provide coverage to its insureds that drive for companies like Uber "for the period of time in which a driver is logged into a transportation network company's digital network." Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10.1-604(5). Thus, because Twin City's policy lawfully excluded liability coverage during any period of time Maxwell was "logged into a transportation network platform as a driver, whether or not a passenger is occupying the vehicle," Twin City was exempt from providing UM/UIM coverage for the same period. Therefore, the Twin City UM/UIM exclusion is not void against Colorado public policy.
3. Twin City Exclusion is Not Unconscionable and Maxwell had No Reasonable Expectation of Coverage
Maxwell also argues that the Twin City exclusion provision is unconscionable. Colorado courts consider several factors to determine whether a contract is unconscionable, including whether (1) parties of unequal bargaining strength executed a standardized agreement; (2) either party lacked opportunity to read or become familiar with the document before signing it; (3) the document used fine print in the portion of the contract containing the challenged provision; (4) there is an absence of evidence that the provision was commercially reasonable or should reasonably have been anticipated; (5) the terms of the contract were substantively unfair; (6) the relationship of the parties was fair, including factors of assent, unfair surprise, and notice; and (7) all the circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract, including its commercial setting, purpose, and effect. Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 991 (Colo. 1986).
Maxwell claims that she had "no input as to the insurance contracts provided to her to cover her injuries due to the accident" in 2018. Taking that fact as true with regard to the Twin City policy, the policy still is not unconscionable. As determined above, the policy is substantively (and commercially) reasonable because it comports with Colorado law. Furthermore, in addition to stating the rideshare-exclusion in four separate places, the policy included an "Advisory Notice to Policyholders Regarding Ride-Sharing" that stated clearly that Maxwell's policy contained exclusions arising out of the operation of a covered vehicle as a public conveyance through a rideshare application, suggesting that Maxwell was provided with adequate notice of her policy's content. Doc. 37-1, 371. For those reasons, the Court finds that the Twin City exclusion provision was not unconscionable.
Maxwell also argues that she reasonably believed she had UM/UIM coverage through the Twin City policy. There are two circumstances where the doctrine of reasonable expectations may apply: (1) where a "reasonable insured carefully reading" a policy would find no indication of a coverage limitation, even if the actual insured did not read the policy; and (2) where the insured demonstrates through extrinsic evidence that, through procedural or substantive deception attributable to the insurer, an objectively reasonable insured would have believed she possessed coverage. Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1051-1054 (Colo. 2011) (citations omitted). As mentioned, Twin City's "Advisory Notice" and the several mentions of the exclusionary provisions related to ridesharing would have brought a coverage-issue to the attention of a careful reader. Moreover, Maxwell has not offered extrinsic evidence to show deception on the part of Twin City. As a result, the Court rejects Maxwell's reasonable-expectations argument.
Twin City is entitled to summary judgment on Maxwell's breach of contract and statutory bad faith claims because her personal automobile insurance policy excluded coverage when she was logged into a rideshare application as a driver and because that exclusion is neither void as violating public policy nor unconscionable.
B. James River
1. No Breach of Contract
Maxwell argues that James River also breached its contract with her by denying her claim for UM/UIM benefits to cover the injuries she suffered in the January 2018 accident. Under the plain language of the JR 100 Policy and the JR 200 Policy, Maxwell was not entitled to benefits. The JR 100 Policy provided liability and UM/UIM coverage for Uber drivers that were connected to an active fare, but did not cover drivers merely available to receive ride requests. The JR 200 Policy covered drivers that were logged into the Uber application and "available to receive requests," even if those drivers did not have an active fare, but the JR 200 policy provided only liability coverage for those drivers, not UM/UIM coverage. Maxwell fell into this latter category, qualifying for liability coverage only under the plain language of the JR 100 and 200 policies.
2. James River Exclusion does not Violate Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10.1-604
Second, Maxwell arguably asserts that the UI/UIM exclusion in the JR 200 policy violates Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10.1-604(3), and that, as a result, she is "entitled to make a claim" under that section. Section 604(3) states that transportation network companies ("TNCs") must "maintain a primary automobile insurance policy" for drivers that are logged into the application but without an active fare that meets
at least the minimum coverage of at least fifty thousand dollars to any one person in any one accident, [and] one hundred thousand dollars to all persons in any one accident, ....
(Emphasis added). Maxwell urges that that language required James River to provide more than liability coverage because it is nonspecific—it says "all persons," and does not reference liability coverage. The JR 200 policy provided liability coverage only, which, consistent with the statute, maxed out at fifty thousand dollars per individual and one hundred thousand dollars per accident for personal injuries. No Colorado court has interpreted section 604 to determine what type of insurance coverage it requires. However, regardless of whether section 604 requires liability coverage only or liability plus UM/UIM coverage, that section establishes the financial responsibility for TNCs alone. TNCs can meet those requirements by being self-insured, offering an insurance rider to a driver's personal automobile insurance, or taking out a corporate liability insurance policy, as Uber chose to do in this case. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10.1-604(3)(b)(III)(A)-(C). James River is not obligated by section 604(3) to provide any type of insurance, and so its liability-only JR 200 policy does not contravene that section. To the extent that Maxwell alleges a claim under Colo. Rev. Stat. § 40-10.1-604(3) against James River, James River is entitled to summary judgment regarding it. Whether Uber/Rasier LLC violated the statutory requirements applicable to it outlined in section 604(3) is not before the Court.
3. James River did not violate Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-609(1)(a)
Third, Maxwell argues that James River violated Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-609(1)(a) when it excluded UM/UIM coverage in its JR 200 policy on account of Rasier LLC's waiver of that coverage. According to Maxwell, section 609 required James River to offer UM/UIM coverage to her as an Uber driver and provide that coverage unless she opted out in writing. Once again, section 609(1)(a) provides that all automobile liability insurance policies must provide parallel UM/UIM coverage "except that the named insured may reject such coverage in writing." The purpose of section 609 is to ensure that Colorado motorists are "afforded an opportunity to protect themselves from losses resulting from the negligent conduct of financially irresponsible operators of motor vehicles." Passamano v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 882 P.2d 1312, 1321 (Colo. 1994), superseded by statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10–4–609(1)(b). The Colorado Supreme Court has recognized that section 609 provides a private civil tort remedy to insureds to redress injuries and damages caused by an insurer's failure to discharge its statutory obligations. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d 905, 911 (Colo. 1992). James River admits that it is bound by section 609, but it insists that, as the "named insured," Uber is the sole entity entitled to accept or reject UM/UIM coverage and therefore its rejection of that coverage exempted James River from having to provide it in the JR 200 policy. The Court agrees with James River.
The plain language of section 609(1)(a) exempts James River from providing UM/UIM coverage when the "named insured" on the policy waives that coverage in writing. The JR policies list "Rasier LLC" as the named insured. The policies do not explicitly name any other insureds, but explain that "covered autos" include the vehicles being driven by Rideshare Drivers that have a contract with the Named Insured during certain time periods. Although Colorado's Supreme Court has not interpreted the meaning of "the named insured" in section 10-4-609(a)(1), see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 396 P.3d 651, 657 (Colo. 2017) ("[W]e need not consider the meaning of "the named insured" in section 10-4-609's waiver provision."), several Colorado cases suggest that, were the Colorado Supreme Court tasked with interpreting that language, it would conclude that a "named insured" is the person or entity listed as the named insured on the policy or the purchaser of the policy. Under that definition, automobile insurers have no duty to provide notice of the availability of UM/UIM to additional insureds that are covered by the policy, such as Maxwell.
For example, in McMichael v. Aetna Ins. Co., 878 P.2d 61, 63 (Colo. App. 1994), the Colorado Court of Appeals interpreted a corporate automobile insurance policy that listed a business as the "named insured" and provided liability and UM/UIM coverage to the business's employees. The main issue in the case was that the policy's UM/UIM provision covered a narrower class of employees than its liability provision in violation of section 609(a)(1)'s mandate that insurance policies offering liability coverage must provide UM/UIM coverage for "persons insured thereunder," i.e., the same class of people receiving liability coverage. Id. To draw the conclusion that the unequal provisions were problematic, the court of appeals acknowledged that, although " § 10- 4-609 expressly permits ‘the named insured’ to reject UM/UIM coverage in writing," "none of those listed as named insureds on the policy in question rejected UM/UIM coverage" and therefore the policy included UM/UIM coverage and, in error, covered too narrow a class of insureds. On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals holding that a corporate automobile insurance policy that includes UM/UIM coverage must cover the same class of individuals that are covered by the liability provisions of the policy. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1995). In doing so, the Court several times distinguished between the business listed as the "named insured" in the policy and the class of employees covered by the policy, holding that, "under the plain meaning of section 10–4–609(1), insurers must provide UM/UIM coverage for all individuals covered under the liability provision of the policy unless the named insured refuses such coverage in writing." Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
Finally, in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 396 P.3d 651, 657 (Colo. 2017), the Colorado Supreme Court held that, in the private automobile insurance context, one named individual insured can waive UM/UIM coverage for another named insured on the same policy by exercising apparent authority, express actual authority, or implied actual authority. The Court noted that its decision was "fully consistent" with
what the authors of a leading insurance treatise have described as "the growing trend": "[T]he growing trend is that a rejection of UM/UIM coverage or a selection of lower limits of UM/UIM limits by one named insured is binding on all named insureds and all additional insureds, rendering it unnecessary for insurers to obtain additional rejections or waivers from all named insureds and all potential additional insureds." 9 Steven Plitt, Daniel Maldonado, Joshua D. Rogers & Jordan R. Plitt, Couch on Insurance Third § 122:50, at 122-170 to -171 (2015).
Id. at 657.
These cases suggest to this Court that, if asked to interpret the phrase "the named insured" in section 609(a)(1), the Colorado Supreme Court would join the host of States interpreting similar UM/UIM statutes that have held that an additional insured is bound by the actions of the designated named insured that rejects UM/UIM coverage in an automobile insurance policy. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Southern Union Gas Co., 112 Ariz. 145, 539 P.2d 902 (1975) (holding that Arizona UM/UIM statute does not give "an additional insured the right to accept or reject uninsured motorist coverage when he did not pay the premium or contract for the coverage" nor does it require the named insured to "notify each and every potential additional insured that the named insured has rejected uninsured motorist coverage before allowing an additional insured to drive or be a passenger in the named insured's automobile"); Whitten v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 410 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. 1982), disapproved on other grounds by Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985) (holding that, where "statute provides that the appropriate party to reject uninsured motorist coverage is the named insured," a son's status as "the principal operator would not make him a named insured for the purpose of rejecting uninsured motorist coverage"); Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. v. Naramore, 950 So. 2d 1138, 1141 (Ala. 2006) (similar but between spouses). Therefore, the Court concludes that James River discharged its duties under section 609(1)(a) by obtaining a written waiver of UM/UIM coverage for the JR 200 policy from Rasier LLC, the named insured of that policy.
4. No violations of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-3-1115
James River did not unreasonably deny Maxwell's claim for UM/UIM benefits considering that it did not have an obligation to provide those benefits and the plain language of the JR 200 policy excluded them.
5. Promissory Estoppel Claim Inapplicable to James River
Finally, Maxwell argues that James River should be estopped from denying her claim for UM/UIM benefits because agents for Uber told Maxwell that she was "100 percent covered" as long as the Uber App was on. Doc. 46 at 8. However, Maxwell does not allege a promissory estoppel claim against James River in her complaint. Furthermore, there are no facts in the record to support the claim that Uber's agents are agents for James River. Therefore, statements by Uber's agents cannot bind James River.
Thus, James River is entitled to summary judgment on Maxwell's breach of contract, bad faith, statutory claims, and promissory estoppel claim, because the applicable James River policies did not provide UM/UIM coverage under the circumstances presented here. Furthermore, those policies' limited provision of UM/UIM coverage did not violate public policy nor contravene any statutory obligations applicable to insurers.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court
• GRANTS Defendant Twin City Fire Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 37), and
• GRANTS Defendant James River Insurance Company's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 41).
Maxwell still has two outstanding claims against Uber Technologies, Inc., a defendant that did not file a motion for summary judgment. Maxwell asserted claims for (1) Breach of Contract – Promissory Estoppel, arguing that Uber's representatives promised that she would be covered at all times while driving for Uber, a promise she relied on to her detriment; and (2) Respondeat Superior, arguing that all actions of agents of Uber must be imputed to the employer. The dispositive motion deadline is August 1, 2019. A final pretrial conference is scheduled for September 18, 2019.
DONE AND SIGNED this 10th day of June, 2018.