Summary
In Maxey v. Texas Commerce Bank of Lubbock, 580 S.W.2d 340, 341 (Tex. 1979), that court expressly declined to express any opinion on the correctness of the Court of Civil Appeals' holding that prejudgment interest for a breach of contract occurring in 1966 was limited to a six percent rate. Furthermore, that court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Chance, 590 S.W.2d 703, 704 (Tex. 1979), permitted a nine percent rate to stand on an award to an insured who sued to recover for a fire loss, even though the applicable statutory rate for prejudgment interest was only six percent.
Summary of this case from Union Bank of Benton, Ark. v. First Nat. BankOpinion
No. B-8010.
March 14, 1979. Rehearing Denied May 2, 1979.
Appeal from the District Court, No. 72, Lubbock County, Bevers, J.
Simon Simon, Harold D. Hammett and Mike Liles, Fort Worth, for petitioners.
Jones, Trout, Flygare Moody, Charles B. Jones, Lubbock, Shafer, Gilliland, Davis, Bunton McCollum, Inc., Perry Davis, Jr. and James M. O'Leary, Odessa, for respondent.
The trial court granted Homer G. Maxey and five other plaintiffs a judgment following a jury trial whereby they recovered substantial damages from Texas Commerce Bank of Lubbock, Texas because of Bank's failure to exercise good faith in a private foreclosure sale of stock in plaintiffs' two closely held corporations. The court of civil appeals concluded that the jury's finding to the special issue inquiring as to the amount of the liabilities of Plaza Building Corporation at the time of the foreclosure sale was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and reversed and remanded the cause for a new trial. 571 S.W.2d 39.
This Court does not have jurisdiction to pass upon the fact question of the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Tippett v. Brannon, 493 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1973).
We therefore refuse the application for writ of error, no reversible error. In doing so, we express no opinion as to the correctness of the holding by the court of civil appeals that the award of prejudgment interest on the amount of actual damages recovered by plaintiffs is limited to the rate of six (6) percent per annum.