Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:01-CV-689-Y
February 12, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
(With special instructions to the clerk of Court) In this action, plaintiff Steven Lee Mattingly, an inmate at the Tarrant County jail when he filed this action, filed a pro-se handwritten complaint seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Tarrant County Sheriff Dee Anderson, a Captain Myers, two mail room clerks, a law-library officer, and the medical staff of John Peter Smith Hospital. (Compl. Style; § IV.) Mattingly complains of many aspects of his confinement at the Tarrant County jail, including, but not limited to: his classification and transfers within different units and jail campuses; the mail room staff's alleged loss of a mailing intended for him; the limitation on access to materials in the law library; the management of his particular housing unit by certain officers, and the unequal treatment by such officers of white and black inmates; and the alleged delay by medical staff in responding to requests for medical care. (Compl. pp. 4-12.) Mattingly claims that he presented and exhausted his complaints through a grievance system, and he has attached copies of grievances and responses related to his complaints about classification and about the loss of mail. (Compl.; attachments.) Mattingly seeks all relief to which he may be entitled. (Compl. at Prayer.)
Mattingly has also included several allegations regarding the process of his conviction that appear to be attacks on that conviction. Mattingly is advised that challenges to his underlying conviction in a state court must be filed on a form petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Thus, any such claims in this action will be dismissed without prejudice to Mattingly's seeking such relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act amended 42 U.S.C. § 1997e to provide that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [ 42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." In Booth v. Churner, 121 S.Ct. 1819 (2001), the Supreme Court held that Congress intended a prisoner to invoke whatever administrative grievance remedies are available within a jail or prison, without regard to whether the grievance procedure affords money-damage relief, before he may file suit contesting prison conditions in federal court. As the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has since explained:
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (West Supp. 2001).
Booth, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 1824-25.
Quibbles about the nature of a prisoner's complaint, the type of remedy sought, and the sufficiency or breadth of prison grievance procedures were laid to rest in Booth. Justice Souter summed up the Court's conclusion in a footnote:
Here, we hold only that Congress has provided in § 1997e(a) that an inmate must exhaust irrespective of the forms of relief sought and offered through administrative sources.
Wright v. Hollingsworth, No. 99-40063, 2001 WL 838861 at 1 (5th Cir. 2001 July 24, 2001), citing Booth, 121 S.Ct. at 1825 n. 6.
Plaintiff Mattingly has not shown that he attempted to exhaust administrative remedies on all of the allegations made the basis of his complaint. Although he sought administrative remedies as to some of his claims, he has provided no explanation or proof of exhaustion of administrative remedies concerning management of his pod, access to materials in the law library, or delay in providing medical care. Even if Mattingly sought only money damages, the fact that Tarrant County authorities would not have afforded him monetary damages as possible relief on such claims, has no bearing on his 1997e(a) obligation to exhaust under Booth. Thus, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed without prejudice pending exhaustion of any administrative remedies.
Several courts have recognized a district court's obligation to impose the exhaustion requirement prior to any consideration of the merits, and even when the inmate claims such procedures are inadequate or futile. See generally Perez v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 182 F.3d 532, 536 (7th Cir. 1999) (Vacating district court's denial of prisoner's Eighth Amendment claims on the merits, and remanding with instructions to dismiss for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under § 1997e(a), noting that "[1997e(a) can function properly only if the judge resolves disputes about its application before turning to any other issue in the suit. . . ." [and noting] "As for the possibility that administrative remedies could be declared futile ex ante, without ever being tried: what would be the point of asking judges to be seers? Then the simplicity of § 1997e(a) would be lost, and instead of requiring exhaustion of remedies it would lead to guesswork about counterfactual situations."); Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Since exhaustion is now a pre-condition to suit, the courts cannot simply waive those requirements where they determine they are futile or inadequate, such an interpretation would impose an enormous loophole in the PLRA, which congress clearly did not intend."); Lavista v. Beeler, 195 F.3d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 1999) (rejecting futility argument where record demonstrated that plaintiff had not actually shown he tried to bring his issues before the Bureau of Prisons).
It is therefore ORDERED that all of Plaintiff's claims for relief based on the conditions of his confinement, be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to their being refiled after he exhausts available administrative remedies.
See Wright, 2001 WL 838861, at 2 (holding both that dismissal of a case for the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) should be without prejudice and that the applicable statute of limitations should be equitably tolled during the pendency of dismissed suit and any additional administrative proceedings).
It is further ORDERED that to the extent Mattingly seeks relief that must be asserted through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, such claims be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to the refiling of same. It is further ORDERED that the clerk of Court is hereby DIRECTED to transmit to Plaintiff the necessary forms for initiating a habeas action and for seeking to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is advised, however, that exhaustion of his state remedies is generally required prior to pursuing habeas relief in federal court.
In order to exhaust state remedies, a petitioner must fairly present all of his claims to the state courts. Deters v. Collins, 985 F.2d 789, 795 (5th Cir. 1993); Richardson v. Procunier, 762 F.2d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 1985). In Texas, all claims must be presented to the court of Criminal Appeals. Procunier, 762 F.2d at 432. To present claims to the Court of Criminal Appeals, a petitioner may either file a petition for discretionary review with the Court of Criminal Appeals after direct appeal, or he may file a postconviction application for writ of habeas corpus. See Feist v. Scott, 885 F. Supp. 927, 930 (E.D.Tex. 1995); see also Stones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 415 (5th Cir. 1995) (exhaustion of state remedies may be accomplished either directly or collaterally), citing Myers v. Collins, 919 F.2d 1074, 1076-77 (5th Cir. 1990); Lowe v. Scott, 48 F.3d 873, 875 (5th Cir.) (noting that a petitioner who seeks to pursue an issue that he failed to raise on direct appeal must use available state collateral procedures to satisfy the exhaustion requirement), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1123 (1995). The state writ of habeas corpus is available under article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.ANN. art. 11.07 et. seq. (Vernon Supp. 2001).
FINAL JUDGMENT
Pursuant to an order issued this same day, Civil Procedure 58:It is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all Plaintiff's claims for relief based on the conditions of his confinement, be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to refiling after exhausting available administrative remedies.
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that to the extent Mattingly seeks relief which must be asserted through a petition for writ of habeas corpus, such claims be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
It is further ORDERED that all costs of court are taxed against the party that incurred them.