Opinion
21-1086
06-28-2023
LISA M. MATTHEWS; MARK P. MATTHEWS, as parents and guardians of J.U., a minor, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-1, Defendant-Appellee.
(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-03163-MSK-STV) (D. Colo.)
Before MATHESON, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [*]
ALLISON H. EID CIRCUIT JUDGE
Lisa and Mark Matthews brought this suit on behalf of their son, J.U., alleging Douglas County School District RE-1 violated J.U.'s right to a free appropriate public education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq. They filed a due process complaint with the Colorado Department of Education, as required by the IDEA, which was dismissed because they had not participated in the administrative process. They appealed to the district court, and the district court affirmed the dismissal. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. We hold that the claims that are the subject of this case-those related to the 2017-2018 school year requesting prospective relief-are moot because J.U. has graduated from high school. We also hold that the remaining claims-those related to the 2016-2017 school year requesting retrospective relief- were properly dismissed by the district court because those claims related to an earlier case and were not properly before the district court in this case.
I.
The IDEA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 et seq., guarantees a free appropriate public education ("FAPE") to all eligible students with disabilities. To accomplish this, the IDEA requires states that receive federal education funding to create an Individualized Education Plan ("IEP") for each eligible student with disabilities to accommodate that student's educational needs. See id. § 1414(d). However, "[t]he obligation to make [a] FAPE available to all children with disabilities does not apply with respect to . . . [c]hildren with disabilities who have graduated from high school with a regular high school diploma." 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i).
The IDEA creates a mandatory administrative framework to resolve disputes between school districts and parents over a student's education plan. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a), (l). The state must afford a parent the opportunity to present a complaint "with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a [FAPE] to such child" to the state educational agency. Id. § 1415(a), (b)(6)(A). The school district has ten days to respond to the due process complaint. Id. § 1415(c)(2)(B)(ii). The school district also has fifteen days to "convene a meeting with the parents and the relevant member or members of the IEP Team who have specific knowledge of the facts identified in the complaint . . . where the parents of the child [may] discuss their complaint, and the facts that form the basis of the complaint, and the local educational agency is provided the opportunity to resolve the complaint." Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). If the matter is not resolved at the meeting, the parents and student are entitled to a due process hearing before the state agency. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(ii). If the parents are not satisfied with that decision, they may appeal to federal district court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A). If thirty days have passed since the parents filed their due process complaint and the school district is unable to secure their participation in the resolution meeting through reasonable efforts, the school district may move to have the agency dismiss the complaint. C.F.R. § 300.510(b)(4).
We refer to the administrative complaint as a "due process complaint" to be consistent with the parties and to distinguish it from the federal complaint.
The student in this case, J.U., attended Legend High School in Douglas County School District RE-1. J.U. had more than one qualifying disability, and the School District had provided him with IEPs since 2013. In 2015, J.U.'s mother and stepfather, Lisa and Mark Matthews ("Appellants"), discovered the School District had deviated from J.U.'s approved IEP without their consent, and they hired private tutors to supplement his education beginning in April of that year. They also filed a due process complaint with the Colorado Department of Education, which utilizes the Colorado Office of Administrative Courts' Administrative Law Judges ("ALJ") to hear such complaints. Appellants were not satisfied with the ALJ's decision and filed a complaint in federal district court. See Matthews v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 16-CV-0717-MSK, 2018 WL 4790715 (D. Colo. Oct. 4, 2018) ("Matthews I"). The district court issued a "stay put" order under which the School District could not change J.U.'s IEP without Appellants' consent and would be financially responsible for implementing it. In March 2016, J.U. was diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder ("ASD"). Appellants requested additional accommodations for his ASD under the IDEA and the Colorado's Exceptional Children's Educational Act, C.R.S. § 22-20-103(5)(a)(I). They allege the school district failed to comply.
The record does not indicate the current status of Matthews I.
Before J.U. began his senior year in 2017, Appellants, proceeding pro se, followed IDEA procedure and filed a second due process complaint with the Colorado Department of Education. This second due process complaint, which is the subject of this appeal, alleged J.U. was entering the 2017-2018 school year (his senior year) with an obsolete IEP that did not accommodate his ASD. They requested an order that the School District create a statutorily compliant IEP for that school year. They did not request compensatory damages or any other retrospective relief.
Along with the complaint, Appellants sent a list of times and dates they would be available for a resolution meeting. As required by the IDEA, the School District repeatedly attempted to schedule the meeting, including at the times Appellants indicated they would be available. In response, Appellants either refused to participate or attempted to set onerous terms for the meeting, such as scheduling it at an inconvenient location for the School District representative. Appellants maintained they were not required to attend the meeting at all until the School District provided an answer to their complaint. The School District did provide a response within the ten-day period but was still unable to secure Appellants' attendance at a resolution meeting. After thirty days had passed, the School District requested the ALJ dismiss Appellants' due process complaint. The ALJ granted the dismissal.
Appellants, still pro se, appealed by filing a new complaint in federal district court. They requested the district court: (1) order an expansion of the administrative record; (2) order the School District to independently evaluate J.U. for ASD; (3) remand the case to the ALJ to "determine the education services necessary to reimburse the parents and compensate [J.U.] for lack of [a] FAPE during the 20162017 school years"; and (4) order costs and other relief. App'x Vol. I at 15. The district court found some of Appellants' claims were related to their earlier case, Matthews I, and dismissed them. It dismissed other claims because they had not been brought before the ALJ. The only remaining issue was whether the ALJ had correctly dismissed the second due process complaint.
For the next thirteen months neither party filed any motions, and Appellants "seemingly [did] not take[] any action to prosecute their claims." Id. at 5. During that time, J.U. transferred out of the Douglas County School District and graduated from a different school district with his high school degree. On February 11, 2021, the district court agreed with the ALJ that Appellants had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies because they had not attended the resolution meeting. The district court then affirmed the ALJ's dismissal. Appellants, now represented by counsel, appeal.
II.
Appellants raise three issues. First, they argue the district court erred by finding they were required to attend the resolution meeting before the School District responded in writing to their due process complaint. Second, they argue the district court erred in dismissing their claims relating to Matthews I. Finally, they seek reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. In response, the School District argues Appellants' claims are moot because J.U. has graduated from high school and he is no longer eligible for the prospective relief Appellants seek.
a.
We must first determine whether Appellants' claims based on the 2017-2018 school year are moot. "The 'existence of a live case or controversy is a constitutional prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction.'" Patrick G. by and through Stephanie G. v. Harrison Sch. Dist. No. 2, 40 F.4th 1186, 1199 (10th Cir. 2022) (quoting Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 520 F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2008)). If at any point in litigation a case becomes moot, we must dismiss it. Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72 (2013). A case is live so long as both parties have a stake in the outcome and the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Smith v. Becerra, 44 F.4th 1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 2022).
Once a student has graduated with a regular high school diploma, the school is no longer obligated to provide him with a FAPE. T.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 54, Stroud, Okla., 265 F.3d 1090, 1092 (10th Cir. 2001); 34 C.F.R. § 300.102(a)(3)(i). If a student has graduated and is no longer entitled to a FAPE, "any claim that a FAPE was deficient becomes moot." T.S., 265 F.3d at 1092. Therefore, claims for prospective relief based on an IDEA violation become moot when a student graduates from high school with a valid diploma. Garcia, 520 F.3d at 1124.
J.U. graduated from high school in 2019 with a regular high school diploma and does not challenge the validity of his degree. He is no longer entitled to a FAPE. We cannot hold that the School District's IDEA procedural violation, if there were one, entitles Appellants to a new due process hearing because such a hearing cannot result in any substantive benefits for Appellants. See T.S., 265 F.3d at 1092-93. We cannot go back in time and rectify alleged shortcomings to J.U.'s education or require the School District to comply with a past IEP. And because J.U. is no longer eligible for a FAPE, we cannot order the School District to provide him with one now. Since we can no longer provide relief for any of these alleged injuries, any claims Appellants might have are moot.
Appellants, citing Garcia v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 520 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2008), argue their claims for reimbursement and compensation are not moot because they are retrospective. However, their claims for compensatory relief relate to the 2016 "stay put" order, which was part of a different case, Matthews I. They do not relate to the 2017-2018 IEP, or lack thereof, which was the subject of the due process complaint at issue here. Appellants conceded at oral argument that neither the administrative due process complaint nor the district court complaint in this case contains claims for compensatory damages or other retrospective relief.
Recognizing this, however, Appellants argue the district court should have interpreted their January 2021 status report filing-in which they requested information on how to file an amended complaint to include claims for compensatory relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act-as a motion to amend the complaint and therefore erred by not addressing it.
Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs amendments to pleadings. The Rule states in pertinent part: "a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). A "'request for a court order must be made by motion' which is 'in writing unless made during hearing or trial.'" Garman v. Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 630 F.3d 977, 986 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b)(1)(A)).
We have repeatedly held a district court need not address a motion that was not properly before it. See, e.g., Lystn, LLC v. Food &Drug Admin., No. 20-1369, 2021 WL 4006184, at *7 (10th Cir. 2021) (unpublished) (a "statement at the conclusion of [Plaintiff's] Rule 59(e) motion asking the district court to 'allow Plaintiff to amend its complaint consistent herewith,' was insufficient to preserve the issue" (internal citation and brackets omitted)); Bruzga v. Cnty. of Boulder by &through Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 795 Fed.Appx. 599, 604 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) ("The mere suggestion that [pro se] plaintiffs would request leave to amend their complaint was insufficient to invoke the district court's authority to permit an amendment."); Cato v. Hargrove, 836 Fed.Appx. 722, 725 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (plaintiff's motion, styled "Motion for Enlargement of Time," was not a "formal motion requesting permission to file the second amended complaint"); Calderon v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. &Rehab. Servs., 181 F.3d 1180, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (a "single sentence, lacking a statement for the grounds for amendment and dangling at the end of [plaintiff's] memorandum, did not rise to the level of a motion for leave to amend. Because a motion for leave to amend was never properly before it, the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to address [plaintiff's] request for leave to cure deficiencies in her pleadings."). "While we of course liberally construe pro se pleadings, an appellant's pro se status does not excuse the obligation of any litigant to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure." Ogden v. San Juan Cnty., 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994). Appellants did not file a motion to amend, and they cite no authority or justification for the proposition that the district court should have interpreted their motion for a status report as a motion to amend. Therefore, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion by not construing Appellants' status report as a motion to amend and addressing it as such.
Unpublished cases are not precedential but may be cited for their persuasive authority. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
For these reasons, Appellants' IDEA claims became moot when J.U. graduated, and we do not reach the merits.
Appellants filed supplemental briefing on Luna Perez v. Sturgis Pub. Sch., 143 S.Ct. 890 (2023). Perez does not apply here because, as these claims are moot, we do not reach the issue of administrative exhaustion.
b.
Appellants next argue the district court erred by dismissing their remaining claims for retrospective relief because they related to Matthews I. In their federal complaint, Appellants specifically asked the district court to "[r]emand the case to the Administrative Court to order a complaint [sic] IEP and determine the educational services necessary to reimburse the parents and compensate [J.U.] for the lack of a FAPE from the 2016-2017 school year." App'x Vol. I at 15 (emphasis added). However, the relevant claims are those found in the due process complaint- the one Appellants filed at the beginning of the 2017 school year which sought only prospective relief. The claims seeking retrospective relief for prior school years belonged to the Mathews I litigation, and Appellants cite no authority or justification for the proposition that they can incorporate their claims from a different case into this case. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the claims related to the 2016-2017 school year.
c.
The IDEA permits the court to award "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs . . . to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). Appellants' claims are moot, and so they are not the prevailing party. We therefore deny their requests to grant appellate attorneys' fees and to remand to the district court for a determination of those fees and costs.
III.
For the reasons stated above, we VACATE the order of the district court relating to Appellants' 2017-2018 IDEA claims and remand with instructions to dismiss as moot, AFFIRM the dismissal of the 2016-2017 claims, and DENY attorneys' fees.
Appellants have also moved to amend the case caption. We directed the School District to respond and provided that if it did not respond, the nonresponse would be taken as consent. The School District did not respond. We therefore GRANT the motion to amend and direct the clerk to amend the case caption to reflect that Lisa and Mark Matthews are J.U.'s guardians as well as parents.
[*] This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.