Opinion
January 23, 1989
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Dickinson, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is reversed, on the law, with costs, Stockfield's motion to dismiss the petition is granted, and the proceeding is dismissed.
The rule is well established that judicial review of a Zoning Board determination is limited and that the Board's decision must be upheld if it has a rational basis and is supported by substantial evidence (see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, 45 N.Y.2d 441; Human Dev. Servs. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 110 A.D.2d 135, affd 67 N.Y.2d 702). In this case, the determination of the Zoning Board to grant an area variance to the appellant Stockfield satisfied this standard and the Supreme Court erred in annulling that determination.
Stockfield applied for an area variance in order to construct a house on a substandard lot. He was therefore required to establish that compliance with the ordinance would result in practical difficulties (see, Matter of Fuhst v Foley, supra; Matter of Pacheco v De Salvo, 127 A.D.2d 597). The Zoning Board, after a hearing and visit to the site by Board members, determined that Stockfield had established that compliance with the zoning ordinance would result in practical difficulties and that granting the variance would not adversely affect the neighborhood.
In annulling this determination, the Supreme Court concluded that Stockfield's hardship was self-created. Although contrary conclusions with respect to this issue might be drawn from the record, the Supreme Court cannot substitute its finding for that of the Zoning Board where there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's determination (see, Conley v Town of Brookhaven Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 40 N.Y.2d 309). Even if Stockfield's difficulties were self-created, such a finding would not, in and of itself, prevent the Zoning Board from granting the variance (see, Matter of De Sena v Board of Zoning Appeals, 45 N.Y.2d 105; Matter of Jackson v Kirkpatrick, 125 A.D.2d 471). The Zoning Board properly considered the relevant factors, including whether there were other means to resolve Stockfield's practical difficulties, before concluding that denial of the variance would deprive him of the reasonable use of his property (see, Human Dev. Servs. v Zoning Bd. of Appeals, supra, at 143).
Finally, the Supreme Court erred in annulling the Zoning Board's determination on the ground that it failed to attach conditions to the variance regarding the size of the house to be constructed on the lot. The imposition of such conditions would have been premature in the absence of an application by Stockfield to exceed the applicable size limitations. Bracken, J.P., Rubin, Sullivan and Harwood, JJ., concur.