Opinion
August 16, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (Lisa, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The law is well established that a potential plaintiff who has not complied with General Municipal Law § 50-h (1) is precluded from commencing an action against a municipality ( see, General Municipal Law § 50-h; Best v. City of New York, 97 A.D.2d 389, affd 61 N.Y.2d 847, for reasons stated below; Patterson v. Ford, 255 A.D.2d 373; Heins v. Board of Trustees, 237 A.D.2d 570; Arcila v. Incorporated Vil. of Freeport, 231 A.D.2d 660; Schrader v. Town of Orangetown, 226 A.D.2d 620). The petitioner here does not dispute the fact that a hearing pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h was adjourned six times at her request or that she failed to appear on the scheduled hearing date of March 30, 1998, despite being advised that it was the last hearing date available before April 4, 1998, the expiration of the Statute of Limitations for commencing an action to recover damages for personal injuries. Since the petitioner failed to provide an adequate excuse for her noncompliance with the respondent's demand for an examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-h (1), the Supreme Court properly denied the petition, made on the eve of the expiration of the Statute of Limitations, to compel the defendant to hold a hearing ( see, Matter of Dickey v. City of New York, 167 A.D.2d 238).
O'Brien, J. P., Ritter, Joy, Altman and Smith, JJ., concur.