Opinion
January 7, 1999.
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Colleen McMahon, J.).
Supreme Court properly dismissed the petition seeking to annul DHCR's denial of petitioners' application for high income rent deregulation. The Rent Regulation Reform Act of 1993 (L 1993, ch 253) and the Rent Stabilization Law (Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 26-501 et seq.) prohibit disclosure of any income other than the Federal adjusted gross income of an occupant of an apartment, as reported on the New York State income tax return, in determining whether the housing accommodation qualifies for deregulation ( see, Matter of Leepson v. Holland, 171 Misc.2d 84, 85-86, affd 245 A.D.2d 176). Accordingly, DHCR appropriately declined to consider the income of the intervenor's corporation, in addition to his own income, in determining whether the apartment qualified for deregulation. Because the agency's determination had a rational basis and was not arbitrary and capricious, the petition must be dismissed (CPLR 7803; see, Matter of Pell v. Board of Educ., 34 N.Y.2d 222).
It should be observed that the terms of the law are unambiguous. It is the function of the court to enforce a statute in a manner that is consistent with legislative intent and, where that intent is clear upon its face, the court will not expand the scope of the legislation by judicial construction ( Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Retirement Sys., 71 N.Y.2d 669, 675-676; Matter of Brusco v. Braun, 199 A.D.2d 27, affd 84 N.Y.2d 674; see, McKinney's Cons Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes § 76). While the criterion of household income does not take into account all income that might be imputed to the tenant, it has the advantage of affording a simple and consistent methodology. It is for the Legislature to decide whether public policy is better served by ease of administration or precision of measurement, and the courts will not intrude upon the legislative prerogative.
Under the circumstances, Supreme Court did not exercise its discretion improvidently when it permitted the tenant to intervene ( see, CPLR 7802 [d]). Nor did the court act improvidently when, pursuant to the same rule, it ordered petitioners to pay all costs incurred in bringing the motion to intervene ( see, Stockler Co. v. Heller, 189 A.D.2d 601, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 936). However, while the' imposition of sanctions pursuant to 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 is a matter entrusted to the sound discretion of the IAS Court in the first instance ( see, Odette Realty Co. v. DiBianco, 170 A.D.2d 299), we find the sanctions imposed against counsel to be excessive and reduce them accordingly.
Concur — Ellerin, J.P., Nardelli, Rubin and Saxe, JJ.