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Claim of Musa v. Nassau County Police Department

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Oct 19, 2000
276 A.D.2d 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)

Opinion

October 19, 2000.

Appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Board, filed February 5, 1999, which ruled that decedent's death did not arise out of and in the course of his employment and denied claimant's application for workers' compensation death benefits.

Scheine, Fusco, Brandenstein Rada P.C. (Carl Saks of counsel), Woodbury, for appellant.

Vecchione Vecchione (Michael F. Vecchione of counsel), Williston Park, for Nassau County Police Department, respondent.

Before: Mercure, J.P., Crew III, Mugglin, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ.


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


Decedent, a police officer, committed suicide at home on September 18, 1992. Claimant, decedent's widow, filed an application for workers' compensation death benefits alleging that decedent's suicide resulted from work-related stress caused by the employer's use of improper practices to reprimand decedent and prevent his promotion. After a hearing a Workers' Compensation Law Judge established accident, notice and causal relationship, and awarded claimant benefits. However, upon review by the Workers' Compensation Board, the Workers' Compensation Law Judge's decision was reversed and the case closed upon the Board's finding that decedent's suicide was precipitated by an underlying depressive condition unrelated to any stress experienced by decedent at work. Claimant appeals.

Claimant contends that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because it was based in part upon the report of a medical expert whose testimony was precluded because of his failure to appear at the hearing. While we agree that the Board incorrectly relied upon the medical report in making the affirmative finding that decedent's depressive condition was not causally related to his employment (see, Matter of Bozier v. A P Shopwell, 263 A.D.2d 631, lv dismissed 94 N.Y.2d 814), we nonetheless conclude that the Board's decision denying claimant's application for benefits should be affirmed.

It is well settled that workers' compensation death benefits may be awarded for a suicide only where the suicide results from insanity, brain derangement or a pattern of mental deterioration caused by work-related injury (see, Matter of Kriete v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., 208 A.D.2d 1075; Matter of Friedman v. NBC Inc., 178 A.D.2d 774, 775). Although decedent's alleged depressive condition may qualify as a "brain derangement" permitting an award of death benefits (see, Matter of Kriete v. Port Auth. of N.Y. N.J., supra, at 1076), claimant still had the burden of establishing by competent medical proof that a causal relationship existed between decedent's employment and the depressive condition and resulting suicide (see generally, Matter of De Salvo v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 248 A.D.2d 897; Matter of Mitchell v. New York City Trans. Auth., 244 A.D.2d 723, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 809).

Here, the only medical evidence offered by claimant on the issue of causation was that provided by decedent's treating psychologist. Although the psychologist testified that decedent's suicide was causally related to employment stress, the Board rejected this opinion finding that it was based upon information provided by claimant and her attorney following decedent's suicide rather than the psychologist's purported independent recollection of treating decedent five years earlier. While acknowledging that the Board may not reject an uncontroverted medical opinion and fashion an expert opinion of its own (see, Matter of Knouse v. Millshoe, 260 A.D.2d 948), it is equally true that the Board is entitled to reject evidence as incredible, even if the evidence is the only proof offered on a particular issue (see generally, Matter of McCabe v. Peconic Ambulance Supplies, 101 A.D.2d 679, 680). Inasmuch as the Board found that the psychologist's opinion lacked evidentiary support in the record, the opinion had no probative value on the issue of causal relationship and the Board correctly declined to consider it (see, Matter of Freitag v. New York Times, 260 A.D.2d 748, 749).

Accordingly, since the record contains no credible medical proof to establish a causal relationship between decedent's suicide and his employment, the Board's decision denying claimant's application for benefits must be affirmed (see, Matter of Rosen v. First Manhattan Bank, 202 A.D.2d 864, 865, affd 84 N.Y.2d 856).

ORDERED that the decision is affirmed, without costs.


Summaries of

Claim of Musa v. Nassau County Police Department

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department
Oct 19, 2000
276 A.D.2d 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
Case details for

Claim of Musa v. Nassau County Police Department

Case Details

Full title:In the Matter of the Claim of NANCY MUSA, Appellant, v. NASSAU COUNTY…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Third Department

Date published: Oct 19, 2000

Citations

276 A.D.2d 851 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)
714 N.Y.S.2d 545

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