Opinion
December 2, 1985
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Dutchess County (Rosenblatt, J.).
Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs or disbursements, determination confirmed, and proceeding dismissed on the merits.
Petitioner was appointed as a temporary, part-time employee on October 27, 1982, pending his qualification for a permanent position by successfully completing a physical examination. On November 8, 1982, his status was changed to a temporary full-time employee. After passing the physical examination, petitioner was accorded permanent status, effective January 13, 1983 and subject to a maximum probationary period of one year. Thereafter, on January 6, 1984, petitioner's services were terminated.
We reject petitioner's contention that his probationary period began on November 8, 1982, the date on which he was switched to temporary full-time status. His probationary period began, according to Division policy, on the date that he passed the physical examination and became a permanent employee (see, 4 NYCRR 4.5 [a] [1]). This occurred on January 13, 1983, and his previous temporary appointment could not have ripened into a permanent appointment by that time (see, Marlow v Tully, 100 A.D.2d 786, affd 63 N.Y.2d 918, cert. denied ___ US ___, 105 S Ct 2708). Therefore, as of the date of his termination, i.e., January 6, 1984, petitioner was a probationary employee and subject to discharge without a hearing and without a statement of reasons, in the absence of any demonstration that dismissal was for a constitutionally impermissible purpose or in violation of statutory or decisional law (see, Matter of York v McGuire, 63 N.Y.2d 760, 761). No such demonstration has been made, and, upon review of the record, we find that petitioner's termination was not arbitrary or capricious (see, Matter of Bonney v Dilworth, 99 A.D.2d 468).
We have examined petitioner's remaining contention and find it to be without merit. O'Connor, J.P., Weinstein, Niehoff and Eiber, JJ., concur.