Opinion
September 26, 1961
Appeal by petitioner from an order of the Supreme Court at Special Term which dismissed the petition in a proceeding brought pursuant to sections 19-a and 16 of the City Home Rule Law and section 335 of the Election Law (1) to have determined the sufficiency and validity of petitions filed pursuant to subdivisions 1 and 6, respectively, of section 19-a of the City Home Rule Law by electors of the City of Glens Falls for amendment of the charter of said city to provide minimum salary schedules for members of the Police and Fire Departments, by adoption of a proposed local law set forth in said petitions and (2) to require the City Clerk to transmit the proposed local law to the election officers charged with the duty of publishing notice of the election. Upon the filing of the petition authorized by subdivision 1 of section 19-a, the City Clerk, acting pursuant to subdivision 4 of that section, certified that the petition did not comply with all the requirements of law "for the reason that two subjects are embraced, contrary to Section 13 subd. 3 of the City Home Rule Law." With respect to the additional petition subsequently filed pursuant to subdivision 6 of section 19-a, the clerk certified the same supposed defect. The clerk's certificate of noncompliance was erroneous in each instance as subdivision 3 of section 13 is inapplicable to a charter amendment, which "may deal with any number of subjects". (City Home Rule Law, § 2, subd. [5]; Matter of Yaras [ City of Albany], 283 App. Div. 214, affd. 308 N.Y. 864.) If we were, nevertheless, to adopt respondent's contention that subdivision 3 is in some way applicable, it would have to be held that but one subject is involved — the fixing of minimum salary schedules — and the facts that two city departments are involved and that there appear recitals of the purposes of the proposed legislation, as distinguished from its "subject", are clearly of no moment. (Cf. Burke v. Kern, 287 N.Y. 203, 213, 214; Conner v. Mayor, etc. of City of New York, 5 N.Y. 285, 297.) A second specification of noncompliance certified by the City Clerk with respect to the additional petition was properly overruled by Special Term and was not asserted upon the appeal. In rejecting the petitions as invalid, Special Term did not rest its decision upon the objections specified by the City Clerk or upon those pleaded, but held the petitions defective by reason of the inclusion in the title of the proposed law of language found to be "confusing and misleading" The title — in which we italicized the words thus characterized — is as follows: "A local law relating to the Police Department and to the Fire Department of the City of Glens Falls, for the purpose of establishing and enacting a minimum salary schedule to foster and promulgate the continuation in service and duty of officers and members of the Police and Fire Departments of the City of Glens Falls for the purpose of encouraging and rewarding the continuation of the members of such departments in service so as to secure for the City the benefits of such added experience, and further for the establishment in alignment with existing salary scales as paid in the year 1960 by other municipalities in the State of New York, and amending the following described sections and paragraphs of the Charter of the City of Glens Falls, New York." In reaching its conclusion, Special Term seems to have relied principally upon Gaynor v. Village of Port Chester ( 231 N.Y. 451); Matter of Dean ( 230 N.Y. 1) and Economic Power Constr. Co. v. City of Buffalo ( 195 N.Y. 286) but these cases are inapplicable, dealing, as each of them does, with the constitutional provision that "No private or local bill, which may be passed by the legislature, shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." (N.Y. Const., art. III, § 15 [formerly § 16].) (Italics supplied.) Comparable provisions appear in subdivision 3 of section 13 of the City Home Rule Law, to wit: "Every such local law shall embrace only one subject. The title shall briefly refer to the subject matter." These statutory provisions are likewise inapplicable to the charter amendment here proposed. (City Home Rule Law, § 2, subd. [5]; Matter of Yaras [ City of Albany], supra.) Assuming, however, that the principle underlying these constitutional and statutory provisions may properly be applied, the title here questioned would not, in our view, offend it. "The purpose of this provision was to prevent concealment and surprise to the members of the Legislature and to the public at large, and to prevent legislative `logrolling.' ( Economic Power Constr. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 195 N.Y. 286.) This is perhaps best illustrated by the occasion for the creation of this constitutional provision, which was added as a result of the success of Aaron Burr in persuading the Legislature to grant him a charter for a water company which had hidden among its provisions a clause enabling him to found a bank. ( Matter of City of New York [ Clinton Avenue], 57 App. Div. 166.)" ( Burke v. Kern, 287 N.Y. 203, 213, supra.) Here, the title clearly indicates and correctly describes the subject as the enactment of a minimum salary schedule and a reading of the proposed law will disclose nothing at variance therewith. That the title recites, whether diffusely or unnecessarily, a number of purposes — again as distinct from subject — is not enough to condemn the form of the projected act. (Cf. Matter of Yaras [ City of Albany], supra, p. 220.) It was suggested upon the argument that the disputed phrase might be considered to constitute unfair or inaccurate propaganda, but such is not a legal barrier to the electorate's right to consider and appraise the proposal upon its merits. Indeed, the local legislative body is required to "provide for suitable publication thereof and publicity thereon for the information of interested voters". (City Home Rule Law, § 19-a, subd. 8.) The conclusion which we have reached upon the merits renders unnecessary our consideration of appellant's contention that this particular objection, neither specified by the City Clerk nor pleaded by respondent, should not have been considered by Special Term nor argued here. An additional objection is addressed by respondent to the proposed deletion of a charter provision preserving certain rights of employees of the Fire Department of the former Village of Glens Falls but it is not, and could not very well be asserted that there are now any individuals in that category. We find no merit in respondent's additional contentions and none of them are such as to require discussion. Order reversed on the law and the facts and application granted in accordance with the prayer of the petition, without costs. Coon, J.P., Gibson, Herlihy, Reynolds and Taylor, JJ., concur.