Opinion
July 20, 1970
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered October 8, 1969 in New York County, which granted petitioner's application in a proceeding under CPLR article 78 to the extent of directing a reclassification of his position evaluation from Court Clerk II to Court Clerk III. The appeal was transferred to the Appellate Division, Third Department. Respondent has held a position as clerk in charge of Parts XII and XIII of the Supreme Court of Bronx County since 1964. This part handles all motions, arraignments, and sentencing in felony cases, in addition to probation violations and all aspects of youthful offender cases. Respondent is responsible for supervising the regular motion calendar, in addition to the pleading, sentence, miscellaneous and certified ready calendars. He is charged with handling the selection of the Grand Juries and with filing and entering their returns. In addition, he must evaluate the sufficiency of orders, search warrants, and certificates of reasonable doubt. Respondent is expected to be informed as to the current changes in criminal law and is often called upon by both prosecutor and defense counsel to resolve difficult procedural questions. Pursuant to a reclassification of nonjudicial employees of the Unified Court System of the City of New York in 1966, respondent was evaluated and classified as Court Clerk II. Court Clerk II performs the following duties: "Under direction performs administrative work or legal-technical work requiring a specialized knowledge of a complex area of procedural law and practice or a broad knowledge of the jurisdiction and functions of the court: acts as the supervisor of a large general office within the court with responsibility for coordinating the work of the various sections in the processing of legal papers from the commencement of an action through entry of judgment or disposition, execution of judgment and supplementary proceedings; acts as clerk in a large or complex trial or special term part, other than in the Supreme Court, acts as clerk of a trial part in the Supreme Court or as clerk of a lesser volume Special Term in that court; reviews papers and confers with attorneys on the more complex motions, applications, petitions and accounts and orders submitted to the court; reviews work of subordinates who make the initial examination of papers submitted to the court; may confer with judges on matters related to the work of the court; controls court calendars; may prepare orders and decrees for the signature of a judge; may direct an important central or administrative service function for the court." The duties of Court Clerk III are as follows: "Under general direction performs exceptionally difficult and highly responsible administrative and legal-technical duties as the supervisor of a very large, separate court location or a very large Special Term or comparable part or activity: coordinates the activities of the various parts and offices under his supervision to insure the efficient operation of the court; confers with attorneys on unusual or difficult problems of practice and procedure in the court; trains subordinates in special areas of practice and procedures; is responsible for review of motion papers, applications, petitions and orders submitted by attorneys and litigants; supervises preparation and control of court calendars; may supervise empanelling of jurors for the entire judicial district where volume of litigation is unsually great." Respondent appealed his classification both as to title and duty evaluation to the Special Classification Appeals Board on the ground that the title specifications more nearly placed his actual position and duties in the Court Clerk III designation rather than Court Clerk II. The Administrative Board of the Judicial Conference, the appellant, refused to change his converted title and position evaluation. However, it made no findings and otherwise failed to disclose the basis for its action. Respondent thereupon instituted this article 78 proceeding in the Supreme Court of New York County. Annexed to the petition were exhibits and the transcript of the hearing before the Special Classification Appeals Board, to the effect that petitioner was the supervisor of a "very large Special Term or comparable part or activity". Appellant's answer did not traverse these allegations, but averred that the act of classification is a matter of subjective determination and evaluation, and denied that its action was arbitrary or capricious. Special Term granted judgment without taking evidence, finding that appellant had advanced "No clear reason * * * for finding otherwise, so that its determination to refuse to reclassify petitioner's position clearly appears to be arbitrary or capricious." This proceeding concerns an administrative determination in the exercise of discretion, and such determination is sustainable if there be any rational basis for it ( Matter of Mandle v. Brown, 4 A.D.2d 283, 287, affd. 5 N.Y.2d 51). Specific findings of fact are unnecessary, but when the decision is challenged in court, the administrative agency must demonstrate the existence of a rational basis for its determination (cf. Matter of Forman v. New York State Liq. Auth., 17 N.Y.2d 224). No such showing has been made here. The underlying data upon which petitioner was evaluated and classified as Court Clerk II has not been supplied — only argumentative or conclusory assertions. On the other hand, on this record, it cannot be determined that the rejection of petitioner's reclassification appeal was arbitrary or capricious. The language of the job descriptions is not sufficiently clear that it could be determined, as a matter of law, simply by comparing the language, that petitioner is performing the work of the higher title. Evidence should be taken explaining or elaborating the meaning and effect of the job descriptions of the two titles. Additionally, inquiry should be made of the location and sizes of the various Special Terms or comparable parts, in order that a comparison may be made between Trial Term Parts XII and XIII of the Supreme Court of Bronx County and terms where the clerk in charge has been classified as Court Clerk III. Since factual issues have been raised, the proceeding should be remitted to Special Term to take evidence of the basis upon which appellant acted in evaluating and classifying petitioner's title as Court Clerk II. Judgment reversed, on the law, without costs, and proceeding remitted to Special Term for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith. Reynolds, J.P., Staley, Jr., and Greenblott, JJ., concur in memorandum by Greenblott, J.; Cooke and Sweeney, JJ., dissent and vote to affirm, in a memorandum by Cooke, J.
An article 78 proceeding in the nature of mandamus lies to correct an illegal or improper classification of positions in the public service ( Matter of Ainsberg v. McCoy, 26 N.Y.2d 56; 23 Carmody-Wait 2d, New York Practice, p. 639) and the classic judicial test in reviewing such a determination, involving the exercise by a public agency of judgment in the area committed to its discretion, is whether the determination is "arbitrary, tyrannical and unreasonable, or is based on false information" ( People ex rel. Lodes v. Department of Health, 189 N.Y. 187, 194; 8 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N.Y. Civ. Prac., par. 7803.10). CPLR 7804 (subd. [e]), as amended in 1965, provides: "The respondent shall also serve and submit with the answer affidavits or other written proof showing such evidentiary facts as shall entitle him to a trial of any issue of fact." The function of such affidavits is to establish respondent's right to a trial of such issues ( Yonkers Bus v. Maltbie, 23 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90, affd. 260 App. Div. 893). Here, the gist of the single affidavit submitted by respondent is that: "Upon a reading of the specifications of Court Clerk II and Court Clerk III, it is very easy to understand how persons may differ in the evaluation of the position herein involved. It becomes an individuals subjective determination and evaluation." This contention, conceding a purely subjective evaluation, is contrary to long established concepts of objectivity regarding appointments and promotions in the civil service of the State and its civil divisions (see N.Y. Const., art. V, § 6; art. VI, § 28; Civil Service Law, § 61; Judiciary Law, § 212; Matter of Mandle v. Brown, 5 N.Y.2d 51, 64; Matter of Andresen v. Rice, 277 N.Y. 271, 282). Since appellant has alleged no evidentiary facts contrary to those set forth in the petition, exhibits and record of the hearing before the Special Classification Appeals Board, and since conflicting inferences may not be drawn therefrom, a trial at Special Term is not warranted ( Matter of Madole v. Barnes, 20 N.Y.2d 169, 174; Matter of Rotkiewicz v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 283 App. Div. 458, affd. 307 N.Y. 847). Even on this appeal, appellant takes the same position, stating in his brief: "The act of classification is invariably a subjective process of evaluation, such as determining whether a person is acting 'under general direction' (Court Clerk III) or 'under direction' (Court Clerk II); or whether the work involved rises to the level of being 'exceptionally difficult and highly responsible' (Court Clerk III) or is rather 'legal-technical work requiring a specialized knowledged of a complex area of procedural law' (Court Clerk II). (Respondent-Appellant's Exhibit 1 * * *). Within the title specifications, there are virtually no tests which are objective in nature, but rather the grouping together under a common title relies basically on subjective evaluation." Neither does respondent indicate that there are other facts to be submitted at a trial nor is this a situation where neither party has included in the record the job description or a detailed survey of the work actually performed by petitioner (cf. Matter of Ainsberg v. McCoy, supra, p. 61). The evidentiary facts submitted by petitioner demonstrate that combined Parts XII and XIII of the Supreme Court, Bronx County, of which petitioner is the clerk, handle all motions, arraignments and sentences in felony cases. Additionally, these parts deal with: all aspects of youthful offender cases, probation violations in felony matters, pleadings, different calendars, the impaneling of Grand Juries, their returns, search warrants, orders, certificates of reasonable doubt, pleas, processing of applications for assignment of counsel, contempt proceedings, bail applications, habeas corpus and extradition proceedings. The clerk's duties are detailed and volume figures related. Combined Parts XII and XIII have petitioner and two clerks, sometimes three, under his supervision, whereas a trial part usually has but one clerk. Exhibits, consisting of letters from Justices experienced in these combined parts, besides factual content, without contradiction, variously refer to the parts in question as "too much for one Judge", "in effect the clearing house for all the work done in the criminal division, Supreme Court, Bronx County" and "comparing the work which comes into Parts XII and XIII with the trial parts, there is no question but that the Clerk in Parts XII and XIII has more responsibility and must possess a greater degree of knowledge in order to properly operate those parts." Another states that the Administrative Judge is in complete agreement with petitioner's evaluation as Court Clerk III. While the position specifications reveal subtle distinctions and an overlapping of functional descriptions, nevertheless, in designating the areas where the functions are to be performed, objective criterions have been supplied which permit a differentiation between Court Clerk II and Court Clerk III. All evidentiary facts submitted indicate that combined Parts XII and XIII, in which petitioner functions, fit the description of "a very large Special Term or comparable part", as incorporated into the definition of Court Clerk III. The classification, admittedly based on a subjective evaluation and disregarding undisputed objective norms and practices, was arbitrary. The judgment should be affirmed, without costs.