Opinion
December 28, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Golden, J.).
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs payable by the State Commissioner, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Kings County, for a new determination on the motion in accordance herewith.
The record reveals that the petitioner's proceeding seeking a restoration of her grant of Aid to Families with Dependent Children included various claims, some of which would warrant an award of counsel fees if the petitioner prevailed and some for which an award of counsel fees would not be available (see generally, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1988). The parties thereafter entered into a stipulation of settlement whereby the petitioner obtained a full restoration of benefits, thus forestalling an adjudication of the merits of her various claims. The stipulation of settlement failed to recite the legal grounds upon which it was based. The petitioner then sought an award of reasonable counsel fees, contending that she had prevailed on a claim cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Supreme Court, Kings County, denied the application. We now reverse.
The petitioner's recovery of substantial relief pursuant to the aforementioned settlement renders her a prevailing party within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (see, Maher v Gagne, 448 U.S. 122; Matter of Misuraca v Perales, 120 A.D.2d 592; Matter of Haussman v Kirby, 96 A.D.2d 244). Moreover, because the petition asserted some claims which are cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the settlement failed to set forth the grounds upon which the petitioner's recovery was premised, the petitioner has established her prima facie entitlement to an award of counsel fees, and this court will not go behind the settlement to examine the merits of her various claims (see, Maher v Gagne, supra; cf., Matter of Misuraca v Perales, supra).
Upon remittitur, the Supreme Court, Kings County, must consider whether there are any special circumstances in this case which would render an award of counsel fees unjust, and if not, the court should determine the reasonable counsel fees to which the petitioner is entitled in accordance with the principles set forth in Matter of Rahmey v Blum ( 95 A.D.2d 294; see, Matter of Humphrey v Gross, 135 A.D.2d 634; see also, Matter of Johnson v Blum, 58 N.Y.2d 454; Matter of Torres v Perales, 121 A.D.2d 386; Matter of Klapak v Blum, 97 A.D.2d 764, affd 65 N.Y.2d 670). The payment of any award is the sole responsibility of the State Commissioner (see, Matter of Unger v Blum, 117 A.D.2d 607; Matter of Carabello v Perales, 117 A.D.2d 598). Thompson, J.P., Rubin, Eiber and Sullivan, JJ., concur.