Opinion
June 1, 1987
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Molloy, J.).
Ordered that the order is modified, as a matter of discretion, by deleting the provisions thereof which granted those branches of the motion which were to vacate the provisions of the judgment entered July 30, 1985, with respect to the 1985/1986 school year, and substituting therefor provisions denying those branches of the motion and reinstating those provisions of the judgment; as so modified, the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The judgment entered July 30, 1985 in this matter was vacated by Special Term on the ground that it was based upon this court's decision in Matter of Walker v Board of Assessors ( 103 A.D.2d 580, affg 118 Misc.2d 467) which was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals ( 66 N.Y.2d 702, rearg denied 66 N.Y.2d 1036). No appeal was taken from the judgment entered July 30, 1985.
We find that the statutory authority provided to the courts under CPLR 5015 (a) (5) to relieve a party from a judgment as a result of a later "reversal, modification or vacatur of a prior judgment or order upon which it is based" does not apply to the instant proceeding. Where a decision provides the precedent for a later determination but does not have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect with respect to the subsequent determination, the later reversal of the prior decision does not provide a basis for relief under CPLR 5015 (a) (5) (cf., Lubben v Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd. No. 27, 453 F.2d 645, 650; Wallace Clark Co. v Acheson Indus., 394 F. Supp. 393, 395, n 4, affd 532 F.2d 846, cert denied 425 U.S. 976, reh denied 427 U.S. 908; 5 Weinstein-Korn-Miller, N Y Civ Prac ¶ 5015.11). In the matter before us, the Walker decision served only as precedent for the judgment entered July 30, 1985, and, therefore, CPLR 5015 (a) (5) does not provide a vehicle for relief from that judgment.
However, CPLR 5015 does not provide the only basis for affording parties relief from a judgment. The courts have the inherent power to set aside a judgment upon the application of any party upon appropriate grounds (see, McMahon v City of New York, 105 A.D.2d 101, 104-105). This is a proper case for the exercise of the court's inherent power in the furtherance of justice. The Board of Assessors of the County of Nassau is entitled to relief from the judgment to the extent that it was directed therein to cancel exemptions granted to properties under Real Property Tax Law § 485-b for the 1986/1987 school year and any subsequent years (see, Matter of McAuliffe v Board of Assessors, Sup Ct, Nassau County, Aug. 4, 1986, Harwood, J.). We modify the order appealed from accordingly. Mangano, J.P., Thompson, Kunzeman and Sullivan, JJ., concur.