Summary
In Matter of Dolbeer (226 N.Y. 623) the provision of the amendment of 1915 to section 220 of the Tax Law in relation to intangible property was construed, the court saying in a per curiam opinion: "When the joint account is created subsequent to the adoption of the statute, the privilege of acquiring the entire property by the right of succession may be subjected to the tax on the method of acquisition.
Summary of this case from Matter of CossittOpinion
Argued April 9, 1919
Decided April 22, 1919
Schuyler C. Carlton, Lafayette B. Gleason and Llewellyn A. Wray for appellant.
Edward S. Clinch for respondent.
This appeal presents the question: Is the entire amount of a joint bank account in the name of husband and wife, payable to the survivor, created subsequent to the taking effect of chapter 664 of the Laws of 1915, taxable on the death of the husband? An appeal from a final order is not an appeal where questions should be certified as provided by the Code of Civil Procedure (§ 190, subd. 3), and it is unnecessary to answer the question certified.
In Matter of McKelway ( 221 N.Y. 15) it was held that even when the joint account was created prior to the adoption of the statute, the transfer by survivorship was taxable to the extent of one-half the joint property. When the joint account is created subsequent to the adoption of the statute, the privilege of acquiring the entire property by the right of succession may be subjected to the tax on the method of acquisition. ( Matter of Vanderbilt, 172 N.Y. 69, 73; Matter of Keeney, 194 N.Y. 281; 222 U.S. 525.) The right to take property by survivorship is the creation of law upon which the state may impose conditions ( Matter of Dows, 167 N.Y. 227; Matter of White, 208 N.Y. 64, 67), if no vested or contract rights are thereby violated.
The record does not disclose who furnished the money which was deposited to the joint credit. Nothing indicates that the succession in this case was not donative in character ( Matter of Orvis, 223 N.Y. 1, 7), and we may well reserve consideration of the application of the statute to a case where the survivor had previously acquired his interest for value.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs in this court and in the Appellate Division, and the proceeding remitted to the Surrogate's Court for the purpose of imposing a tax in accordance with this opinion.
HISCOCK, Ch. J., CHASE, HOGAN, CARDOZO, POUND, McLAUGHLIN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur.
Order reversed, etc.