Opinion
NO: 97-3811 Section: "J"(3)
October 23, 2000
Before the court is a MOTION TO REOPEN EXONERATION FROM OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY PROCEEDING ON BEHALF OF JEAN R. HAWKSLEY WIFE OF/AND WILLIAM H. HAWKSLEY AND TO PERMIT FILING OF ANSWER AND CLAIM (Rec. Doc. 66), filed by Jean R. Hawksley and William H. Hawksley. Global Industries Offshore, Inc. and Global Pipelines Plus, Inc. (collectively "Global") oppose the motion. The motion, set for hearing on August 30, 2000, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument. For the following reasons, the motion is regrettably denied.
FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 9, 1997, the crewboat M/V CHRISTOPHER ran aground near the entrance to the main pass of Bayou Baptiste Collette. William H. Hawksley ("Hawksley"), a pipeline inspector employed by MPC International, Inc. ("MPC"), was a passenger aboard the CHRISTOPHER. Several passengers notified Global, the vessel's owner and operator, of injuries they sustained as a result of the grounding, but Hawksley was not among them.
On December 8, 1997, Global filed for exoneration from or limitation of liability in this Court and posted a bond in the amount of $850,000. The Court set a claims bar date of January 16, 1998. In accordance with the notice provisions of Rule F and by order of this Court, Global published a notice of the limitation action, along with pertinent deadlines, in the Times-Picayune newspaper. Global also served personal notice of the limitation action on all persons who had already filed a damage claim following the CHRISTOPHER's grounding. Four individuals filed claims in the limitation proceeding, and on July 7, 1998, the Court entered an order of default as to all other potential claimants.
The limitation action was filed pursuant to 46 U.S.C. § 181-185, 188 and Rule F of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In January 1999, the parties attended a settlement conference, and shortly thereafter, reached a settlement resolving the claims of the four claimants in the limitation action. On March 5, 1999, this Court, upon joint motion of all parties, entered an order dismissing the limitation action. At no time before dismissal did Hawksley attempt to file a claim in the limitation action, and it is undisputed that Global did not have actual notice of his intent to pursue a claim for damages.
On July 8, 1999, approximately four months after the Court dismissed the limitation action, Hawksley filed suit against Global in the state district court for Plaquemines Parish. In February 2000, that suit was dismissed without prejudice when Global informed Hawksley's counsel of the limitation action that had proceeded in this Court. On June 29, 2000, well over a year after the Court dismissed the limitation proceeding, Hawksley filed the instant motion seeking to file an answer and assert a claim in the limitation action.
DISCUSSION
Supplemental Admiralty Rule F gives a district court discretion to allow a party to file a claim in a limitation proceeding after the claims bar date has passed. Supp. R. F(4); Lloyds Leasing Ltd. v. Bates, 902 F.2d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Blue Stack Towing Co., 313 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1963)). In Golnoy Barge Co. v. M/T Shinoussa, 980 F.2d 349 (5th Cir. 1993) (per curiam), andTexas Gulf Sulphur, supra, the Fifth Circuit established "guideposts" to assist district courts in exercising their discretion to allow or refuse late claims under Rule F. Accordingly, a district court ruling on a motion to file a late claim in a limitation proceeding should consider (1) whether the proceeding is pending and undetermined, (2) whether granting the motion will adversely affect the rights of the parties, and (3) the claimant's reasons for filing late. Golnoy, 980 F.2d at 351. "[R]elief from a tardy claim is not a matter of right — [i]t depends on an equitable showing." Id. (quoting Texas Gulf Sulphur, 313 F.2d at 363) . Clearly then, it is within the district court's discretion to permit the filing of a "late claim," i.e., one filed after the claims bar date but while the limitation action is still pending.
Rule F(4) of the Supplementary Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims provides in part that "[f]or cause shown, the court may enlarge the time within which claims may be filed."
In this case, the limitation proceeding is not pending and undetermined — it was settled and dismissed well over a year before Hawksley filed the instant motion. However, Hawksley argues that equitable considerations militate toward allowing his claim because Global failed to notify him of the limitation action even though his identity as a passenger aboard the CHRISTOPHER was readily ascertainable. He also points out that his failure to take affirmative action against Global is understandable because he was receiving workers' compensation benefits from MPC. Finally, he points out that no prejudice will inure to either Global or any of the other claimants because he has reason to believe that their claims were paid by Global's insurers, and therefore allowing his claim, would not dilute the limitation fund to the prejudice of more timely filed claims.
In opposition, Global asserts that it had no duty to personally serve Hawksley with notice of the limitation action because he was not a "person asserting a claim" within the meaning of Rule F(4). Further, Global asserts that it would face great prejudice were the Court to reopen the limitation proceeding because, contrary to Hawksley's belief, the entire $850,000 limitation fund was expended in payments to the four claimants who timely filed and settled the case. Global also points out that it would be prejudiced by having to litigate issues that it chose to resolve by way of settlement. Thus, it would lose the benefit of the bargain that it gained by settling the matter.
Hawksley concedes that there is an absence of authority to show that a claimant can assert a claim in a limitation action after the proceeding has terminated. The Court, through exhaustive research, unearthed three decisions involving a claimant's attempt to reopen a terminated limitation action, and all three were detrimental to Hawksley's cause.See Complaint of Gulf Inland Marine Corp., 1998 WL 560342 (E.D. La. 1998); Complaint of American President Lines LTD., 1980 AMC 1872 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Dowdell v. United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 139 F. 444 (9th Cir. 1905).
In Gulf Inland Marine, a fairly recent case, the district court denied claimant's motion to reopen a limitation proceeding eight months after the court had entered a final judgment. 1998 WL 560342, at *2-3. The court employed the Golnoy Barge analysis, and concluded that claimant had failed to present any equitable facts militating in favor of reopening the proceeding. Id. Further, the court found that allowing claimant to file his claim would adversely affect the rights of Gulf Inland Marine because its exposure would go from "nil" to "over $275,000." Id.
Similarly, the facts of the instant case satisfy none of the factors pronounced by the Fifth Circuit in Golnoy Barge. First and foremost, the limitation proceeding is not pending and undetermined. To the contrary, it was dismissed and terminated well over a year ago. And unlike the claimant in Gulf Inland Marine, Hawksley has not filed his claim within one year of the termination so as to possibly have availed himself of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief of judgment.
Second, allowing Hawksley's claim to, proceed will surely have an adverse effect on Global. While Hawksley claims that the limitation fund was paid by Global's insurer, he has introduced no evidence to support such a contention. On the contrary, Global has introduced evidence to show that it has in fact paid the limitation fund in excess of its limit. See Affidavit of John Richard Fitzgerald, Global's Exhibit 14.
Finally, Hawksley's motion is completely void of any equitable facts to justify his extreme tardiness in filing a claim at this time. This is especially perplexing in light of the fact that he alleges severe injuries for which his employer's insurer has been providing coverage.
As to Hawksley's argument that he was entitled to actual notice of the proceeding, nothing in the record suggests that Global was aware of his injuries until he filed suit in state court after the limitation proceeding had already terminated. He concedes that he never notified Global of his injuries and dealt exclusively with his own insurer. Further, Global followed all of the procedures for notification under Rule F(4) by publishing notice of the claims bar deadline in the local news papers and by providing actual notice to those who had already asserted a claim when the limitation action was filed. See Rule F(4)
To be sure, the Court is sympathetic to Hawksley's plight and it is with much regret that the Court denies him the relief he seeks. But given the extremely dilatory nature of Hawksley's claim and the absence of anything to suggest bad faith on the part of Global, the Court declines to reopen this proceeding absent some supporting legal authority. Accordingly,
The Court also notes that Hawskley filed the instant motion and claim on June 29, 2000, which was within the three year statute of limitations for maritime claims. Accordingly, but for the limitation action, Hawksley's claim would have been timely.
IT IS ORDERED that Hawksley's Motion to Reopen Exoneration From or Limitation of Liability Proceeding on Behalf of Jean R. Hawksley Wife Of/and William H. Hawksley And to Permit Filing of Answer And Claim should be and is hereby DENIED.
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