Opinion
Argued March 27, 1981
Decided May 12, 1981
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department, CON. G. CHOLAKIS, J.
Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Alan W. Rubenstein and Shirley Adelson Siegel of counsel), for Barbara Blum, as Commissioner of the New York State Department of Social Services, appellant. Robert G. Lyman, County Attorney (Alan P. Joseph and Philip R. Murray of counsel), for John Fahey, as Commissioner of the Albany County Department of Social Services, appellant.
V. Jerome Luhn for respondent.
MEMORANDUM.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, without costs, and the petition dismissed.
The Appellate Division concluded that, in computing a family's entitlement to public assistance benefits, the Department of Social Services must disregard any OASDI (Old-Age, Survivors' and Disability Insurance) benefits received by a family member between the ages of 18 and 22 who is currently attending school on a full-time basis. This conclusion was based, in part, upon an "Action Transmittal — Interpretation" issued by the Department of Health and Welfare which directed State agencies to disregard such income in accordance with the decision in Elam v Hanson ( 384 F. Supp. 549). Inasmuch as the applicable Federal statutes plainly mandate a contrary conclusion, we hold that the decision of the Appellate Division must be reversed.
An "Action Transmittal — Interpretation" is a bulletin sent to the State agencies by the Department of Health and Welfare to advise them of current Federal policy and departmental views regarding the proper application of the public assistance laws. In the instant case, the parties have raised some question as to whether an "Action Transmittal — Interpretation" has the same status as a formal regulation, notwithstanding that it has not been published in advance in accordance with the Federal Administrative Procedures Act (compare U.S. Code, tit 5, § 553, subd [b], with U.S. Code, tit 5, § 553, subd [a], par [2]; see, also, Rodriguez v Swank, 318 F. Supp. 289, affd 403 U.S. 901). Nevertheless, we deem it unnecessary to resolve this dispute, since the rationale underlying our decision in this case applies equally to official regulations and less formal administrative pronouncements by the Federal agency concerning the applicability and effect of Federal law. We note, however, that although the Department of Health and Welfare regards an "Action Transmittal — Interpretation" as having a somewhat lesser status than a formal regulation, it nevertheless considers the former to be as binding upon State agencies as the latter ("Action Transmittal", SSA-AT-78-28, Department of Health and Welfare, July 11, 1978).
As a general rule, Federal law requires State agencies to take into consideration any income or resource of eligible family members in determining the family's need (US Code, tit 42, § 602, subd [a], par [7]; see Social Services Law, § 131-a, subd 1). Under existing Federal regulations, most Social Security payments are to be treated as income for this purpose ( 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 [a] [4] [i]). Thus, although prior to 1965 individuals over the age of 18 were not eligible to receive Social Security benefits, State social service agencies have always been directed to deduct the Social Security benefits received by their younger counter-parts in determining the family's public assistance need.
In 1965, Congress enacted the statute at issue in this case, which extended Social Security benefits to dependents between the ages of 18 and 22 who attend school on a full-time basis. (Public Law 89-97, § 306, 79 U.S. Stat 370, codified at U.S. Code, tit 42, § 402, subd [d], par [1], cl [B], subdcl [i]). Contrary to the assumption made in the court below, there is absolutely no evidence that Congress intended to require State social service agencies to treat the payments authorized under the new statute any differently than they had been treating the Social Security benefits received by family members under the age of 18. Indeed, the evidence points in the opposite direction. Had Congress not assumed that the newly authorized payments would be regarded as income for public assistance purposes, it would not have found it necessary to add section 406 of the act, which enables State agencies to disregard the lump-sum, retroactive payments that were to be received by the designated eligibles as a result of the legislation, "[ n] otwithstanding the provisions of" section 602 (subd [a], par [7] [emphasis supplied]; see Report of the Senate Finance Committee in Relation to Public Law 89-97, No. 404, reprinted in 1965 U.S. Code, Cong and Admin News 1943, 2089, 2212). Obviously, if Congress had intended to mandate that all of the benefits paid under the act be disregarded, there would have been no need for it to specify that the retroactive portion of the payments may be disregarded at the election of the States.
Although the legislation was not actually enacted until July of 1965, Congress specifically provided that the newly authorized benefits would be payable "after December, 1964" (Public Law 89-97, § 306, subd [d]). Thus, the statute expressly contemplated the retroactive payment of benefits.
We are aware that the Department of Health and Welfare, the Federal agency charged with administering the Social Security Act, has embraced a contrary interpretation of the applicable statutes and has directed the State social service agencies to comply with its views. We are also aware that the public assistance portion of the Social Security Act represents a "`scheme of cooperative federalism'" (Matter of Jones v Berman, 37 N.Y.2d 42, 52, quoting King v Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316), which ordinarily requires States electing to participate in the program to comply with the relevant Federal regulations (Hagans v Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 530, n 1; Matter of Dunbar v Toia, 45 N.Y.2d 764, 766; Matter of Beaudoin v Toia [ Jorczak], 45 N.Y.2d 343, 348; see Social Services Law, § 358, subd 1). We cannot, however, agree with petitioner's contentions that the "scheme of cooperative federalism" implicit in the public assistance system requires States to adhere blindly to all Federal directives, no matter how irrational or inconsistent with applicable Federal law. In instances such as this, where the Federal agency's interpretation manifestly "runs counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision" (Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 N.Y.2d 451, 459), as well as the underlying legislative intent, we think that the State agency is entitled to rely upon the Congressional mandate despite the existence of a contradictory directive issued by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. We find it significant in this connection that the Federal agency is itself limited to promulgating rules and regulations which are "not inconsistent with" the provisions of the Social Security Act (US Code, tit 42, § 1302).
We similarly reject petitioner's contention that our court lacks the power to go beyond the mere enforcement of the Federal rule in this case and to inquire into the underlying validity of the Federal rule in issue. This contention is based upon a line of cases in which it was held that State courts have no subject matter jurisdiction to review Federal administrative orders (Fieger v Glen Oaks Vil., 309 N.Y. 527, 533-534; Wasservogel v Meyerowitz, 300 N.Y. 125, 133-134; Matter of Armand Schmoll, Inc. v Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y., 286 N.Y. 503; but see Leighton v Bearman, 302 N.Y. 865 ). Whatever the continuing vitality of these cases (cf. Bodrick v Mayfair Constr. Corp., 38 N.Y.2d 926, cert den 429 U.S. 825), however, we cannot agree with petitioner that their holdings should be applied in a unique context such as this, where the States clearly have been given authority concurrent to that of the Federal agency to implement and enforce the provisions of Federal law.
We recognize that our holding today may engender certain practical difficulties due to the disparity between the interpretation adopted by the State commissioner and approved by this court and the interpretation of Federal law which the Department of Health and Welfare has adopted. Since the States are generally required to administer their public assistance programs in a manner which conforms to the requirements of the Social Security Act and Federal regulations lawfully promulgated thereunder (US Code, tit 42, §§ 601-604), the State commissioner may actually be risking a loss of Federal funds by adhering to an interpretation of law which varies from that adopted by the Federal agency (see Hagans v Lavine, supra, at p 530, n 1). Nonetheless, although we remain concerned with the practical consequences of our decision, we cannot permit our concerns to dissuade us from deciding the controversy at hand — whether the petitioner, who has placed her dispute before the New York courts, is, in fact, entitled to the benefits she seeks under existing Federal law. If, as a practical matter, our negative answer to this question places the State of New York at odds with the Federal Department of Health and Welfare, the State is presumably sufficiently equipped to seek an ultimate resolution of the dispute in a more appropriate, Federal forum.
I would affirm the disposition below and decline the invitation of the State and local Departments of Social Services to invalidate the Federal "Action Transmittal — Interpretation" on which that disposition was premised.
I do not doubt the jurisdictional power of our court to review and invalidate the ruling of the Federal agency; I do question the jurisprudential wisdom of our court's exercising that power in the circumstances of this case. The administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, indeed even the availability of Federal moneys to support the administration and benefits of that program in our State, depends on our State's maintaining conformity with the requirements and conditions laid down by the Congress as implemented by regulations and rulings of the Department of Health and Welfare, the Federal agency charged with administrative responsibility for the program.
Proper respect for and the application of the principle of judicial abstention dictate constraint on the part of State courts before proceeding to the invalidation of regulations and rulings of a Federal agency. Experience demonstrates that there is a continuing resonance, sometimes tension, between the State and Federal agencies with respect to the details and particulars of State administration of the Federally sponsored program. After approval of the basic State plan, there continues almost constant communication and negotiation by correspondence and conference between representatives of the two governmental agencies. Practical resolutions and accommodations are sometimes postponed for substantial periods of time.
In my view, when an impasse is reached, calling for judicial resolution, the appropriate forum for such proceedings is the Federal court. Both agencies may then be made parties to the proceedings, with full opportunity to be represented and to be heard. Invalidation, if any, would be binding and conclusive nationwide.
When, as has the majority in this case, a State court accepts the invitation of its own State agency to invalidate a ruling of the Federal agency there necessarily is an unfortunate component of nonfinality giving rise to practical uncertainty. The Department of Health and Welfare obviously is not bound by this court's decision in this case. It will be wholly free to insist on recognition in the State of New York of the ruling today held invalid, by recourse to administrative sanctions including at the extreme withholding of Federal moneys. Certainly our ruling can have at best only persuasive impact on the application of the Federal ruling in other States. Aside from what I perceive as consequential awkwardness, I regard it as unwise and inconsistent with sound judicial principle to invalidate a ruling of the responsible Federal administrative agency in an action between an individual welfare recipient and the State and local agency without having the benefit of a full exposition of the views of the agency responsible for promulgating and enforcing the particular ruling with respect to the merits of the challenge to the ruling at issue.
It would be unfortunate if this case were to set a precedent for State and local Departments of Social Service, at odds with their Federal counterpart, to diminish welfare benefits in violation of Federal regulations or rulings thought by them to be objectionable in the expectation that judicial challenge would be mounted in State rather than Federal courts.
Accordingly, I would vote to affirm the disposition below on the principle of judicial abstention, without reaching or considering the merits of the challenge to the Federal ruling.
Chief Judge COOKE and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, WACHTLER, FUCHSBERG and MEYER concur in memorandum; Judge JONES dissents and votes to affirm in an opinion.
Order reversed, etc.