Opinion
Argued April 29, 1999
June 14, 1999
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 3, the appeal is from an order of disposition of the Family Court, Queens County (Fitzmaurice, J.), dated October 1, 1997, which, upon a fact-finding order of the same court, dated January 1, 1997, made after a hearing, finding that the appellant had committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted the crimes of sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, and sexual abuse in the second degree, adjudged him to be a juvenile delinquent and placed him with the New York State Division of Youth for a period of 18 months.
Monica Drinane, New York, N.Y. (Nancy Botwinik of counsel), for appellant.
Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Francis F. Caputo and Dona B. Morris of counsel), for respondent.
DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, DANIEL F. LUCIANO, HOWARD MILLER, JJ.
DECISION ORDER
ORDERED that the order of disposition is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The trial court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in allowing the six-year-old complainant to testify as a sworn witness, as he had " 'some conception' of the obligations of an oath and the consequences of giving false testimony" ( People v. Parks, 41 N.Y.2d 36, 46, quoting People v. Washor, 196 N.Y. 104, 109). Although he gave perfunctory answers to the questioner's sometimes leading questions, his testimony, as a whole, demonstrated that he understood that he had a moral duty to tell the truth ( cf., People v. Brill, 245 A.D.2d 384; People v. Maldonado, 199 A.D.2d 563; People v. Ranum, 122 A.D.2d 959). He knew the difference between the truth and a lie, knew that he would be punished if he did not tell the truth, and stated that he would tell the truth in court.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the presentment agency ( cf., People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620; see, Matter of Stephanie F., 194 A.D.2d 789), we find that it was legally sufficient to support the fact-finding order. Resolutions of issues of credibility, as well as the weight to be accorded to the evidence, are primarily questions to be determined by the trier of fact, which saw and heard the witnesses ( cf., People v. Gaimari, 176 N.Y. 84, 94). Its determination should not be disturbed unless clearly unsupported by the record ( cf., People v. Garafolo, 44 A.D.2d 86, 88; see, Matter of Stephanie F., supra). Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we find that the finding of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( cf., CPL 470.15).
The appellant's remaining contentions are without merit.