Matter of Adams v. Tersillo

Full title: In the Matter of CAROL S. ADAMS, Appellant, v. FRANK TERSILLO, Respondent

Court: Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, Second Department

Date published: Dec 15, 1997

245 A.D.2d 446 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997)

666 N.Y.S.2d 203

Opinion

December 15, 1997

Appeal from the Family Court, Orange County (Kiedaisch, J.).

Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, by deleting from the 18th decretal paragraph thereof the words "Neither party shall directly or indirectly make statements to each other, or any other persons, which are derogatory of the other party" and substituting therefor the words "While in the presence of one or both of their children or those who are in contact with their children, with the exception of the parties' respective lawyers and therapists, neither party shall directly or indirectly make statements which are derogatory of the other"; as so modified, the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs to the appellant.

An injunctive order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order ( Carroll v. President Commrs. of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181). The State may not employ "means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved" ( Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488). "In other words, the order must be tailored as precisely as possible to the exact needs of the case" ( Carroll v. President Commrs. of Princess Anne, supra, at 184).

In the instant case, in an attempt to protect the parties' children from the adverse affect of the parents' disparaging remarks about each other, the Family Court restricted the parties from making any derogatory statements about each other to any other person. This prior restraint on speech is overbroad and the court's objective could have been more narrowly achieved. Therefore, the order is modified by prohibiting the parties from making derogatory statements concerning each other in the children's presence or in the presence of those who have contact with the children.

The appellant's remaining contention lacks merit.

Mangano, P.J., Santucci, Joy and Lerner, JJ., concur.