Opinion
February 3, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Hutcherson, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
The petitioner's motion for renewal of her application for leave to serve a late notice of claim was not made until after the expiration of the applicable Statute of Limitations. Consequently, it was untimely as a matter of law and the Supreme Court had no authority to exercise its discretion to grant the motion (see, General Municipal Law § 50-e; Pierson v. City of New York, 56 N.Y.2d 950; Myrick v. County of Suffolk, 139 A.D.2d 633; Siahaan v. City of New York, 123 A.D.2d 620). We note in this regard that the motion was one to renew rather than to reargue, and it did not relate back to the date of the initial application (see, Guastamacchia v. New York City Dept. of Transp., 162 A.D.2d 587; Matter of Rieara v. City of New York Dept. of Parks Recreation, 156 A.D.2d 206; Matter of Lopez v. City of New York, 123 A.D.2d 765; Thomas v. City of New York, 102 A.D.2d 867).
In any event, given the lack of adequate proof that the delay was caused by the petitioner's physical condition and that the respondent would not be prejudiced by the late service, we conclude that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the petition (see, e.g., Matter of Perry v. City of New York, 133 A.D.2d 692; Carroll v. City of New York, 130 A.D.2d 702). Thompson, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and O'Brien, JJ., concur.