Summary
In Matter of Abrams v Ronan (36 N.Y.2d 714) the Court of Appeals held that the Bronx Borough President could not sue the directors of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority except in compliance with section 394 of the New York City Charter. Similarly in Lamberti v Metropolitan Transp. Auth. (170 A.D.2d 224, 225) the First Department held that the refusal of the Corporation Counsel to bring an action did not give the Borough President "`implied authority'" to retain counsel and bring his own action.
Summary of this case from Hevesi v. PatakiOpinion
Argued February 11, 1975
Decided March 19, 1975
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department, JOSEPH A. BRUST, J.
Richard Rifkin for appellant.
John G. de Roos, Robert R. Prince, Helen R. Cassidy and James P. McMahon for respondents.
MEMORANDUM. Petitioner-appellant appeals from an order of the Appellate Division, First Department, which affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his petition. The record conclusively establishes that the petitioner has instituted this proceeding solely in his capacity as the President of the Borough of The Bronx and has been represented by an individual who holds the position of counsel to the President of The Bronx. We affirm the dismissal of the petition on the grounds that petitioner proceeds in contravention of subdivision a of section 394 of the New York City Charter which vests in the Corporation Counsel the "charge and conduct of all the law business of the city and its agencies". In addition the petition fails to state a cause of action for denial of equal protection of the laws.
The Appellate Division order should be affirmed, without costs.
Chief Judge BREITEL and Judges JASEN, GABRIELLI, JONES and WACHTLER concur in a memorandum; Judge COOKE concurs in result in the following memorandum in which Judge FUCHSBERG concurs: I concur in the result, solely on the ground that appellant as the Borough President is not aggrieved and therefore did not have standing. Had appellant proceeded as an individual, which he stated he did not, I would have arrived at a different conclusion in regard to dismissal at this juncture.
Order affirmed.