Opinion
CASE NO. 516 CRD-5-86
JUNE 14, 1988
The claimant was represented by Laurence V. Parnoff, Esq.
The respondent-Second Injury Fund was represented by Michael J. Belzer, Esq., Assistant Attorney General. The respondent-estate was not represented.
This Petition for Review from the September 26, 1986 Finding and Award of the Commissioner At Large acting for the Fifth District was heard February 26, 1988 before a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Robin Waller and Gerald Kolinsky.
FINDING AND REMAND
Paragraphs 1 through 11 of the Commissioner At Large acting for the Fifth District's September 26, 1986 Finding are affirmed and adopted as the Finding of this Division.
However, the matter is remanded for further proceedings concerning the equivalent monetary value of room and board furnished the employee by the employer.
OPINION
Claimant, a household employee, was involved in an automobile accident August 9, 1984 while on an errand for her employer. As a result, she received an injury to her lower back. Sarah Dember, the employer, died October 13, 1984. Claimant filed a notice of claim July 8, 1985 with the Fifth District and with the attorney representing the Estate of Sarah Dember. The Waterbury Probate Court by an order published November 22, 1984 had set February 14, 1985 as the final date for presentation of claims against the estate.
By his Finding and Award September 26, 1986 the trial Commissioner found Claimant had suffered an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment. He awarded benefits and set her compensation rate at $240.00 weekly based on a $360.00 average weekly wage. At the time of injury Claimant was being paid a $250.00 weekly monetary wage, but she was also receiving weekly room and board. The commissioner set $110.00 as the value of the room and board.
The Second Injury and Compensation Assurance Fund, because of its potential liability under Secs. 31-351, C.G.S. and 31-355, C.G.S. appeared below to contest the claim, and it is the appellant here. It disputes (1) the commissioner's jurisdiction to enter an award as no claim was presented against the estate of the employer by February 14, 1985, (2) the orders against the estate since the estate was not the employer and (3) the $240.00 weekly compensation rate as no evidence was presented as to the reasonable value of room and board.
Neither the trial Commissioner nor this tribunal is a court of general jurisdiction. Our authority is basically limited to chapter 568 matters. We therefore will make no pronouncements concerning Sec. 45-205, C.G.S. and whether under Sec. 45-205 (b), C.G.S. a workers' compensation claim may be a right of action accruing "after the time limited for the presentation of claims". But we do have jurisdiction to determine whether our own statute for limitation of claim has been observed. Sec. 31-294, C.G.S. obligates employee making a claim to "forthwith notify his employer, or some person representing the employer, of such injury . . .". That same statute also provides, "No proceedings for compensation . . . shall be maintained unless a written notice of claim for compensation given within one year . . . . Such notice may be given to the employer or any commissioner . . . ". Claimant here gave such notice well within the year both to the Fifth District Commissioner and to a representative of the employer. Therefore, for workers' compensation purposes the injury claim was timely filed
Sec. 45-205. Effect of time for presenting claims to fiduciary. Effect of failure to present claim. Orders re extension of time. Amount of claim. Exceptions. (a) The court of probate may order the citation of the creditors of the deceased whose estate is in settlement before it to bring in their claims against such estate within such time, not more than twelve months nor less than three months, from the date of such order, as it limits, by publishing a notice to that effect in a newspaper having a circulation in the probate district in which such estate is in settlement and by such further notice as the court deems necessary.
(b) If any creditor fails to exhibit his claim to the fiduciary or his attorney as directed in such order, within the time limited by such order, he shall be barred of his demand against such estate; but, when a right of action accrues after the time limited for the presentation of claims, it shall be exhibited within four months after such right of action accrues and shall be paid out of the estate remaining after the payment of the debts exhibited within the time period.
As to the second issue, i.e. that the estate was not the claimant's employer, there was abundant evidence that Sarah Dember was the employer. The employer's liability for benefits devolved to her estate when Sarah died as that liability was an obligation of the deceased "cast upon (her) by law", Smith v. New Haven, 21 Conn. Sup. 395, 396 (1959).
Instead, Respondent's third objection concerning the lack of any evidence on which to base a finding of equivalent monetary value for room and board seems well taken. Our careful examination of the December 20, 1985 and March 27, 1986 hearing transcripts discloses no testimony on this point. A remand is therefore necessary for the hearing of such evidence.
We affirm the first eleven paragraphs of the September 26, 1986 Finding but sustain the appeal and remand for further proceedings only on the specific issue of the equivalent monetary value of the weekly room and board.
Commissioners Robin Waller and Gerald Kolinsky concur.